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10 Chapter 1
1.1 Background and Purpose Statement
This dissertation investigates how the quality of auditing of financial statements relates 
to the regulatory context in which audits are performed. Auditing is the process of 
providing assurance about the reliability of the information contained in financial 
statements prepared in accordance with generally accepted accounting principles 
(Knechel 2001). Auditing is also a professional service delivered by experts in response to 
economic and regulatory demand (Knechel et al. 2013). Many stakeholders are basing 
economic decisions on information in companies’ financial statements. Those users of 
financial statements, which include capital providers such as shareholders and creditors, 
and other stakeholders such as suppliers, customers and employees, need those statements 
to provide reliable information regarding the company’s financial position. Usually, 
they are not in a position to evaluate the reliability of the financial statements, because 
they do not have access to the underlying data, they lack the skills to do so, and it would 
be too costly. Therefore, they have an information disadvantage compared to the 
company’s management. The interests of company’s management, which is responsible 
for providing the information, and the users of that information, may not be aligned. In 
fact, it is widely agreed that these interests are often conflicting: while users of financial 
statements require relevant and reliable information, company’s management may have 
incentives, for instance personal bonuses, to present the information more favorably. 
Auditors are the independent professionals hired to provide a competent and objective 
opinion on the reliability of the information. In doing so, they improve the quality of 
that information and reduce the information disadvantage of the users of financial 
statements. Auditors thus operate primarily in the public interest. 
 At the same time, auditors are operating in a system with incentives that may 
negatively influence the quality of the audits they perform (AFM 2014). First, they are 
paid by the companies whose financial statements they audit but from whom they need 
to be independent. The auditor has to balance the public interest of performing an 
objective and critical audit and the client company’s interests of providing high-level 
service to retain the client’s business. Second, an audit can be considered a credence 
good: the quality of an audit is practically unobservable, both for the users of financial 
statements and the audited company (Causholli and Knechel 2012). Only the auditor 
has both access to all the underlying information and the expertise and the professional 
judgment needed to plan and perform the audit in accordance with the professional 
auditing standards. Neither the users of financial statements nor the audited company 
are able to assess whether the auditor made the right decisions during the audit. In the 
end, they are also unable to assess whether the audit has reduced the risk of material 
misstatements in the financial statements to an acceptably low level. Third, auditors 
have organized themselves in audit firms and are performing audits as a commercial 
business enterprise with an aim of making a profit. Besides audit, they are also providing 
other services to clients and they are collaborating with other professionals within their 
firm or their network, e.g., tax and management consultants, and legal experts. Auditors 
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need to balance their own business objectives, e.g., growth, efficiency and profit 
maximization, with the objectives for audit quality set by regulation. 
 The incentives that may negatively influence the quality of audits have created 
the need for professional standards and regulation to ensure a constant and adequate 
level of auditing. Auditing is, or has become, a highly regulated profession. International 
legislators (e.g., the European Union) and regulators (e.g., the International Auditing 
and Assurance Standards Board (IAASB) and the International Ethics Standards Board for 
Accountants (IESBA)), as well as national legislators and regulators (e.g., professional 
bodies) have defined a wide spectrum of requirements for the auditing profession. Those 
requirements are on the one hand focused at the individual auditor level. For instance, 
auditors need to follow a predetermined educational track consisting of both theoretical 
and practical training, and take part in appropriate programs of continuing education in 
order to maintain their theoretical knowledge, professional skills and values at a 
sufficiently high level and to attain and maintain their audit qualification. Professional 
bodies keep register of qualified auditors. Registered auditors are further required to 
comply with applicable professional ethical standards, including independence 
regulations, and auditing standards. On the other hand, requirements are focused at the 
audit firm level. Audit firms are responsible for establishing and maintaining systems of 
quality control that include policies and procedures that provide them with reasonable 
assurance that: (a) the firm and its personnel comply with professional standards and 
applicable legal and regulatory requirements; and (b) reports issued by the firm or 
engagement partners are appropriate in the circumstances. Initially, peer review systems 
were employed to have audit firms or auditors assess each other’s quality control systems 
and quality of audit files.
 A number of large audit failures and accounting scandals in the early 2000s (e.g., 
Enron, WorldCom, Xerox, Ahold, and Parmalat) have severely undermined public 
confidence in auditors and their reports. Worldwide, regulators have responded by 
increasing their regulatory focus on audit firms in the course of the last fifteen years. 
Three of those regulatory topics are at the heart of this dissertation: the introduction of 
independent public oversight, the strengthening of auditor independence, and the 
development of audit quality indicators to increase audit firm transparency.
 One of the most fundamental changes in the history of the auditing profession is 
the installment of independent public oversight bodies in many countries in the first 
decade of the 21st century, replacing the auditing profession’s self-regulatory peer review 
system. This regulatory move was triggered by the high-profile corporate failures, which 
made regulators believe that the peer review system was no longer adequate and 
appropriately functioning. Independent public oversight was proposed instead as an 
alternative way of organizing audit oversight with the goal of restoring confidence in and 
safeguarding the public function of the auditing profession and the quality of its work.
 At the same time, regulators around the world started to tighten independence 
requirements, or considered to do so, in an attempt to improve audit quality and to 
regain public trust in the auditors’ reports. Many countries introduced a ban on (most) 
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other services for audit clients that were considered public interest entities (PIEs; i.e., 
listed companies, credit institutions and insurance companies). Furthermore, in 
addition to the individual partner rotation requirements already in place, audit firm 
rotation was considered or even already introduced. These initiatives are indicative of a 
commonly shared belief that auditors’ and audit firms’ independence must be further 
strengthened, not only in fact, but also in appearance, in order to safeguard audit 
quality. 
 Audit firm governance (i.e., the audit firm’s governance structure, quality control 
policies, human resource policies, independence and ethics) became an increasingly 
important issue on the agenda of regulators. The governance of an audit firm is expected 
to have a significant influence on the audit quality delivered by (the auditors of) that 
firm. Increasing the transparency of those governance and professional practices, 
particularly in the form of publishing audit quality indicators, is high on the regulators’ 
agendas. Transparency of audit firms through audit quality indicators is believed to 
increase market participants’ ability to observe audit quality, thus enabling dif feren-
tiation and competition among audit firms on the basis of publicly available data, and 
providing incentives for firms to increase audit quality (e.g., Bedard et al. 2010; PCAOB 
2015). 
 The purpose of this dissertation is to empirically assess how these regulatory 
topics (i.e., public oversight, auditor independence, and audit quality indicators) relate 
to audit quality. Exploiting the unique access to proprietary data on audit firms from the 
Dutch public oversight body, this dissertation contributes to the existing literature on 
these topics by shedding new light on various audit quality aspects. 
 Prior literature provides guidance on how to approach audit quality research by 
suggesting how to define and measure audit quality. Users, auditors, regulators, and 
society—all stakeholders in the financial reporting process—may have very different 
views as to what constitutes audit quality (Knechel et al. 2013), resulting in different 
definitions to be found in the auditing literature. First, the quality of audit services can be 
defined as the market-assessed joint probability that a given auditor will both (a) discover 
a breach in the client’s accounting system, and (b) report the breach (DeAngelo 1981b; 
Watts and Zimmerman 1983). The probability that a given auditor will discover a breach 
depends on the auditor’s technological capabilities, the audit procedures employed on a 
given audit, the extent of sampling, etc. The conditional probability of reporting a 
discovered breach is a measure of an auditor’s independence from a given client. 
Alternatively, one might conclude that a ‘good’ audit is one where there is execution of a 
well-designed audit process by properly motivated and trained auditors who understand 
the inherent uncertainty of the audit and appropriately adjust to the unique conditions 
of the client (Knechel et al. 2013). From yet another perspective, higher audit quality can 
be defined as greater assurance that the financial statements faithfully reflect the 
company’s underlying economics, conditioned on its financial reporting system and 
innate characteristics (DeFond and Zhang 2014). Finally, audit quality can be considered 
a complex concept which is impossible to reduce to a simple definition, and it can be 
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argued there are gradations of audit quality across a continuum from low- to high-quality 
audits, and that quality is affected by each of the following units of analysis (Francis 
2011, 126): (a) audit inputs; (b) audit processes; (c) accounting firms; (d) audit industry 
and audit markets; (e) institutions; and (f) economic consequences of audit outcomes.
 The three studies in this dissertation build upon these definitions and suggested 
units of analysis in their examination of the relationship between the three regulatory 
topics and audit quality. 
1.2 Three Empirical Studies
This dissertation includes three empirical studies on how the previously described 
regulatory topics (i.e., public oversight, auditor independence, and audit quality 
indicators) relate to audit quality. All three studies exploit the unique access to proprietary 
data on audit firms from the Dutch public oversight body, thereby contributing to the 
existing literature on these topics by shedding new light on various audit quality 
aspects. 
 Chapter 2 presents the first study, which is about public oversight and audit 
quality. In this chapter, the effectiveness of public oversight in the Netherlands is 
examined by testing whether (a) the public oversight body can differentiate audit quality 
in its first-time inspection round, and (b) audit quality improves after the first-time 
inspection round. Specifically, the study focuses on whether there is an association 
between the outcome of the first-time inspections (i.e., ‘material findings’ or ‘no material 
findings’) and the level of earnings quality, and any subsequent change in earnings 
quality, of companies audited by the inspected audit firms. In additional analyses, it is 
examined what types of deficiencies are most able to differentiate audit quality. 
Furthermore, by means of comparison, prior peer review outcomes of audit firms are 
examined whether these appropriately distinguish and improve audit quality. Data on 
inspection outcomes, types of deficiencies, and peer review outcomes are obtained from 
the proprietary files of the Dutch public oversight body. These data are complemented 
with public financial statement data. 
 Chapter 3 presents the second study relating to auditor independence and audit 
quality. More specifically, the association is examined between the existence of an audit 
firm-client business relationship and audit quality, inferred from both audit fees and 
earnings quality. In 2011, the Dutch public oversight body performed an exploratory 
review regarding the independence of audit firms with a license to perform audits for 
PIEs. The public report that was published after this review shows, amongst other things, 
that audit firms maintain business relationships with various audit clients. The identified 
business relationships can be characterized as business relationships in which the audit 
firm purchases goods or services from an audit client. The existence of such a business 
relationship may constitute an independence threat for which the Code of Ethics (IESBA 
2013) prescribes the application of the conceptual framework: audit firms and auditors 
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Abstract
Despite the significant amount of resources spent on public oversight of the auditing 
profession, there is little evidence on whether a public oversight body can differentiate 
audit quality. We address this question using proprietary data on first-time inspections 
by the Dutch public oversight body. Further, we examine whether audit quality improves 
after the first inspection round. We show that client companies of an audit firm with 
material findings in its inspection report have lower earnings quality than companies 
audited by a firm without material findings. These results hold for audit firms with and 
without public interest entities (PIEs), except for the group of smallest non-PIE audit 
firms. We find that deficiencies related to engagement performance and documentation, 
independence and quality reviews are most able to distinguish audit quality. In contrast 
to U.S. evidence, we do not find support for an improvement in audit quality after the 
first inspection round. Our study contributes to the emerging literature on the 
effectiveness of oversight of audit firms, and is one of the first that relates to a non-U.S. 
setting.
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2.1 Introduction
One of the most fundamental changes in the history of the auditing profession is the 
replacement of self-regulatory peer reviews by independent public oversight. It was 
triggered by a number of high-profile corporate failures and concerns that the self-
regulated peer review system lacked credibility and failed to assure audit quality (Fogarty 
1996). Independent public oversight was proposed instead as an alternative way of 
organizing audit oversight with the goal to restore confidence in and safeguard the public 
function of the auditing profession. Oversight authorities supervise the compliance with 
rules and regulations, perform inspections and investigations in order to identify 
insufficient audit quality, and impose sanctions accordingly. Carcello et al. (2011) argue 
that independent public oversight has some structural advantages over self-regulatory 
peer reviews: inspectors are expected to be more independent and more objective, having 
more inspection expertise, and devoting more attention and resources to the supervision 
process. DeFond (2010), however, argues that the shift from a peer review system to 
independent public oversight may be associated with a trade-off of expertise for 
independence. Given these opposing arguments, and the significant amount of resources 
that is spent on public oversight, its functioning and ability to appropriately distinguish 
and improve audit quality becomes an important empirical question, which we address 
in this paper. 
 While there is an emerging literature in the U.S. on the impact of PCAOB inspec-
tions on audit firm behavior and potential market consequences (e.g., Nagy 2014; 
DeFond and Lennox 2011; Lennox and Pittman 2010a), studies addressing this basic 
empirical question are surprisingly limited. Research outside the U.S. on public oversight 
is even more scant despite the fact that many national oversight bodies have been 
operational since a number of years. One of the main impediments is the lack of public 
data on public oversight bodies’ findings (Maijoor and Vanstraelen 2012). In this study, 
we make use of proprietary access to first-time inspection outcomes on audit firms of the 
Dutch public oversight body (AFM), which were used for granting audit firm licenses. 
First-time inspection outcomes are particularly interesting to examine the suggested 
trade-off of expertise for independence. 
 The purpose of the study is to examine the effectiveness of the Dutch public 
oversight body by testing (a) its ability to discriminate audit quality for the population of 
audit firms requiring a license, and (b) whether audit quality improves after the first-
inspection round. In additional analyses, we examine what type of deficiencies are most 
able to differentiate audit quality. Our study relates to both publicly listed and private 
companies since independent public oversight in the Netherlands entails the entire 
statutory audit market comprising both type of companies. Furthermore, by means of 
comparison, we examine whether the prior peer review outcomes of audit firms 
appropriately distinguished and improved audit quality. Collectively, this allows to 
further complement current data and insights from the U.S. on audit quality differentiation 
by independent public oversight bodies. Of note, in contrast to the PCAOB, the AFM did 
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not initially target low-quality audit firms which would raise concern on the represen-
tativeness of the dataset to address our empirical questions (DeFond 2010). Rather, it 
relates to all audit firms with at least 10 audit clients. 
 Based on a sample of first-time inspection reports of 51 audit firms covering over 
85 percent of the statutory audit market in the Netherlands, and relating to 6,609 client 
company-year observations over the years 2005-2008, we find that companies audited 
by firms with material findings in its first-time inspection by the public oversight body 
have lower earnings quality than companies audited by audit firms without material 
findings. This finding holds for audit firms with and without PIE (public interest entities) 
clients2, except for the group of smallest non-PIE audit firms. However, our evidence does 
not provide support for an improvement in audit quality after the first inspection round. 
This finding is in contrast to U.S. evidence suggesting an improvement in audit quality 
after PCAOB inspections (Carcello et al. 2011; Gramling et al. 2011). Further, we find that 
the types of deficiencies identified by the public oversight body that are most able to 
distinguish audit quality are related to the performance and documentation of audit 
engagements, independence, and quality reviews. These findings contribute to existing 
U.S. research on public oversight for which the public portion of the PCAOB inspection 
report typically does not disclose quality control problems. Furthermore, it is consistent 
with the emphasis that is currently placed by standard setters and regulators (e.g., EC, 
IAASB, PCAOB) on audit firm governance, quality control, and auditor independence to 
safeguard audit quality. Finally, we find no support for an association between the prior 
peer review outcomes of audit firms and earnings quality of client companies. We also fail 
to find support that audit quality improved after peer review outcomes. 
 The contribution of our study is two-fold. First, we contribute to the limited 
literature on the effectiveness of an independent public oversight body in differentiating 
and improving audit quality. Second, we contribute to the literature by examining what 
types of deficiencies in audit firms identified by the public oversight body are most able 
to differentiate audit quality. Overall, our findings contribute to the emerging literature 
on the inspection process of public oversight bodies, and we are one of the first to 
examine this in a E.U. setting. 
 The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we des-
cribe the regulatory changes to the institutions responsible for monitoring audit firms in 
the U.S., Europe, and the Netherlands in particular. Further, we give an overview of the 
insights from prior research studying the effectiveness of self-regulation and independent 
oversight as mechanisms for audit quality monitoring. In the third section, we develop 
our hypotheses. Our research design and sample are described in the fourth section. The 
results of our study are presented in the fifth section. In the sixth section, we perform an 
additional analysis using prior peer review data. Finally, we provide a discussion and 
conclusion of our findings in the final section.
2 Public interest entities are stock listed companies, insurance companies, and credit institutions 
(banks). 
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2.2 Background 
2.2.1 Regulation of the Auditing Profession
One of the legislative responses to the loss of public confidence in the audit process 
following the high-profile scandals in the U.S. and Europe in the early years 2000 was to 
put an end to the era of self-regulation of the auditing profession. With the im plemen-
tation of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in the U.S., all accounting firms that issue an audit 
report for an SEC-reporting company or substantially participate in the audit are required 
since 2004 to be registered with the PCAOB, performing periodic independent inspections 
of these firms. Other countries around the world (e.g., Australia, Canada and Japan) have 
followed the U.S. example of installing independent public oversight.
 In Europe, the revised 8th E.U. Directive (2006) put an end to self-regulation of the 
auditing profession in all E.U. member states, and member states were given two years 
(up to June 2008) to implement the provisions of the new Directive. European public 
oversight authorities now have ultimate responsibility for approval and registration of 
audit firms, quality control of audit firms and auditors, continuous education of auditors 
and investigative and disciplinary actions against audit firms. 
 The Netherlands was one of the first European countries to set up an independent 
public oversight system for all audit firms performing statutory audits.3 Since October 
2006, public oversight of the auditing profession in the Netherlands is regulated by the 
Audit Firms Supervision Act (AFS Act 2006). The AFS Act delegates the oversight of audit 
firms performing statutory audits to the Netherlands Authority for the Financial Markets 
(AFM), an independent authority which reports to the Dutch Ministry of Finance. Under 
the AFS Act, all audit firms need to apply for a license granted by the AFM to perform 
statutory audits in the Netherlands, and become subject to continuous inspections. The 
AFS Act contains quality control requirements for audit firms that are primarily based on 
the ‘International Standard on Quality Control 1’ (IAASB 2009b). The applicable quality 
control requirements at firm and engagement level are summarized in Exhibit 1. All the 
inspections conducted in the license approval process are carried out by non-practicing 
staff employed by the AFM. The first-time inspections consisted of desktop reviews and 
on-site inspections of audit firms with at least 10 audit clients. The purpose of these 
inspections was to verify the audit firm’s compliance with all legal requirements and 
professional standards, and to identify any material deficiencies in the audit firm’s 
quality control system and/or audit files on client engagements. The inspections had two 
3 A statutory audit is de!ned in the Audit Firms Supervision Act (AFS Act) as “an audit of the !nan-
cial accounts of an enterprise or institution serving a social purpose, that has been made manda-
tory by or pursuant to the statutory provisions stated in the appendix to this Act”. "is includes 
the audits of all public companies and private companies that meet two out of the following three 
criteria: a) turnover over € 7.3 million, b) total assets over € 3.65 million, and c) number of em-
ployees over 50 (applicable to the time period studied in this paper). Furthermore, this includes 
the audits of several !nancial enterprises, municipalities, provinces, and certain governmental 
agencies. 
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possible initial overall outcomes: ‘no material findings’ and ‘material findings’. These 
initial outcomes were communicated with the respective audit firms at the end of the 
on-site inspection before the final decision on the license application was made. In case 
of no material findings, the audit firm was considered of sufficient quality and it was 
communicated that a license to perform statutory audits would be granted at a later date. 
In case of material findings, the audit firm was considered to be of low(er) quality. If the 
deficiencies were considered to be correctable within the short term, the audit firm was 
given time to make the necessary improvements. If the improvements subsequently 
proved to be satisfactory, the audit firm would be granted a license. If the deficiencies 
were not considered to be correctable within the short term, the license application 
would be rejected.4 
2.2.2 Prior Literature5
Studies performed in the U.S. show that peer review opinions are related to perceived and 
actual audit quality but also that not all peer reviews are objective and that some firms 
were able to control peer review outcomes by choosing ‘friendly’ reviewers (e.g., Hilary 
and Lennox 2005; Casterella et al. 2009; Anantharaman 2012). 
 Similar to the work of Hilary and Lennox (2005) on the credibility of peer reviews, 
Lennox and Pittman (2010a) test whether the inspection reports issued by the PCAOB 
provide credible information to clients about audit firm quality, and find that audit 
firms’ market shares appear to be insensitive to the content of the PCAOB reports. At the 
same time, DeFond and Lennox (2011) show that the PCAOB inspection regime 
incentivized small low quality audit firms to exit the public audit firm market. Abbott et 
al. (2013) find that the clients of GAAP-deficient, triennially inspected auditors are more 
likely to dismiss these auditors in favor of triennially inspected auditors that are not 
GAAP-deficient. Since the PCAOB recently started to disclose quality control deficiencies 
which were not appropriately addressed within a year, Nagy (2014) finds that audit firms 
do lose market share following the public disclosure of quality control criticisms. 
Similarly, Dee et al. (2011) show a negative market reaction to PCAOB sanctions imposed 
upon a Big 4 audit firm for which quality control problems were disclosed. 
 Research on the empirical question whether the public oversight body is able to 
appropriately distinguish and improve audit quality is limited and focused on the 
PCAOB. In a recent working paper, Aobdia (2015) relates PCAOB engagement specific 
deficiencies to commonly used measures of audit quality in the literature, and finds that 
several of these measures are predictive of audit deficiencies. Gunny and Zhang (2013) 
4 Most audit !rms make use of the opportunity to appeal the decision to reject a license. If the audit 
!rm makes further improvements during this (legal) process, the AFM is bound to take these 
improvements into consideration and grant a license if the audit !rm has demonstrated that it 
complies with all relevant requirements. 
5 For an overview of the literature on public oversight, we refer to O$ermanns and Vanstraelen 
(2014).
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Exhibit 1
   Description of Quality Control Requirements
Audit Firm Level
General policies  
and procedures
Audit firms are required to design a system of quality control to provide the 
firm with reasonable assurance that the firm and its personnel comply with 
professional standards and regulatory and legal requirements, and that 
reports issued by the firm or engagement partners are appropriate in the 
circumstances. The system of quality control is usually laid down in the audit 
firm’s quality manual, which consists of policies, procedures, descriptions, 
and standards.
(Control) structure A majority of the voting rights in the audit firm shall be held by and a majority 
of the members of the administrative or management body of the audit firm 
must be persons that satisfy the requirements in regard to the competence of 
auditors. Furthermore, the formal or actual control structure of the audit firm 
shall not represent an obstacle for effective oversight.
Good repute All members of the audit firm’s administrative and/or management body 
(policymakers and co-policymakers) should be of good repute. (Since none of 
the audit firms included in our sample had material findings regarding the 
good repute of their (co-)policymakers, the ‘good repute’ requirement is left 
out of the further analyses).
Integrity The audit firm should establish integrity policies and procedures designed to 
prevent the involvement of the audit firm, the auditors or other employees of 
the audit firm in criminal offences and infringements of the law, and 
relationships with clients that could be detrimental to confidence in the 
audit firm or in the financial markets.
Independence If an audit firm or any other part of the network maintains relationships with 
an audit client or a third party affiliated to that audit client that could 
represent a threat to the independence of the audit firm vis-à-vis either the 
audit client or the third party, the audit firm must apply safeguards to ensure 
its independence by eliminating or reducing such a threat. If such safeguards 
are not feasible, the audit firm shall not accept the assignment, or shall 
terminate the assignment.
Client account 
records
An audit firm shall maintain a systematic, accessible and up-to-date set of 
client account records, which include per audit client the name and full 
business address of the audit client, whether the audit client is a public 
interest entity, the name of the responsible auditor, and the fees charged for 
the statutory audit and the fees charged for other services rendered in any 
financial year.
Acceptance and 
continuance of 
audit engagements
Before accepting or continuing an assignment for an audit, an audit firm 
must determine whether the firm and its auditors comply with all applicable 
requirements, whether it has the specialist employees, time and resources 
required to perform the audit in an appropriate manner, and the integrity of 
the audit client.
(Human) resources An audit firm shall provide the auditor with such time, resources and 
personnel as he needs to carry out his task in an appropriate manner.
Consultation An audit firm will ensure that, where necessary for the proper conduct of an 
audit, the responsible auditor consults subject-matter specialists. The audit 
firm will ensure that the responsible auditor documents the subject and 
conclusions of such a consultation.
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Engagement 
quality control 
review
The firm should establish policies and procedures requiring, for all audits for 
PIEs and for all other audits that meet the criteria as set out by the firm, an 
engagement quality control review that provides an objective evaluation of 
the significant judgments made by the engagement team and the conclusions 
reached in formulating the audit report. The engagement quality control 
review should be performed by a certified auditor and be completed before 
the audit report is issued.
Monitoring and 
internal inspections
An audit firm shall ensure compliance with its system of quality control and 
it will carry out an annual evaluation of its system of quality control, including 
a periodic inspection of a selection of completed engagements. Audit firms 
that perform audits for public interest entities must appoint a compliance 
officer. 
Duty of care The audit firm shall ensure that its auditors comply with the requirements in 
regard to their competence, independence, objectivity, integrity, and 
reporting of reasonable assumptions of fraud.
Audit Engagement Level
Professional 
skepticism
The auditor should plan and perform an audit with an attitude of professional 
skepticism recognizing that circumstances may exist that cause the financial 
statements to be materially misstated.
Sufficient appropriate 
audit evidence
The auditor should obtain sufficient appropriate audit evidence to be able to 
draw reasonable conclusions on which to base the audit opinion.
Audit trail The audit files should provide an accurate and coherent reproduction of the 
various phases of the audit process: the engagement acceptance or 
continuance, the audit approach, the audit plan, the risk analysis, the 
performance of audit procedures, the findings, the conclusions, and the 
audit opinion.
Fraud In planning and performing the audit to reduce audit risk to an acceptably 
low level, the auditor should consider the risks of material misstatements in 
the financial statements due to fraud. An auditor who, during the performance 
of an audit, is given access to data or information which justifies the reasonable 
assumption of fraud of substantial importance in regard to the financial 
accounts of the audit client, will report this assumption to an investigating 
official.
Notes: The quality control requirements in this exhibit are derived from the legal requirements in the Audit 
Firms Supervision Act (Articles 14-31), the Decree on the Supervision of Audit Firms (Articles 8-38), and the 
International Standards on Auditing (i.e., ISA 200, 230, 240, and 500).
Exhibit 1 - continued
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provide some empirical support that PCAOB reports are able to discriminate audit quality 
for triennially inspected audit firms, but fail to find evidence that PCAOB inspection 
reports distinguish audit quality for annually inspected audit firms. Carcello et al. (2011) 
provide preliminary evidence that the quality of audits provided by Big 4 firms improved 
after the first and second inspection rounds. Gramling et al. (2011) find that there is a 
higher likelihood that triennially inspected audit firms with PCAOB audit deficiencies 
will issue a going-concern opinion to a financially distressed client company subsequent 
to their inspection than before. 
 Apart from De Fuentes et al. (2010) showing that sanctioned auditors by the 
Spanish Institute of Accounting and Auditing exhibit lower average audit quality than 
non-sanctioned auditors, there is very limited insight on the effectiveness of peer reviews 
and independent public oversight outside the U.S. The purpose of this paper is to 
contribute to the emerging literature on the effectiveness of public oversight by providing 
insights from a non-U.S. setting.
 
2.3 Development of Hypothesis 
To assure high quality inspections, inspectors must have both the expertise to capture 
actual audit quality and the necessary independence to report the outcome of their 
inspections objectively (FEE 2006). The long-standing debate in the economics literature 
between self-regulation and government regulation (Peltzman 1976; Stigler 1971) is 
characterized by an alleged trade-off of expertise for independence associated with the 
switch from peer reviews to independent public inspections. Since independent full-time 
inspectors have no personal or employment relationship with the audit firms they 
inspect, concerns on inspectors’ independence are mitigated. It can, however, be very 
challenging for full-time inspectors of an oversight body to have or maintain their 
knowledge of professional developments and their understanding of day-to-day business 
and audit techniques. Therefore, the expertise of the inspectors performing the quality 
reviews is of utmost importance to obtain high quality inspections. To assure the 
technical competence of the Dutch AFM inspectors, all employed inspectors have on 
average 10 to 15 years of relevant experience in the auditing profession. Furthermore, 
before starting the license application inspections, the inspectors have received extensive 
training to ensure their knowledge of recent regulatory and professional developments. 
We therefore expect the public oversight inspectors to have both the expertise and the 
necessary independence to distinguish between high and low quality audit firms in the 
first-time inspections. 
 While the public oversight body communicates inspection outcomes at audit firm 
level, we formulate our hypotheses and measure audit quality at the client-firm level for 
a number of reasons. First, GAAP and GAAS deficiencies identified by the public oversight 
body at the audit engagement level will lead to material findings at the audit firm level. 
Second, as Carcello et al. (2011) argue and as outlined in the quality control requirements 
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(see Exhibit 1), the inspection process is expected to identify deficiencies in how firms 
plan and perform audits at the audit engagement level. Third, we follow prior studies on 
the effectiveness of PCAOB audit firm inspection reports, measuring audit quality at 
client firm level (e.g., Carcello et al. 2011; Gramling et al. 2011; Gunny and Zhang 2013; 
Aobdia 2015).
  Hence, we test the following hypothesis:
  H1:  Audit quality is lower for client companies of audit firms with material 
   findings in the first-time inspections compared to client companies of audit 
   firms without material findings in the first-time inspections. 
  Being able to differentiate between audit firms with high and low audit quality is 
the basic premise but only one aspect of the effectiveness of a public oversight body. To 
be able to subsequently improve audit quality is arguably even more important. In line 
with Carcello et al. (2011), we would expect that the detailed inspections and reported 
findings offer possibilities to audit firms to improve audit quality subsequent to these 
inspections by taking corrective actions. Furthermore, audit firms to which the public 
oversight body communicated material findings are likely to have stronger incentives to 
take corrective actions compared to audit firms without material findings. Hence, we 
would expect that the improvement in audit quality will be more pronounced for audit 
firms with deficient inspection reports after the first-time inspections, and formulate the 
following hypotheses: 
 H2a: Audit quality for client companies improves in the post-inspection 
  period compared to the pre-inspection period.
 H2b: Audit quality improves more for client companies of audit firms with mat- 
  erial findings than for client companies of audit firms without material 
  fin dings in the post-inspection period compared to the pre-inspection 
  period.
 However, these expectations may prove to be premature in the Dutch setting. The 
initial first-time inspection outcomes were only communicated confidentially to the 
respec tive audit firms and no public audit firm-specific reports were published. 
Furthermore, most audit firms with a substantive audit practice eventually received a 
license. Both factors may have limited the sense of urgency to improve as perceived by 
the audit firms involved. In fact, subsequent generic inspection reports published by the 
AFM have shown a persistent insufficient audit quality in the audit files reviewed.6 
6  In 2010 the AFM published a report regarding the audit quality and quality control monitoring 
of Big 4 audit !rms. "e AFM concluded that approximately 52 percent of the 46 statutory audits 
for the !nancial year 2008 it reviewed in the course of the inspection to be of insu&cient quality 
(AFM 2010). In 2013, the AFM concluded that approximately 74 percent of the 47 statutory audits 
for the !nancial years 2010-2011 it reviewed in the course of the inspection of nine other audit 
!rms with PIE clients to be of insu&cient quality (AFM 2013a). Also in 2013, the AFM concluded 
that approximately 80 percent of the 110 statutory audits for the !nancial year 2012 it reviewed in 
the course of the inspection of 50 audit !rms with only non-PIE clients to be of insu&cient quality 
(AFM 2013b). In 2014, the AFM published a report with the conclusion that statutory audits 
performed by the Big 4 audit !rms were still too o'en of insu&cient quality (i.e., 45 percent of 40 
reviewed audits) and that quality improvement measures taken in the prior period had proven 
ine$ective (AFM 2014). 
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2.4 Research design
2.4.1 Empirical Model
Dependent Variable
As a proxy for audit quality, we use abnormal accruals. Earnings quality measures, such as 
abnormal accruals, are designed to capture financial reporting quality which should 
arguably be the ultimate goal of the auditor to improve (DeFond and Zhang 2014). 
Furthermore, the descriptive analysis of Roybark (2009) on the type of deficiencies 
identified by the PCAOB documents that common deficiencies relate to accounting for 
inventory and/or cost of sales, cash and cash equivalents and marketable securities, 
revenue recognition and accounts receivable. All of these accounts affect the magnitude 
of accruals. This is also reflected in the findings of Aobdia (2015) showing that abnormal 
accruals at client-firm level are predictive of engagement-specific deficiencies identified 
by the PCAOB. As larger accruals imply lower earnings quality, a high quality audit will be 
more effective at constraining opportunistic reporting by managers resulting in lower 
levels of abnormal accruals (Francis et al. 2009).
 To measure abnormal accruals, we use the performance-adjusted cross-sectional 
modified Jones (1991) model as described by Dechow et al. (1995) and Kothari et al. 
(2005), and first estimate the following OLS regression:7 
   TA
t
 = α
0 
+ α
1
(1/ASSETS
t-1
) + α
2
(ΔREV
t
 - ΔAR
t
) + α
3
PPE
t  
+ ε
                                    
(1)
 All the variables used in various tests are summarized in Table 1.
We estimate equation (1) by year and by three-, two-, or one-digit SIC codes depending 
on whether there are at least 10 companies in each SIC group.8 A company’s unadjusted 
abnormal accruals are set equal to the difference between total accruals and the fitted 
normal accruals estimated by the appropriate residuals from equation (1). Subsequently, 
we adjust abnormal accruals for performance as advised by Kothari et al. (2005). To this 
end, we rank companies within each industry-year group into ten groups based on their 
return-on-assets (ROA). Performance-adjusted abnormal total accruals (ATA) are the 
difference between the sample company’s ‘unadjusted abnormal accruals’ and the 
median abnormal accruals for companies in the same industry-year-ROA decile. We 
analyze the absolute value of ATA, and income-increasing (ATA>0) and income-decreasing 
7 Observations for which any value of the variables in equation (1) is above the 0.99 value or below 
the 0.01 value of all companies are excluded from the calculation of parameter values for equation 
(1) to mitigate the effect of these extreme values on the calculation of ‘expected’ accruals. 
However, these companies are included in the !nal sample, a'er winsorizing extreme values.
8 We have 8 industries at the 1-digit SIC level for each year in our sample; at the 2-digit SIC level, we 
have 39 industries in year 2005, 38 in year 2006, 36 in year 2007 and 33 in year 2008; at the 3-digit 
SIC level, we have 56 industries in the years 2005 and 2006, 46 in the year 2007 and 40 in the year 
2008.
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Table 1
      Variable Definitions (In Alphabetical Order)
Variable Definition
%AQ_MAN An audit firm’s percentage of managers with an audit qualification.
ΔAR A company’s change in accounts receivable from year t-1 to year t, scaled 
by lagged total assets.
ΔREV A company’s change in sales from year t-1 to year t, scaled by lagged total 
assets.
|ATA| The absolute value of ATA.
ASSETS A company’s total assets in thousand euros.
ATA A company’s abnormal accruals, calculated using a variant of the 
performance-adjusted cross-sectional modified Jones (1991) model as 
described by Dechow et al. (1995) and Kothari et al. (2005) (see equation 
1 for details).
AUDITORS An audit firm’s number of auditors appointed in charge of statutory 
audits.
AV_CLIENTS An audit firm’s average number of companies audited by an individual 
auditor.
AV_FEES An audit firm’s average total audit fees invoiced for performing statutory 
audits.
AWCA A company’s abnormal working capital accruals in year t, calculated as 
realized working capital minus ‘expected’ working capital, where expected 
working capital is assumed to be a fixed proportion of sales (Dechow et al. 
1998; DeFond and Park 2001).
CFO A company’s cash flows from operations scaled by total assets (absolute 
value in regressions on absolute abnormal accruals and signed value in 
regressions on income-increasing or income-decreasing (i.e., signed) 
abnormal accruals). 
CLIENTS An audit firm’s total number of companies audited.
EXCEPT An indicator variable equal to 1 if the material findings involve exceptional 
issues in audits, e.g., consultations or fraud issues; otherwise 0.
FEES An audit firm’s total audit fees invoiced for performing statutory audits.
INDEP An indicator variable equal to 1 if the material findings involve the audit 
firm’s independence policies and procedures or the auditors’ application 
of professional scepticism; otherwise 0.
INDUSTRY Vector of industry dummies (SIC 100-199: Mining and construction; SIC 
200-399: Manufacturing; SIC 400-490: Transportation, Communication, 
Electric, Gas, and Sanitary Services, SIC 500-599: Wholesale trade). SIC 
700-899 (Services) is the industry of reference.
LEV A company’s total liabilities scaled by total assets.
LISTED An indicator variable equal to 1 if the company is publicly quoted; 
otherwise 0.
LNASSETS The natural logarithm of a company’s total assets in thousand euros.
LOSS An indicator variable equal to 1 if the company reports a loss in the 
current year; otherwise 0.
MANAGERS An audit firm’s number of individuals that (co-)determine the day-to-day 
policies of the audit firm.
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MF An indicator variable equal to 1 if the Dutch public oversight body (AFM) 
had material findings in its initial inspections of the company’s audit 
firm; otherwise 0.
MF_PR An indicator variable equal to 1 if the Dutch peer review team had material 
findings in its review; otherwise 0.
ORG_STRUCT An indicator variable equal to 1 if the material findings involve the 
audit firm’s organizational structure and (human) resource allocations; 
otherwise 0.
PERF_DOC An indicator variable equal to 1 if the material findings involve the audit 
firm’s performance and documentation of statutory audits; otherwise 0.
PIE An indicator variable equal to 1 if the company’s audit firm has applied 
for a PIE license to be allowed to audit public interest entities; otherwise 
0.
POST_INSP An indicator variable equal to 1 for the financial years audited after the 
AFM inspections, i.e., for the years 2007 and 2008; otherwise 0.
POST_REV An indicator variable equal to 1 for the financial years audited after the 
peer reviews inspections, i.e., for the years 2005 and 2006; otherwise 0.
PPE_GROWTH A company’s one-year growth in gross property, plant, and equipment 
from year t-1 to year t. 
PPE A company’s gross property, plant, and equipment, scaled by lagged total 
assets.
QC_SYSTEM An indicator variable equal to 1 if the material findings involve the audit 
firm’s design of its quality control system (e.g., policies and procedures); 
otherwise 0.
REVIEW An indicator variable equal to 1 if the material findings involve the audit 
firm’s engagement quality reviews or monitoring and internal inspections; 
otherwise 0.
ROA A company’s return on assets, defined as net income scaled by lagged 
total assets. 
SALES_GROWTH A company’s one-year growth in sales from year t-1 to year t.
SALESVOL Sales volatility, defined as the standard deviation of the change in a 
company’s sales, scaled by average assets in the preceding three years.
SALES A company’s sales.
TA Total accruals, defined as a company’s change in non-cash current assets 
minus the change in current liabilities excluding the current portion of 
long-term debt, minus depreciation and amortization, scaled by lagged 
total assets.
WC Non-cash working capital, defined as a company’s (current assets – cash 
and short-term investments) – (current liabilities – short-term debt).
WSUM The number of different types of deficiencies identified during the 
inspection of a company’s audit firm, ranging from 0 to 6.
YEAR Vector of year dummies.
 
Table 1 - continued
28 Chapter 2
abnormal accruals (ATA<0) separately, since ex ante it is not clear what the direction of 
earnings management is, given that we have both listed and private companies in our 
sample. Hence, companies are expected to exhibit both income-increasing and income-
decreasing accruals (Warfield et al. 1995). 
Independent Variables
 Test variables. The independent variable of interest for testing H1 is the Dutch 
public oversight body’s first-time inspection outcome (‘material findings’ or ‘no material 
findings’) concerning the company’s audit firm (MF). The indicator variable MF is given 
a value of 1 if material findings were identified at the company’s audit firm by the AFM 
and 0 if no material findings were identified. First-time inspection outcomes are collected 
from the files of the AFM. For testing H2a and H2b, we additionally construct an indicator 
variable POST_INSP equal to 1 if the observation is post-inspection, and 0 if it is pre-
inspection. 
 Control variables. To control for differences in earnings management incentives 
and company characteristics that are associated with earnings quality, we include the 
following control variables found in prior studies to be associated with abnormal accruals 
(e.g., Dechow and Dichev 2002; Francis et al. 2013; Hribar and Nichols 2007; Young 
1999): LNASSETS, to control for company size, LEV, to control for a company’s leverage, 
CFO and LOSS, to control for a company’s performance (measured as cash flow from 
operations scaled by total assets and by an indicator variable equal to 1 if the company’s 
net income is negative, and otherwise 0, respectively), SALES_GROWTH, PPE_GROWTH, 
and SALESVOL, to control for a company’s natural volatility of its accruals (measured as 
the one-year growth in sales and gross property, plant and equipment, and the standard 
deviation of the change in a company’s sales, scaled by average assets in the preceding 
three years, respectively), LISTED, to control for a company’s stock listing, and YEAR and 
INDUSTRY dummies.9
 Hence our empirical model for testing H1 formally look as follows:10 
 |ATA
t 
|, ATA
t
>0
 
or ATA
t
<0 = β
0
 + β
1
MF
t
 + β
2
LNASSETS
t
 + β
3
LEV
t
 + β
4
CFO
t 
 + β
5
SALES_GROWTH
t 
+ β
6
PPE_GROWTH
t
 + β
7
SALESVOL
t
+ β
8
LOSS
t
 
 + β
9
LISTED
t
 + YEAR/INDUSTRY #xed e$ects + ε     (2)
9 We note that we do not include a Big 4 audit dummy in our main model since Dutch Big 4 audit 
!rms cannot be considered a homogenous group with regard to audit quality. From press releases 
(available on the AFM website, www.afm.nl), it becomes clear that the AFM has issued reports on 
the inspections and investigations of all Big 4 audit !rms, and issued administrative !nes to three 
Big 4 !rms, regarding non-compliance with the Dutch audit !rms supervision act in the period 
2007 to 2009.
10 Observations for which any value of the variables (dependent, test, and control variables) in 
equations (2) and (3) is above the 0.99 value or below the 0.01 value of all companies are winsori-
zed to mitigate the e$ect of these extreme values. 
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The empirical model for testing H2a and H2b is equivalent to equation (2), but includes 
an indicator variable for the post-inspection period (POST_INSP) and an interaction 
between this indicator variable and the material findings variable (MF * POST_INSP), and 
hence formally look as follows:
 |ATA
t 
|, ATA
t
>0
 
or ATA
t
<0 = β
0
 + β
1
MF
t
 + β
2
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t
 + β
3
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   + β
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t
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10
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t
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11
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      + INDUSTRY #xed e$ects + ε                           (3)
2.4.2 Sample 
Our research sample consists of all Dutch companies subject to a statutory audit 
(excluding financial institutions and insurance companies, SIC 600-699, and utilities 
companies, SIC 490-499) for which the name of the audit firm is available as well as the 
required financial statement data for the empirical models using the databases Amadeus, 
Orbis and Reach.11 We further require that each audit firm has company-year observations 
for the period 2005-2006 as well as for the period 2007-2008. 
 The AFM inspections with regard to the license applications of Dutch audit firms 
with clients subject to a statutory audit were conducted from January 2007 to May 2008. 
These inspections involved the review of most recently finalized audit files, i.e., audits for 
the financial years 2005 and 2006. Hence, we consider the earnings quality of companies 
in the audit firm’s client portfolio for the financial years 2005-2006.12 In order to examine 
the change in earnings quality after the initial inspections, we collect data for the 
financial years 2007-2008. 
 This results in a sample of 5,152 company-year observations to test the association 
between the inspection outcome and earnings quality, and a sample of 6,609 company-
11 Amadeus is a pan-European database distributed by Bureau Van Dijk (http://www.bvdep.com) 
that contains financial information on over 11 million public and private companies in 41 
European countries. Orbis contains information on 140 million companies worldwide, with an 
emphasis on private company information. Since Amadeus and Orbis do not include the name of 
the audit !rm for each !nancial year separately (they only mention the current audit !rm), we 
collect the names of the responsible audit !rms from the database Reach. Reach is a database 
distributed by Bureau Van Dijk (http://bvdep.com/) that contains financial statement data of 
Dutch listed and non-listed companies. 
12 "e !nancial year (2005 or 2006) for which the most recently !nalized audit was available for re-
view, depended on several factors, including the date of inspection and the audit client’s size and 
listing status. For inspections at the end of the 2007-2008 inspection period, 2006 audits were 
more o'en reviewed, especially for larger and/or listed companies for which 2006 audits were 
available at the time of the inspection. Since we do not know exactly for which audit !rms only 
2006 !les were reviewed, for which !rms only 2005 !les, and for which !rms a combination, we 
consider a two-year period to compute pre-inspection accruals most appropriate. 
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year observations to test the change in earnings quality.13 These observations involve 
3,229 unique companies and 51 unique audit firms, performing in total approximately 
85 percent of all statutory audits in the Netherlands. All these audit firms eventually 
received a license from the AFM to perform statutory audits14: 50 at the predetermined 
license-granting dates of 27 September 2007 (audit firms with PIE clients) or 29 September 
2008 (audit firms with only non-PIE clients) and one at a later date.15 
2.5 Results
2.5.1 Descriptive Statistics and Univariate Results
Company Characteristics
Panel A of Table 2 summarizes the descriptive statistics for companies audited by a firm 
with and without material findings. Since companies may have incentives to under- or 
over-report earnings, we consider the absolute value of abnormal accruals (|ATA|) to 
capture the combined effect of income-increasing and income-decreasing earnings 
management (Warfield et al. 1995). Average |ATA| (p = 0.017), and income-increasing 
abnormal accruals (ATA>0, p = 0.012) are significantly higher for companies audited by a 
firm with material findings. Companies audited by a firm with material findings further 
tend to be larger, have relatively lower cash flows from operations, and lower sales 
volatility than companies audited by an audit firm with no material findings. Further 
univariate tests (unreported) show that for the audits performed after the initial 
inspections, i.e., audits for financial years 2007 and 2008, abnormal accruals (absolute, 
income-increasing, and income-decreasing, respectively) for companies with a ‘material 
findings’ auditor are not significantly different from abnormal accruals for companies 
with a ‘no material findings’ auditor (p = 0.781, 0.467, and 0.137). When we consider the 
difference between abnormal accruals in the period before the initial inspections, i.e., 
audits for financial years 2005 and 2006, and after the initial inspections, i.e., audits for 
13 We collected the data in two stages. For the data collection relating to the pre-inspection period, 
we used a version of the database Reach which was more extensive compared to the version we 
had available to collect data relating to the post-inspection period. We attempted to further 
complement this by using the databases Amadeus and Orbis, but continue to have a smaller data-
set in the post-inspection period compared to the pre-inspection period due to a recent deterio-
rated coverage of particular !nancial statement items used in accruals measurement. We have 
performed all analyses also on the subsample of companies for which we have at least one obser-
vation in the pre-inspection period and one observation in the post-inspection period and the 
conclusions with regard to Hypothesis 1, 2a and 2b remain unchanged.
14 In general, the AFM grants a license within eight weeks a'er receiving all information necessary 
for the application. However, with the introduction of the AFS Act in 2006, transitional provisions 
were put into force allowing the AFM up to two years to perform !rst-time inspections for all 
audit !rms that were already active in the statutory audit market and in need of a license.
15 We have run the analyses without the audit !rm of which the license was initially rejected and this 
does not change our inferences.
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financial years 2007 and 2008, we find that on average absolute abnormal accruals are 
significantly higher in the post-inspection period (p = 0.000), which is driven by more 
negative income-decreasing abnormal accruals in the post-inspection period (p = 0.000), 
while income-increasing abnormal accruals remain unchanged (p = 0.148). These results 
also hold in the subsamples of companies audited by a firm with and without material 
findings. 
Audit Firm Characteristics 
The companies in our total sample are audited by 51 audit firms that applied for a license 
to be compliant with the Dutch audit regulation (AFS Act 2006). The first-time inspections 
of the AFM lead to material findings relating to audit firms’ internal quality control 
systems and/or audit files for 32 of these 51 audit firms (63 percent). For 19 audit firms (37 
percent) the first-time inspections lead to no material findings. 
 Panel B of Table 2 summarizes descriptive statistics. In the univariate tests for 
differences in means (t-statistic) and medians (z-statistics) of the size measures (i.e., 
number of audit clients, total audit fees, number of auditors, and number of managers) 
and the ratios (i.e., average number of audit clients per auditor, average audit fee per 
client, and percentage of managers with an audit qualification) between ‘material 
findings’ and ‘no material findings’ audit firms, we find that there are no significant 
differences between these audit firms. 
Correlations
Table 3 includes the Pearson correlation coefficients among the company characteristics 
and the ‘material findings’ variable (MF). The absence of very high correlations and 
(untabulated) average VIF values of well below the commonly used threshold of 10 (1.31 
for the association analysis and 1.59 for the change analysis), show that the risk of bias in 
our multivariate analyses due to multicollinearity is minimal (Hair et al. 2006).
2.5.2 Multivariate Results
Table 4 reports the multivariate regression results for equations (2) and (3) to test our 
hypotheses. We tabulate coefficients from OLS-regression models and, in parentheses, 
t-values based on robust standard errors that are clustered by audit firm.16 
 We run the regressions for equations (2) and (3) for the absolute abnormal accruals 
as well as for the income-increasing and income-decreasing accruals separately. In Table 4, 
we report a significant positive association between absolute and income-increasing 
16 As prior studies using abnormal or discretionary accruals as the dependent variable in their 
multivariate analyses point out, there may be econometric problems associated with the OLS re-
gression test on the accruals whose distribution is truncated at a certain value (e.g., Gul et al. 2007; 
Hossain et al. 2011). To mitigate these problems we have conducted Tobit tests as sensitivity ana-
lysis. "e results of these Tobit tests are similar to those of the OLS regressions as presented in 
Table 4.
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abnormal accruals (|ATA| and ATA>0), and the Dutch public oversight body’s inspection 
outcome (MF) for the company’s audit firm (p = 0.000 and 0.005 respectively). For in come-
decreasing abnormal accruals (ATA<0), we find a significant negative association (p = 
0.002). The results for the control variables are mostly as expected based on prior 
literature.17 Overall, these results support H1, and suggest that independent public 
oversight inspections by the AFM were able to distinguish between high and low quality 
audit firms.
 Regarding the change in earnings quality form the pre- to the post-inspection 
period, we find no support for H2a and H2b. For the full period 2005-2008, we report a 
significant positive association between absolute and income-increasing abnormal 
accruals (|ATA| and ATA>0), and material inspection findings (MF) for the company’s 
audit firm (p = 0.000 and 0.006 respectively). For absolute and income-increasing, (|ATA| 
and ATA>0) neither the interaction between MF and POST_INSP, nor the indicator 
variable POST_INSP are significant. For income-decreasing abnormal accruals (ATA<0) 
the indicator variable POST_INSP is significant and negative. These results indicate that 
there appears to have been hardly any change, and in particular no improvement, in 
earnings quality from pre- to post-inspections. This finding is confirmed using a 
difference-in-differences design estimated with our control variables (not reported for 
brevity) as the results show no significant difference-in-differences.
2.5.3 Sensitivity Analyses
Categories of Audit Firms
We perform additional tests to check whether our findings also hold for different 
categories of audit firms. First, we re-estimate equations (2) and (3), but now run separate 
regressions for two subgroups: (1) companies audited by a PIE audit firm (i.e. an audit firm 
that applied for a license to perform statutory audits for PIEs, i.e., listed companies, banks 
and insurance companies)), and (2) companies audited by a non-PIE audit firm. In Dutch 
audit regulation an important distinction is made between audit firms that audit PIEs 
and those that have only non-PIE clients in their portfolio. Although both types of audit 
firms need to comply with Dutch audit regulation in order to be allowed to perform 
statutory audits in the Netherlands and are subject to public oversight, audit firms that 
intend to perform statutory audits for PIE clients have to comply with additional 
standards and arguably have higher reputation risk. Untabulated regression results show 
that our findings in Table 4 are robust for client companies of both PIE and non-PIE audit 
firms. The test variable MF is significant at 1 percent for absolute and income-increasing 
abnormal accruals (|ATA| and ATA>0) for PIE audit firm clients (p = 0.002 and 0.006 
17 As noted in the research design, we do not include a Big 4 audit dummy in our main model since 
in this study Dutch Big 4 audit !rms cannot be considered a homogenous group with regard to 
audit quality. However, including a Big 4 dummy in the regression model gives robust results for 
our variable of interest, MF. We refer to the sensitivity tests for a further analysis of our !ndings 
for di$erent categories of audit !rms.
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respectively) and at 10 percent for non-PIE audit firm clients (p = 0.058 and 0.090 
respectively) in the association analysis. If we further subdivide the non-PIE audit firms 
into groups based on the number of audit clients, and run separate regressions, we find 
that our test variable MF is significant for the larger audit firms and not for the 15 smallest 
firms with 35 audit clients or less. We find no support for H2a and H2b for either PIE or 
non-PIE audit firm clients.
Earnings Management Incentives
As pointed out by Ball (2013) and Eshleman and Guo (2014a), examining the magnitude 
of a company’s abnormal accruals may not be sufficient evidence to infer the extent of a 
company’s earnings management without taking management incentives or the 
predicted direction of earnings management into account. To address this issue, we run 
an analysis to distinguish companies with an incentive to manipulate earnings from 
those without such an incentive based on their leverage. Following the debt-equity 
theory, highly leveraged companies have incentives to manage earnings upwards to 
prevent violations of debt covenants (e.g., DeFond and Jiambalvo 1994; Watts and 
Zimmerman 1990; Young 1999). Therefore, in order to distinguish companies with an 
incentive to manipulate earnings from those without such an incentive, we re-estimate 
equations (2) and (3) for above- and below-median leveraged companies separately. The 
distinction between high and low quality audit firms is expected to be more pronounced 
in the earnings quality of companies with an incentive to manipulate earnings. 
Untabulated regression results show that our findings in Table 4 are robust for above-
median leveraged companies: MF is significant and positive for both absolute and 
income-increasing abnormal accruals (p = 0.000 and 0.002 respectively). For below-
median leveraged companies, MF is insignificant. We find no support for H2a and H2b 
for either above- or below-median leveraged companies.
Alternative Accruals Measure
DeFond and Jiambalvo (1994) and Teoh et al. (1998) argue that non-working capital 
accruals are less susceptible to manipulation than working capital accruals. Therefore, as 
a sensitivity test, we use DeFond and Park’s (2001) abnormal working capital accruals 
(AWCA) model as an alternative measure of accruals quality which is also used in a 
number of audit quality studies (e.g., Carey and Simnett 2006; Francis and Wang 2008; 
Van de Poel and Vanstraelen 2011). The regression results for equations 2 and 3 using 
AWCA show a significant positive association between our variable of interest, MF, and 
absolute AWCA (p = 0.000), income-increasing AWCA (p = 0.075), and income-decreasing 
AWCA (p = 0.000). We find no association between the inspection outcomes and a change 
in earnings quality when using AWCA as dependent variable.
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2.5.4 Additional Analysis of Material Findings
In addition to inspections at the client engagement level, the AFM inspections also 
consist of an in-depth assessment of the audit firm’s internal quality control procedures 
and audit files to test whether these are fully compliant with the quality control 
requirements as set out in the AFS Act, or whether there are any material deficiencies. 
Exhibit 1 contains a summary of these requirements. We have been able to review the 
AFM files in order to identify the deficiencies that were communicated with the audit 
firms. For all 34 audit firms with material findings we have analyzed the types of 
deficiencies identified by the AFM.
 The material findings identified by the AFM are related to six types of deficiencies. 
The first type (QC_SYSTEM) involves the design of the quality control system and 
includes all deficiencies regarding the audit firm’s general and integrity policies and 
procedures, and its duty of care. The second type (PERF_DOC) involves the performance 
and documentation of audits and includes audit file deficiencies such as the lack of 
sufficient appropriate audit evidence, the lack of an adequate audit trail, and a 
malfunctioning of the audit engagement acceptance and continuance procedures. The 
third type (EXCEPT) involves exceptional issues in audits, such as issues relating to 
consultation procedures and fraud. The fourth type (INDEP) involves the audit firm’s or 
auditor’s independence and includes findings with regard to specific independence 
issues, a lack of professional skepticism, or inappropriate client account records (i.e., no 
appropriate distinction between audit fees and non-audit fees). The fifth type (REVIEW) 
involves the engagement quality control reviews and the monitoring and internal 
inspection reviews. The sixth type (ORG_STRUCT) involves the audit firm’s organizational 
structure, including deficiencies in its voting-rights structure and availability of (human) 
resources.
 
Table 5
Frequency of Types of Deficiencies
Types of Deficiencies Audit firms with 
material findings  
(n = 32)
Design of the quality control system (QC_SYSTEM) 69%
Performance and documentation of audits (PERF_DOC) 84%
Exceptional issues in audits (EXCEPT) 38%
Independence (INDEP) 84%
Reviews (REVIEW) 91%
Organizational structure (ORG_STRUCT) 25%
This table presents for each type of material findings the proportion of audit firms with material inspection 
findings for which the Dutch public oversight body identified that type of material findings during the 
license inspection process. See table 1 for variable definitions.
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 For each of the six types of deficiencies, the audit firms were coded 1 if the AFM 
had material findings with regard to that particular type of deficiency, and otherwise 0. 
The material deficiencies identified by the AFM involve both deficiencies in the 
description of the formal procedures as well as in the actual functioning of these 
procedures.18 Table 5 provides the total frequency of types of deficiencies for the audit 
firms with material findings.19 
 In order to find which types of deficiencies identified by the AFM are most able to 
discriminate audit quality, we replace the MF variable with each of the six types of 
deficiencies variables in six separate multivariate regressions for equation (2) for those 
companies audited by an audit firm with material findings.20 Table 6 presents the 
regression results for absolute abnormal accruals. This table shows that for companies 
audited by audit firms with material findings, absolute abnormal accruals are 
incrementally larger when the audit firm deficiency involves the performance and 
documentation of audits (PERF_DOC), exceptional issues in audits (EXCEPT), auditor 
independence (INDEP), and their internal (quality control) reviews (REVIEW). 
Untabulated results show that in the analyses of income-increasing accruals, QC_SYSTEM 
(i.e., the design of the quality control system of the audit firm), PERF_DOC, INDEP, and 
REVIEW are also significant and positive. In the analyses of income-decreasing accruals, 
only REVIEW is significant and negative.
 Finally, we perform a regression test including a variable WSUM, measuring the 
sum of the different types of deficiencies, ranging from 0 to 6 for the full sample. 
Untabulated results show that the number of different types of deficiencies identified for 
the company’s audit firm, is significantly and positively associated with absolute and 
income-increasing abnormal accruals (p = 0.000 and 0.002 respectively), and significantly 
and negatively with income-decreasing abnormal accruals (p = 0.001). These results 
indicate that, consistent with the results presented in Table 4, a higher number of 
different types of deficiencies identified by the public oversight body is associated with 
lower earnings quality. Collectively, we find that both the fact that there are material 
findings and the amount of different types of deficiencies at audit firm level are associated 
with earnings quality at the client firm level.
18 For instance, a de!ciency with regard to the independence requirements can involve a material 
omission in the audit !rm’s independence safeguards as described in its quality manual, as well as 
an actual breach in its independence from a particular audit client.
19 We note that Table 5 does not represent the number of de!ciencies identi!ed by the public over-
sight body, but rather the percentage of audit !rms for which the public oversight body identi!ed 
material !ndings regarding the respective types of de!ciencies. 
20 Since the six types of de!ciencies are highly correlated, including all six types of de!ciencies in 
one regression would lead to bias due to multicollinearity with VIF-values for !ve out of six types 
variables ranging from 7.72 to 30.44.
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2.5.5 Additional Analysis of Peer Reviews
By means of comparison, we also look into the effectiveness of the former peer reviews in 
distinguishing and improving audit quality. Prior to the installment of the Dutch public 
oversight body, audit firms were subject to a mandatory peer review system. In a peer 
review an audit firm’s internal quality control system and the quality of the professional 
work was reviewed by auditors (‘peers’) that were not employed by or otherwise affiliated 
with the reviewed audit firm. In the Netherlands, the peer reviews were performed under 
the responsibility of the inspection units of the professional bodies for registered 
auditors. These inspection units appointed the reviewers. However, the peer review 
regulation included the option for audit firms to request the inspection unit to appoint 
another audit firm to perform the peer review, instead of the reviewers otherwise 
appointed by the inspection unit. In practice, particularly the larger or PIE audit firms 
made use of this option and were therefore often reviewed by another (large) audit firm, 
rather than by reviewers from different audit firms. 
 The peer reviews culminated into an overall assessment of the audit firm, which 
can also be classified as ‘no material findings’ and ‘material findings’. While peer 
reviewers are actively participating in the audit market and are therefore expected to 
have sufficient expertise to detect deficiencies in audit quality, their independence may 
be impaired by their employment by an audit firm that is also subject to the same peer 
review process. For that reason, peer reviewers may be less effective in distinguishing 
between high and low quality audit firms. 
 We construct a second sample equivalent to the sample used in our main analysis 
described before. We only include companies for which the audit firm had been subject 
to both the public oversight inspection and the peer review process. Since the peer 
reviews considered in this study were conducted in the years 2005 and 2006, and 
involved reviews of most recently finalized audit files, we investigate the earnings quality 
of companies in the audit firm’s client portfolio in the years 2003-2004 to test for an 
association between the peer review outcomes and earnings quality. In order to test 
whether earnings quality increased in the period after the peer reviews, we compare 
earnings quality in the years 2003-2004 with earnings quality in the years 2005-2006. 
This results in a sample of 4,610 company-year observations over the years 2003-2004, 
and a sample of 9,585 company-year observations over the years 2003-2006 to test the 
change in earnings quality. These observations involve 3,224 unique companies audited 
by 30 unique audit firms. These 30 audit firms include mainly the larger audit firms out of 
our initial sample of 51 audit firms, and still account for approximately 80 percent of all 
statutory audits in the Netherlands.21 
21 Since the number of audit !rms that received both a peer review outcome and an inspection 
outcome (n=30) is lower than the number of audit !rms included in our main analysis (n=51), we 
re-perform our main analysis on the smaller sample. Untabulated results show that the results 
presented in Table 4 remain robust for this smaller sample.
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Table 7
Inspection Outcomes and Peer Review Outcomes for 30 Audit Firms
Peer review outcome:  
material findings
Peer review outcome:  
no material findings
Total
Inspection outcome: 
material findings
7 10 17
Inspection outcome: no 
material findings
4 9 13
Total 11 19 30
This table presents the outcomes received from the public oversight body and the peer reviews for the 
30 audit firms that received both types of outcomes. 
 We define a second independent test variable, MF_PR, which is given a value of 1 
if material findings were identified at the company’s audit firm by the peer review 
system, and otherwise 0. In this sample, the peer reviews lead to material findings for 13 
of these 30 audit firms (43 percent), while the public oversight body had material 
findings for 18 of these 30 audit firms (63 percent). Table 7 relates the public oversight 
inspection outcomes to the peer review outcomes. It shows that for 16 audit firms (53 
percent) the public oversight inspection came to the same outcome as the prior peer 
review and for 14 audit firms (47 percent) the public oversight inspections came to a 
different conclusion than the peer reviewers. When performing a Pearson Chi2 test, we 
find no significant relationship between the public oversight inspection outcomes and 
the peer review outcomes (p = 0.558). The correlation coefficient between MF and MF_PR 
is 0.107 and insignificant. This finding is consistent with the AFM’s report after its first 
inspections, stating that it could not rely on prior peer review outcomes22 and needed to 
perform more inspections. 
 To test whether peer review outcomes were associated with earnings quality and 
whether peer review lead to higher earnings quality in the following period, we replace 
MF by MF_PR in equations (2) and (3). The results, reported in Table 8, show that the 
coefficient on MF_PR, measuring the peer review outcome, is significantly negative for 
absolute abnormal accruals and insignificant for income-increasing, or income-
decreasing abnormal accruals. Further, the outcomes of the peer review appear to have 
had no effect on earnings quality in the period following those reviews: the coefficient 
for the interaction term MF_PR*POST_REV is insignificant, while the coefficient for 
POST_REV is positive and significant, indicating an overall increase in absolute and 
22 "e report is available (in Dutch) on: http://www.afm.nl/nl-nl/professionals/nieuws/2007/sep/
evaluatie-niet-oob-vergunningaanvragers. 
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income-increasing abnormal accruals in the period after the peer reviews. When running 
the regressions separately for companies audited by PIE and non-PIE audit firms (not 
tabulated), we find similar results. There is no significant association between the audit 
firm’s peer review outcome and (a change in) earnings quality for either PIE audit firm 
clients or for non-PIE audit firm clients. 
 Overall, these findings indicate that while there is a significant association 
between the Dutch public oversight outcomes and earnings quality of the clients of the 
inspected audit firms, there is no support for such an association with the peer review 
outcomes. 
2.6 Conclusion
Given the amount of resources spent on independent public oversight, the effectiveness 
of public oversight is an important empirical question. We address this question using 
proprietary data of the Dutch public oversight body containing overall outcomes of its 
first-time inspections conducted for audit firm license approval. Our paper is one of the 
first to provide evidence on the quality of independent inspection outcomes in an E.U. 
setting, the Netherlands, which was one of the first European countries that removed the 
responsibility for audit quality assurance from the auditing profession. 
 Overall, our results provide evidence that the Dutch independent inspection 
outcomes credibly reflect audit quality. However, in contrast to U.S. evidence, we do not 
find evidence to support an improvement in audit quality after the first inspection 
round. Hence, these results provide only partial support for the effectiveness of the 
Dutch public oversight system. While being able to distinguish audit quality is a basic 
premise for the appropriate functioning of a public oversight body, the ability to improve 
audit quality is arguably even more important for which we fail to find support. One 
possible explanation could be that audit firms may have less incentives to improve after 
receiving a deficient inspection report in a setting where those firm-specific inspection 
reports are not publicly disclosed. 
 Our results further show that the types of deficiencies identified by the public 
oversight body that are most able to differentiate audit quality are related to the 
performance and documentation of audit engagements, auditor independence, and 
(internal quality control) reviews. This finding is constructive to recent U.S. research 
since the public portion of a PCAOB report typically does not divulge quality control 
problems when addressed within a period of 12 months. In addition, it supports the 
current emphasis of standard setters and regulators such the EC, IAASB and PCAOB to 
focus on promoting auditor independence and audit firm governance and quality 
control systems to improve audit quality.
 By means of comparison, we examine in an additional analysis a subsample of 
audit firms for which we have both the inspection outcome of the Dutch public oversight 
body and the prior peer review outcome. Using this subsample, we continue to find a 
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significant association between the inspection outcomes and earnings quality, but fail to 
find a similar association between a company’s earnings quality and the outcome of the 
prior peer reviews. This would suggest that audit firms in the Netherlands were subject to 
‘friendly’ peer reviews, which may not to be surprising since audit firms, and in particular 
the larger and PIE audit firms, made use of the option to choose their peer reviewer. 
Furthermore, similar to public oversight, we do not find support for an improvement in 
audit quality after a peer review outcome. 
 Our study is subject to a number of limitations. First, we rely on abnormal accruals 
to measure audit quality. Financial restatements, another commonly used measure of 
audit quality, are not available in the Netherlands, and the limited number of bankrupt 
companies in our sample period makes use of going concern opinions (GCO) infeasible.23 
Second, we measure audit quality at client level, while the public oversight body provides 
an opinion at the audit firm level. While client-level measures are often used to provide 
information on audit firm quality (e.g., Francis and Michas 2013), there is a mismatch 
between these levels of analysis. While analysis at the audit firm level would be interesting, 
it would require developing a methodologically sound composite audit quality measure 
at that level, a challenging task in itself.24 Finally, a sound analysis at audit firm level 
would require a sufficient number of observations to have adequate power, and our 
sample is limited to 51 audit firms. In our setting, the concern about mismatch of levels 
of analysis is partially offset as the AFM includes inspections at the audit engagement 
level, focusing on both GAAP and GAAS deficiencies, in their evaluation of audit firms.25 
A third limitation is that our findings relate to the first inspection outcomes for the 
granting of audit firm licenses, and thus the effect of subsequent inspection outcomes is 
unknown. Our study also does not allow to draw conclusions on which system, peer 
review or independent public oversight, is more effective, partly due to the time gap 
between the public oversight and peer review outcome data. Finally, we cannot rule out 
the possibility that client companies with low quality financial statements selected a low 
quality audit firm. However, a public oversight body is expected to identify audit firms 
allowing client companies to report low-quality earnings. 
 While we can only speculate that audit firm behavior may be affected by whether 
or not inspection reports are publicly disclosed, this conjecture could specifically be 
addressed in future research in for example a setting where there is a change in disclosure 
policy. In sum, this paper contributes to the literature by investigating inspection 
23 Interestingly, Aobdia (2015), using PCAOB data, shows that abnormal accruals at client level are 
predictive for engagement speci!c de!ciencies, while GCOs are not.
24 For example, does it require weighting of clients in the portfolio and if so, at what dimensions 
(client importance, client risk, and/or client complexity)? Further, it is not clear how to aggregate 
client outcomes to the !rm level while also considering variation in client characteristics.
25 Our method relates a material de!ciency at the audit !rm level to all clients in the !rm’s portfolio (inclu-
ding the non-inspected client companies), which should bias against !nding results as client companies 
chosen by inspectors are not random. However, we do !nd a signi!cant association between a material 
de!ciency at audit !rm level and the magnitude of accruals at client level, suggesting that the opinion of the 
public oversight body is informative for the audit quality of the client portfolio.
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findings of the audit oversight body in the Netherlands, taking advantage of proprietary 
data on their inspection results as well as those of prior peer reviews. The literature on 
public oversight continues to grow, but many issues remain unsettled. Further 
international comparisons would be very useful in deepening our understanding of the 
impact of public oversight on auditor behavior, as would employing different research 
methodologies (e.g., experiment, field study). Further research comparing findings of 
peer review reports with public oversight inspection reports would be particularly useful 
in comparing the effectiveness of these mechanisms in improving audit quality. 
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Abstract
While there is a substantial body of literature examining the impact of the provision of 
non-audit services and auditor tenure on auditor independence, there is surprisingly 
little empirical evidence on other independence threats covered by independence 
regulation. The purpose of this study is to assess how audit firms respond to the existence 
of a business relationship with an audit client, in terms of adjusting their audit efforts or 
risk premiums, by examining the association of the business relationship with audit fees 
and earnings quality. A propensity-score matching approach was used in constructing a 
research sample with proprietary data from the Dutch audit oversight body, complemented 
with public financial statement data. The results show that business relationships are 
consistently associated with higher audit fees and do not negatively affect earnings 
quality. Interestingly, in those situations where the business relationship coincides with 
high non-audit fees relative to audit fees, earnings quality appears to be even higher. 
Overall, this study contributes to the literature on auditor independence, and may be of 
interest to auditors, standard setters and regulators.
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3.1 Introduction
Independent auditing is an essential feature of efficient capital markets and regulators 
have long been concerned with potential threats to auditor independence (e.g., Church 
et al. 2015). Auditors and audit firms have a legal monopoly on performing statutory 
audits of financial statements and a responsibility to act in the public interest. At the 
same time, they operate in circumstances that may create conflicts between this public 
interest and their own personal and commercial interests, thereby threatening the 
auditor’s independence. The Code of Ethics for Professional Accountants, as developed 
by the International Ethics Standards Board for Accountants (IESBA), establishes ethical 
standards for auditors, including independence requirements.2 These independence 
requirements deal with specific circumstances and relationships that create or may 
create threats to independence (e.g., provision of non-assurance services to an audit 
client, long association of senior personnel with an audit client, employment with an 
audit client, fees, business relationships, financial interests, family and personal 
relationships, gifts and hospitality, and actual or threatened litigation). 
 Prior studies on auditor independence have dealt with a number of the circum-
stances and relationships influencing independence, often to examine their association 
with audit quality (see for reviews for example Beattie and Fearnley 2002; Bedard et al. 
2008; Gramling et al. 2010; Tepalagul and Lin 2015; Church et al. 2015). Mainly because 
of lack of data, not all of the circumstances and relationships covered by the Code of 
Ethics have been addressed by prior studies. The purpose of this study is to examine one 
of these unaddressed relationships, i.e., business relationships between audit firms and 
their audit clients. Business relationships arise from commercial relationships or 
common financial interests between the audit firm and the audit client. This study 
focuses on business relationships in which the audit firms purchases goods and services 
from an audit client. Such business relationships arise when an audit firm procures for 
instance its audit software from an IT company, its office buildings from a construction 
company, or its business loans from a bank, while the audit firm is also performing 
statutory audits for those companies. 
 The Code of Ethics recognizes that business relationships may create self-interest 
or intimidation threats (IESBA 2013, paragraph 290.124), and thereby negatively im pact 
audit quality. Public oversight bodies, including the Dutch audit oversight body, have 
called for clearer, unambiguous and more restrictive rules for auditor independence, 
including those regarding business relationships (AFM 2011). This paper contributes to 
the literature on auditor independence, by providing first-time insights in business 
relationships between audit firms and audit clients, of which necessary data are not 
2  In pursuing its mission to serve the public interest, the International Federation of Accountants 
(IFAC) Board has established the IESBA which developed and issued, under its own authority, 
the Code of Ethics for Professional Accountants, for use around the world (IESBA 2013, 7).
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commonly available, and their association with audit fees and earnings quality. Its 
results will also inform practicing auditors, standard setters and regulators.
 In this paper, I aim to assess how audit firms adjust their efforts and/or risk 
premiums when they maintain a business relationship with an audit client. Specifically, 
I examine the association between the existence of an auditor-client business relationship 
and both audit fees and earnings quality. The audit firm may consider the business 
relationship a threat to the auditor’s independence and may attempt to mitigate this 
threat with safeguards, as required by the independence regulation, such as additional 
audit or review efforts, or other quality control measures. If so, engagement effort would 
increase. Alternatively, but more likely simultaneously, the audit firm may consider the 
business relationship a risk and attempt to cover it by charging a price premium to the 
audit client. In both cases, audit firms are expected to charge higher fees to audit clients 
with which they maintain a business relationship. Increased audit effort and/or quality 
control measures may also actually improve the quality of the audit, which could be 
reflected in higher earnings quality. However, if a business relationship impairs the 
auditor’s independence, the auditor may perform a below-standard audit, with lower 
audit fees and lower earnings quality.
 I use a propensity-score matching approach to construct a sample of Dutch 
companies maintaining a business relationship with their audit firm3, matched with 
similar companies without such business relationships. Data on business relationships 
and audit fees are obtained from the proprietary files of the Dutch audit oversight body.4 
The results show that business relationships are consistently associated with higher audit 
fees and, particularly in those situations where the business relationship coincides with 
high non-audit fees relative to audit fees, with higher earnings quality. Overall, the 
results suggest that audit firms respond to the circumstances in which they maintain a 
business relationship with an audit client, most likely by adjusting their audit efforts. 
However, alternative explanations for higher audit fees, such as the audit firm charging a 
risk premium to the audit client, cannot be completely ruled out. Importantly, I find no 
3 "e sample only includes business relationships with the 15 audit !rms holding a license to per-
form statutory audits for PIEs in the Netherlands. In the Netherlands, PIEs are legal entities 
whose transferrable securities (both stocks and bonds) are admitted to trading on a regulated 
market, banks, and insurance companies. Additional quality requirements are applicable to audit 
!rms that perform such PIE audits, including stricter independence requirements and the need 
to obtain a speci!c PIE license to perform statutory audits for PIEs.
4 In 2011, the Netherlands Authority for the Financial Markets (AFM), responsible for audit over-
sight in the Netherlands, performed an exploratory review regarding the independence of Dutch 
audit !rms and auditors. "e public report that was published a'er this review showed, amongst 
other things, that audit !rms maintained business relationships with various audit clients (AFM 
2011). "e identi!ed business relationships can be characterized as business relationships in 
which the audit !rm purchases goods or services from an audit client, e.g., facility and personnel 
services, o&ce buildings, ICT, so'ware development, banking and insurance services, and car 
leasing. "e AFM report ‘Incentives for Audit Quality – An exploratory review’ of 6 October 2011 
elaborates on some speci!c cases of business relationships (AFM 2011, 28-31). "e AFM con-
!rmed with the audit !rms the accuracy and completeness of the factual information gathered in 
the course of its review concerning business relationships.
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evidence of impaired independence, which would be manifested in lower audit fees and 
lower earnings quality. These results appear robust for a number of sensitivity tests on 
cross-sectional subsamples (e.g., based on the audit firm size (Big 4 or non-Big 4), type of 
audit client (PIE or non-PIE), demand for audit quality, and client risk), as well as for an 
alternative measure of business relationships (i.e., the monetary value of these business 
relationships) and alternative matching methods. 
 The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. The next section reviews prior 
literature on auditor independence and independence regulation, and provides some 
background information on the accounting and auditing environment in the 
Netherlands. The third section presents the research hypotheses, and the fourth section 
describes the research sample and the empirical models used in the analyses. The 
empirical findings are reported in the fifth section, followed by a number of sensitivity 
tests in the sixth section. Finally, the last section provides the conclusion, limitations, 
and suggestions for further research. 
3.2 Background
3.2.1 Prior Literature
A number of papers provide reviews of the already extensive literature on auditor 
independence (e.g., Beattie and Fearnley 2002; Bedard et al. 2008; Gramling et al. 2010; 
Tepalagul and Lin 2015; Church et al. 2015). Since auditor independence coincides with 
auditor objectivity and the ability to withstand client pressure to acquiesce to substandard 
reporting (DeFond et al. 2002), independence rules are intended to minimize the 
possibility that external factors will inappropriately influence an auditor’s judgment, 
thus promoting high-quality audits (Gramling et al. 2010). Higher audit quality can be 
defined as greater assurance that the financial statements faithfully represent relevant 
information about the company’s underlying economics, conditioned on the company’s 
innate characteristics and financial reporting practices (DeFond and Zhang 2014). The 
supply of high-quality audits is believed to be a function of the auditor’s competence and 
independence, where competence refers to the auditor’s ability to discover deficiencies 
in the client’s financial reporting, and the auditor’s independence refers to the auditor’s 
willingness to report these discovered deficiencies, arising from reputation and litigation 
incentives (e.g., DeAngelo 1981a; Dechow et al. 2010; Watts and Zimmerman 1983). 
Therefore, if the auditor’s independence is threatened, audit quality may become 
impaired. 
  According to the Code of Ethics (IESBA 2013, paragraph 290), certain circumstances 
and relationships may create threats to independence to which the conceptual framework 
approach should be applied (e.g., provision of non-assurance services to an audit client, 
long association of senior personnel with an audit client, employment with an audit 
client, fees, business relationships, financial interests, family and personal relationships, 
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gifts and hospitality, and actual or threatened litigation). Prior research has extensively 
covered the first four types of circumstances and relationships: non-audit services, 
auditor tenure, employment with an audit client, and fee dependence. 
 Regulators are generally concerned that non-audit services make auditors 
financially dependent on their clients and that the consulting nature of many non-audit 
services puts auditors in managerial roles (DeFond et al. 2002), while audit firms argue 
that the provision of non-audit services improves the performance of the audit (Knechel 
and Sharma 2012) or creates efficiencies from knowledge spillover effects (Simunic 
1984). Overall, prior research indicates that the provision of non-audit services has rarely 
been associated with impaired audit quality, and in some cases it is associated with higher 
audit quality (Church et al. 2015; DeFond and Zhang 2014; Gramling et al. 2010). 
However, while Bell et al. (2015) find on average no association between non-audit 
services and audit quality, they do find a positive association for listed companies and a 
negative association for privately held companies. Furthermore, many studies have 
shown that higher fees for non-audit services are associated with higher audit fees (e.g., 
Simunic 1984; Palmrose 1986b; Hay et al. 2006). For a more elaborate overview of the 
literature on non-audit services and auditor independence, I refer to Sharma (2014). 
 The length of the association between the auditor and the audit client (i.e., auditor 
tenure) has also been widely studied. While behavioral studies find that long associations 
impair audit quality and support the importance of independence achieved by rotation, 
archival studies on auditor tenure, and the related topics of audit firm and partner 
rotation, provide mixed results (Bedard et al. 2008). For instance, Chi et al. (2009) find 
little evidence that mandatory partner rotation is associated with higher audit quality, 
proxied by abnormal accruals and earnings response coefficients. Using the frequency of 
audit adjustments as an alternative measure for audit quality, Lennox et al. (2014) do find 
audit quality to be higher in the years surrounding a mandatory auditor rotation. Bell et 
al. (2015) find that audit quality is lower in the first year of the engagement, im proves 
shortly thereafter and declines for very long engagements. However, they find the 
decline in audit quality only applies to privately held companies. For listed com panies, 
audit quality remains high with very long tenure. Audit fees are generally lower in audits 
where the auditor is relatively new to the engagement, i.e. with shorter tenure, either 
because of ‘low-balling’ (DeAngelo 1981a), or because the new auditor can offer more 
efficient service (e.g., Francis and Simon 1987; Simon and Francis 1988; Deis and Giroux 
1996; Gregory and Collier 1996; Craswell and Francis 1999; Hay et al. 2006). 
 When auditors leave the audit firm and are employed by an audit client, particularly 
private investors demonstrate concern with independence (Dart and Chandler 2012). 
This ‘revolving-door’ situation may impair either the particular auditor’s independence 
in the audit periods leading up to the employment by the audit client, or the audit firm’s 
independence in subsequent audits (Gramling et al. 2010), or both. A one-year cooling-
off period appears to be beneficial (Wright and Booker 2010). Although several recent 
studies measuring the quality of accounting accruals provide little evidence that the 
quality of audited financial statements is actually affected in such employment situations 
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(Gramling et al. 2010; Geiger et al. 2008; Geiger et al. 2005), others find that ‘affiliated’ 
companies are significantly more likely than unaffiliated companies to receive clean 
audit opinions (Lennox 2005) and report larger signed and unsigned abnormal accruals 
than other companies (Menon and Williams 2004).
 Regarding the argument that audit firms’ independence may be impaired by the 
fees received from audit clients, prior research suggests that the relative size of the audit 
client does not affect perceived independence (Pany and Reckers 1980), nor does it 
influence abnormal accruals (e.g., Reynolds and Francis 2001; Chung and Kallapur 
2003), not even when fees are below costs in first-year engagements (‘low balling’) 
(Gramling et al. 2010).
 On balance, prior studies have found little evidence for a negative effect of these 
threats on audit quality, and even some evidence that audit quality may actually 
improve. However, regulators still frequently express concerns about various potential 
threats to auditor independence (e.g., Church et al. 2015; AFM 2011). DeFond and Zhang 
(2014) observe that the perceived threats typically present a tradeoff between reduced 
auditor independence, which impairs audit quality, and improved auditor competence, 
which improves audit quality. Thus, finding that some threats do not impair audit 
quality, and even improve it in some cases, is evidence consistent with auditor competence 
playing an important role in explaining audit quality.
 Currently, there appears to be very little or no prior research on the other cir-
cumstances and relationships covered by the Code of Ethics, including business 
relationships. One early study by Lavin (1976) touched upon a specific example of a 
business relationship, finding that CPAs, lending officers, and research financial analysts 
mostly perceived an audit firm with its office in a building owned by a client to be 
independent. The current paper contributes to the literature by examining the fairly 
unexplored topic of business relationships and audit firms’ responses in terms of audit 
fees and earnings quality when they maintain these business relationships with audit 
clients. 
3.2.2 Dutch Accounting and Auditing Environment
The Dutch accounting regulatory environment is well described by Schelleman and 
Knechel (2010). The Netherlands is generally regarded as a country with a well-developed 
capital market system, with broad share ownership, and accounting and auditing 
traditions similar to the U.S. and U.K. (Mueller et al. 1994; Nobes 1998), although the 
Dutch litigation environment is not as severe as in the U.S. As of 1 January 2005, listed 
Dutch companies are required to apply International Financial Reporting Standards 
(IFRS) as promulgated by the IASB and adopted by the E.U. in their consolidated financial 
statements. Many aspects of the Dutch audit market closely resemble those in Anglo-
Saxon countries, including that the international audit firms are all present, and 
dominate the market by auditing the majority of listed companies (Bröcheler et al. 2004; 
Langendijk 1997; Boone et al. 2000). Since 1 October 2006, audit firms are subject to an 
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independent audit oversight body, the Netherlands Authority for the Financial Markets 
(AFM). The AFM grants licenses to audit firms that have demonstrated that they comply 
with the quality control requirements that are primarily based on the ‘International 
Standard on Quality Control 1’ (IAASB 2009b). Thereafter, the AFM performs periodic 
risk-based inspections, thematic reviews, and investigations, and is empowered to 
impose sanctions, such as warnings, instructions, incremental penalty payments, and 
administrative fines. Audit firms are legally obliged to provide any information requested 
by the oversight body and fully cooperate with any inspection or investigation performed 
by the oversight body. 
3.3 Development of Hypothesis
Business relationships arise from commercial relationships or common financial 
interests between the audit firm, or a member of the audit team, or a member of that 
individual’s immediate family, and the audit client or its management (IESBA 2013, 
paragraph 290.124). Generally, a business relationship in which the audit firm purchases 
goods and services from an audit client, does not create a threat to independence if the 
transaction is in the normal course of business and at arm’s length. However, the nature 
or magnitude of the transactions may be such that they create a self-interest threat 
(IESBA 2013, paragraph 290.126). When the goods or services provided by the audit 
client are of importance to the auditor, the audit client has the ability to put pressure on 
the auditor and to influence his objectivity. This may occur if the audit client provides 
goods or services that are instrumental to the everyday business of the audit firm (e.g., 
providing office space to the audit firm, car leases for all personnel, business loans to 
individual audit partners). These types of business relationships are therefore expected to 
be of economic importance to the audit firms involved. I examine whether these business 
relationships also affect audit firms’ behavior. 
 The Code of Ethics prescribes the application of the conceptual framework in 
particular circumstances: “the firm and the members of the audit team shall evaluate the 
implications of circumstances and relationships and determine whether safeguards […] can be 
applied when necessary to eliminate the threats to independence arising from these circumstances 
and relationships or reduce them to an acceptable level” (IESBA 2013, paragraph 290.100, 
p.54). Therefore, the auditor is required to conduct a self-assessment of his independence 
by identifying and evaluating threats arising from a business relationship and taking 
measures to safeguard his independence where necessary. 
 If the auditor’s independence is threatened, for instance by a self-interest threat 
caused by a material business relationship or high non-audit fees (or a combination 
thereof), audit quality may become impaired. After all, auditor independence coincides 
with auditor objectivity and the ability to withstand client pressure to acquiesce to 
substandard reporting (DeFond et al. 2002). In order to perform a higher quality audit, 
i.e., to provide greater assurance that the financial statements faithfully represent 
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relevant information about the company’s underlying economics conditioned on the 
company’s innate characteristics and financial reporting practices (DeFond and Zhang 
2014), the auditor will have to be both competent and independent (e.g., DeAngelo 
1981a; Dechow et al. 2010; Watts and Zimmerman 1983). 
 If an auditor’s independence is threatened, and thereby the level of audit quality 
potentially impaired, this may be considered an audit risk. Audit risk is defined in the 
International Standards on Auditing (ISAs), as developed by the International Auditing 
and Assurance Standards Board (IAASB), as the risk that the auditor expresses an 
inappropriate audit opinion when the financial statements are materially misstated. 
Audit risk is a function of the risks of material misstatement (consisting of inherent risk 
and control risk) and detection risk. In particular, a loss of objectivity is expected to 
increase the risk that the auditor does not detect a material misstatement, which he 
might have detected otherwise. Furthermore, threatened auditor independence may 
increase the risk of litigation. First, the audit oversight body may impose sanctions in 
case of a breach of independence regulation, causing both financial and reputational 
costs for the auditor and audit firm. Second, in case of an audit failure, third parties may 
litigate and use the threatened independence as an argument to strengthen their case 
against the auditor or audit firm (Schmidt 2012).
 Francis and Krishnan (1999) describe various ways in which a rational auditor 
might respond to uncertainties or risks: (1) the auditor could expend more effort, (2) the 
auditor could screen out high-risk clients, (3) the auditor could charge a premium to 
compensate for risk, (4) the auditor could negotiate with the audit client to make 
adjustments or other measures to mitigate the uncertainties or risks, or (5) the auditor 
could express the uncertainties or risks in a modified audit report. This paper focuses on 
the first and third potential strategies, both of which will culminate in higher audit fees 
charged by the audit firm to the audit client, as also proposed by Seetharaman et al. 
(2002). 
 Independence rules require auditors and audit firms to take quality control 
measures or other safeguards in case the auditor’s independence is threatened, such as 
additional audit or review efforts, in order to promote high-quality audits (Gramling et 
al. 2010). Prior studies find the amount of hours spent on the audit, i.e., audit effort, to be 
positively related to audit quality (e.g., Caramanis and Lennox 2008; Deis and Giroux 
1996; Deis and Giroux 1992; Palmrose 1989, 1986a). Higher audit fees, ceteris paribus, are 
generally considered indicative of greater effort on the engagement, rather than of 
economic bonding between the auditor and the client (Eshleman and Guo 2014a). The 
audit firm may also attempt to compensate for increased risk and to cover possible future 
(litigation) losses by charging an insurance premium to the audit client (e.g., Ghosh and 
Pawlewicz 2009; Seetharaman et al. 2002; Simunic 1980). Prior studies provide evidence 
that an increase in audit fees is at least partly or almost exclusively due to higher levels of 
auditor effort, rather than to a pure price or risk premium (e.g., Lobo and Zhao 2013; 
Schelleman and Knechel 2010; Simunic and Stein 1996). Hence, it is expected that 
charging a price premium to compensate for increased litigation risk is happening 
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simultaneously with, rather than as an alternative to increased audit effort.5
 Increased audit effort intended to safeguard the auditor’s independence is 
expected to result in higher earnings quality, especially when the increased effort (also) 
consists of obtaining additional audit evidence and performing more audit work. If 
increased effort merely consists of more extensive reviews or other quality control 
measures, it may not necessarily lead to higher earnings quality, but at the least safeguard 
earnings quality at a steady (i.e., unchanged) level. A risk premium charged to the audit 
client, without differential audit effort (intended to compensate for losses the auditor 
may incur from a future independence threat) is also not likely to change earnings 
quality. 
 Assuming that auditors are compliant with independence regulations requiring 
them to take appropriate safeguards, it is expected that auditors respond to a business 
relationship by increasing their audit effort or quality control measures, resulting in 
higher audit fees and higher earnings quality.6 Hence, the following research hypotheses 
are posited: 
 H1a: Business relationships between audit firms and audit clients are as so cia- 
   ted with higher audit fees, ceteris paribus.
 H2a:  Business relationships between audit firms and audit clients are associated 
  with higher earnings quality, ceteris paribus.
 As previously stated, the conceptual framework prescribed in the Code of Ethics 
leaves it up to the auditor to conduct a self-assessment of his independence. There are no 
further rules or guidance prescribing which nature or magnitude of business transactions 
form an unacceptable independence threat, leaving ample room for judgment. This may 
cause auditors and audit firms facing similar situations not always carrying out the same 
assessment or arriving at the same conclusion (AFM 2011). 
 Following regulatory concerns with the application of the conceptual framework, 
the assumption of auditors taking appropriate measures to safeguard their independence 
may be flawed. If the independence threat arising from a business relationship actually 
5 Additionally, it could be argued that the ‘reciprocal’ situation of a business relationship (i.e., the 
audit clients pays an audit fee to the auditor for the audit, and the auditor pays a fee to the audit 
client for the goods or services purchased) puts the audit !rm in a more powerful negotiating 
position as compared to a mere audit-relation with a client. "is increase in negotiating power 
could empower the audit !rm to earn rents (or equivalently, make the audit client more willing to 
pay ‘full price’ for the audit and not demand any discounts). However, ex ante it is not clear to what 
extent this increased negotiating power would indeed lead to higher audit fees. "e audit !rm 
could also receive a discount on the purchased goods or services, leaving the audit fees 
unchanged. 
6 "is expectation follows the ‘neoclassical’ perspective of the audit market as proposed by Hribar 
et al. (2014) and supported by !ndings of Doogar et al. (2015). Hribar et al. (2014, 514) adopt a 
neoclassical perspective of the audit market, which assumes that auditors will increase fees to 
compensate for the additional risk and additional audit hours required for companies with poor 
quality accounting systems. Prior studies conjecture that impaired auditor independence result-
ing from higher fees leads to lower quality accounting information, while Hribar et al. argue that 
lower quality accounting systems result in higher fees charged by auditors, thereby reversing the 
direction of causality linking audit fees and accounting quality. 
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materializes and the auditor does not respond with any mitigating measures, the auditor 
is expected to perform a below-standard audit, i.e., apply lower audit effort and charge 
lower audit fees, reflected in lower earnings quality.7 In order to test whether business 
relationships are associated with impaired independence, the following alternative 
hypotheses are formulated:
 H1b: Business relationships between audit firms and audit clients are associated 
  with lower audit fees, ceteris paribus.
 H2b: Business relationships between audit firms and audit clients are associated 
  with lower earnings quality, ceteris paribus.
 In both sets of hypotheses, the hypothesized associations are expected to be 
stronger when the independence threat is bigger. It can be argued that an independence 
threat is more severe in the presence of more different types of relationships or interests. 
Although prior research indicates that the provision of non-audit services has rarely been 
associated with impaired audit quality, and in some cases it is associated with higher 
audit quality (Church et al. 2015; DeFond and Zhang 2014; Gramling et al. 2010), 
regulators and auditors are still considering non-audit services a potential threat to the 
auditor’s independence for which safeguards must be applied. Therefore, when a 
business relationship coincides with (high) non-audit services, this may be considered a 
potentially larger threat to the auditor’s independence. In the presence of two 
independence threats, i.e., a business relationship and high non-audit services (i.e., 
above-median non-audit fees relative to audit fees), the auditor’s response of increasing 
(H1a and H2a) or decreasing (H1b and H2b) audit effort or quality control safeguards is 
expected to be stronger and associated with both higher (H1a and H2a) or lower (H1b and 
H2b) audit fees and earnings quality.
3.4 Research Design
3.4.1 Sample
Comparing audit fees and earnings quality for companies that maintain a business 
relationship with their audit firm to companies that do not maintain such a business 
relationship can be characterized as a form of ‘natural experiment’. The companies with 
business relationships can be considered the ‘treated’ observations. In order to test 
whether the ‘treatment’ has any effect, there is a need to find similar companies without 
business relationships to function as ‘untreated’ control observations. 
7 Using fees as a proxy for audit e$ort is based on the assumption that the market for audit services 
is competitive (e.g., Craswell et al. 1995; Simunic 1980; Elliott 1998). Competition implies that fee 
changes are mainly caused by changes in costs rather than pro!t margin, which is corroborated 
by prior studies (e.g., Lobo and Zhao 2013; Schelleman and Knechel 2010; Simunic and Stein 
1996).
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 First, I collected data for the ‘treated’ companies with business relationships with 
their audit firms. I obtained information on business relationships from the AFM’s 
proprietary files of the thematic review the AFM conducted in 2011 on incentives for 
audit quality, with independence as one of the key aspects under consideration. This 
review started with an extensive collection of data on various relationships between 
audit firms and their audit clients, indicating potential threats to auditors’ independence. 
The AFM used a questionnaire to collect the data from the 15 audit firms holding a license 
to perform statutory audits for PIEs in the Netherlands. The AFM reviewed whether audit 
firms had business relationships with audit clients or third parties affiliated with audit 
clients in the period 1 January 2009 to 31 December 2010 related to developing, renting 
out, handing over or transferring property; granting or taking up loans; and supplying 
goods or services with a single or annual value in excess of €100,000, or sponsorship 
relationships with audit clients with a cost value exceeding €5,000 (AFM 2011, p.27, 
33).8,9 Following this data collection, the AFM performed on-site inspections of 
independence procedures and selected independence cases. The AFM confirmed with 
the audit firms the accuracy and completeness of the factual information gathered in the 
course of its review. I complemented the data on business relationships with data on 
audit fees, also retrieved from the AFM’s files, and with financial statement data needed 
for the empirical models described in the next section.10
 Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics for the 184 business relationship 
observations included in the sample.11 Panel A provides a breakdown of the business 
relationships in various types. Facility services business relationships involve the audit 
firm procuring services and products from the audit client regarding office facilities, such 
as office supplies, printing, cleaning, catering, security, energy, and postal services. Office 
building business relationships involve procuring services regarding development, 
construction, maintenance, or rental of office buildings for the audit firm. ICT business 
relationships involve services regarding sales, development, or maintenance of software 
8 For the purpose of this paper, the sponsorships identi!ed separately by the AFM, are considered 
to be business relationships, since the reported sponsorships all involved some sort of marketing 
services in return (e.g., advertising, use of business seats). 
9 "e AFM only collected data on business relationships between audit !rms and audit clients. No 
data were collected on comparable relationships between audit !rms and companies that were 
not audit clients. "erefore, the available data do not allow for testing whether audit !rms pay 
more or less for the goods or services procured from audit clients as compared to goods or services 
procured from non-audit clients. 
10 I obtained these !nancial statement data from the databases Orbis and Amadeus (both distrib-
uted by Bureau van Dijk (http://www.bvdinfo.com)) and manually collected data from !nancial 
statements from Company.info. Orbis contains information on 140 million companies world-
wide, with an emphasis on private company information. Amadeus is a pan-European database 
that contains comprehensive information on around 19 million companies across Europe. 
Company.info contains information on both pro!t and non-pro!t organizations on more than 2 
million Dutch companies.
11 Untabulated results show that the 184 business relationships involve 103 unique audit client 
companies, i.e., audit !rms maintained business relationships with 81 audit clients in both 2009 
and 2010, and with 22 audit clients in only one of the two years. 
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and hardware, including data vendors, telecom and internet services. Financial services 
business relationships involve banking (e.g., business accounts, loans, mortgages) and 
insurance services. Personnel business relationships involve services regarding hiring of 
temporary personnel, training, and salary administration. Car lease business relationships 
involve leasing of company cars. The other business relationships involve the remaining 
miscellaneous types of services, such as hospitality, consulting, and sponsoring. Panel B 
describes the industries in which the audit client companies involved in the business 
relationships with the audit firms are active. Panel C shows that 36 business relationships 
are maintained with public interest entities (PIEs, i.e., listed companies, banks, or 
insurance companies), and the remaining 148 business relationships with non-PIEs. 
Panel D shows that a majority of the business relationships, i.e., 85.9 percent, involve a 
Big 4 audit firm. 
Table 1
 
Descriptive Statistics for Business Relationships
Panel A: Types of Business Relationships
Number of Business Relationships
Type of Business Relationship 2009 2010 Total
Facility services 22 22 44
Office building 19 17 36
ICT 15 14 29
Financial services 10 12 22
Personnel 11 11 22
Car lease 8 6 14
Other 8 9 17
Total 93 91 184
Panel B: Number of Companies and Business Relationships per Industry
Number of Business Relationships
SIC Code Industry Description 2009 2010 Total
010-199 Mining and Construction 4 5 9
200-399 Manufacturing 8 8 16
400-499 Transportation and Communication 5 3 8
500-599 Trade 13 15 28
600-699 Financials 32 30 62
700-899 Services 31 30 61
Total 93 91 184
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Second, I collected data for the ‘untreated’ or ‘control’ companies without business 
relationships with their audit firms. In order to construct a research sample of both 
treated and untreated observations, I follow Eshleman and Guo (2014b), Lawrence et al. 
(2011), and Boone et al. (2010) and use a propensity-score matching approach, developed 
by Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983), to match each business relationship observation to a 
similar observation with no business relationship. There are a number of reasons to 
choose a propensity-score matching approach over constructing a sample consisting of 
all Dutch companies. First, there may be a potential endogeneity problem, as the 
likelihood of an audit firm maintaining a business relationship with an audit client may 
very well be dependent on underlying variables that also determine audit fees. A first 
glance at the descriptive statistics for companies with a business relationship with their 
audit firm (as reported in Table 3 and further described in the next section), shows that 
these companies are for instance significantly larger (both in total assets and in number 
of subsidiaries), more highly leveraged, and more often listed at the two main stock 
exchanges indexes (i.e., the Amsterdam Exchange Index (AEX) and the Amsterdam 
Midkap Index (AMX)). These characteristics are also important in explaining audit fees 
(as described in the next section). Using a propensity-score matching approach addresses 
this endogeneity problem (Lawrence et al. 2011), as it attempts to minimize the variation 
in the company characteristics between treatment and control groups (Eshleman and 
Panel C: Number of Companies and Business Relations per Type of Company 
Number of Business Relationships
Type of Company 2009 2010 Total
PIE 17 19 36
Non-PIE 76 72 148
Total 93 91 184
Panel D: Number of Companies and Business Relations per Type of Audit Firm 
Number of Business Relationships
Type of Audit Firm 2009 2010 Total
Big 4 81 77 158
Non-Big 4 12 14 26
Total 93 91 184
Table 1 - continued
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Guo 2014b).12 Second, audit and non-audit fee data are not readily available, especially 
not for non-PIE companies, and need to be manually collected from AFM files. Lastly, the 
number of business relationships between audit firms and audit clients is naturally 
confined: an audit firm generally only needs a limited number of suppliers, i.e., mostly 
one, for each type of goods or services.13 Performing multivariate analyses on such a 
sample would likely result in low power tests. Therefore there is a need for a smaller 
sample in which the ‘treated’ observations are present in a higher proportion.
 For all Dutch companies with sufficient financial statement data available in 
either the Orbis or Amadeus databases, the likelihood of a business relationship is 
modeled using the following logit regression:14 
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 All variables used in various tests are defined in Table 2. 
Audit Fee Analysis Sample
After obtaining the fitted values from estimating equation (1), each business relationship 
observation is matched, without replacement, to four company-year observations 
without a business relationship with the closest fitted value.15 For observations of non-
PIE companies, a three percent caliper distance is applied. For observations of PIE 
companies this restriction is not applied, to prevent losing too many PIE observations.16 
12 An alternative method for dealing with endogeneity, is using a Heckman (1979) model. However, 
as pointed out by Lennox and Pittman (2010b, 236): “In the context of auditor choice, a researcher 
who wishes to use the Heckman (1979) model faces the o'en intractable task of identifying an 
independent variable that meets the following conditions: (a) it is exogenous, (b) it is a very 
powerful predictor of auditor choice in the !rst stage model, and (c) it does not a$ect the depen-
dent variable in the second stage model.” If one does not have such a variable, then the results 
from the Heckman model can be extremely sensitive to minor changes in the speci!cation of the 
model (Lennox et al. 2012).
13 According to another AFM report published in 2010, there are 21,544 statutory audits performed 
in the Netherlands, of which 15,404 by the PIE audit !rms included in this study (AFM 2010). 
"is means that the 184 business relationships only account for a little over 1 percent of the total 
number of audits.
14 All independent variables are winsorized at the 1 and 99 percentile level to mitigate the e$ect of 
these extreme values.
15 I match each business relationship observation with four observations without business relation-
ships in order to improve the reliability of the models. In a sensitivity test (untabulated), instead 
of matching each business relationship observation with four observations without a business 
relationship, I use a 1-on-1 matching. "e regression tests on this reduced research sample of 364 
observations lead to qualitatively the same results.
16 In a sensitivity test the three percent caliper distance is also applied to the entire sample, including 
the observations of PIE companies. By doing so, 22 business relationships with PIE audit clients 
(and their matched observations) are excluded from the sample, reducing the research sample to 
810 observations. "e regression tests on this reduced research sample lead to qualitatively the 
same results. 
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Table 2 
Variable Definitions (In Alphabetical Order)
Variable Definition
∆AR A company’s change in accounts receivable from year t-1 to year 
t, scaled by lagged total assets.
ASSETS A company’s total assets in thousand EUR.
ATA A company’s abnormal accruals, calculated using a variant of 
the performance-adjusted cross-sectional modified Jones (1991) 
model as described by Dechow et al. (1995) and Kothari et al. 
(2005) (see equation (2) for details).
BIG4 An indicator variable equal to 1 if the company’s financial 
statements are audited by a Big 4 audit firm, and otherwise 0.
BR An indicator variable equal to 1 if there is a business relationship 
between the company and its audit firm.
BR_CARLEASE An indicator variable equal to 1 if the business relationship 
involves leasing of company cars, and otherwise 0.
BR_FACILITY_SERVICES An indicator variable equal to 1 if the business relationship 
involves services and products regarding office facilities, such 
as office supplies, printing, cleaning, catering, security, energy, 
postal services, and otherwise 0.
BR_FINANCIAL_SERVICES An indicator variable equal to 1 if the business relationship 
involves banking or insurance services, and otherwise 0.
BR_ICT An indicator variable equal to 1 if the business relationship 
involves services regarding sales, development, or maintenance 
of software and hardware, including data vendors, telecom and 
internet services, and otherwise 0.
BR_OFFICE_BUILDING An indicator variable equal to 1 if the business relationship 
involves services regarding development, construction, 
maintenance, or rental of office buildings, and otherwise 0.
BR_OTHER An indicator variable equal to 1 if the business relationship 
involves other services, such as hospitality, consulting, and 
sponsoring, and otherwise 0.
BR_PERSONNEL An indicator variable equal to 1 if the business relationship 
involves services regarding hiring of temporary personnel, 
training, and salary administration, and otherwise 0.
CFO A company’s cash flows from operations scaled by lagged total 
assets. In the regression analysis tests with absolute abnormal 
accruals, the absolute value of CFO is used as an independent 
variable. In the regression analysis tests with income-increasing 
or –decreasing abnormal accruals, the signed value of CFO is 
used.
FYAUDIT An indicator variable equal to 1 if the company’s audit firm is 
performing a first-time audit, and otherwise 0.
INDUSTRY Vector of industry dummies (SIC 200-399: Manufacturing; SIC 
400-499: Transportation, Communication, Electric, Gas, and 
Sanitary Services, SIC 500-599: Wholesale trade, SIC 600-699: 
Financial companies, SIC 700-899: Services. SIC 100-199 (Mining 
and construction) is the industry of reference).
INVREC A company’s sum of inventory and receivables scaled by total 
assets.
63Business Relationships and Auditor Independence: When Audit Firms are Their Clients’ Clients
3
LEV A company’s total liabilities scaled by total assets.
LISTED An indicator variable equal to 1 if the company is publicly 
quoted; otherwise 0.
LNASSETS A company’s natural logarithm of total assets in thousand euros.
LNAUDITFEE A company’s natural logarithm of audit fees in euros paid by the 
company to the audit firm;
LNNASFEE A company’s natural logarithm of fees in euros paid by the 
company to the audit firm for other services than the statutory 
audit.
LOSS An indicator variable equal to 1 if the company reports a loss in 
both year t and year t-1, and otherwise 0.
MAINEX An indicator variable equal to 1 if the company’s shares are 
included in one of the two largest Dutch stock indexes (AEX and 
AMX), and otherwise 0.
PPE A company’s gross property, plant, and equipment, scaled by 
lagged total assets.
PPE_GROWTH A company’s one-year growth in gross property, plant, and 
equipment from year t-1 to year t. 
ΔREV A company’s change in sales from year t-1 to year t, scaled by 
lagged total assets.
ROA A company’s return on assets, defined as net income scaled by 
lagged total assets. 
SALES A company’s sales.
SALES_GROWTH A company’s one-year growth in sales from year t-1 to year t.
SALESVOL A company’s sales volatility, defined as the standard deviation of 
the change in a company’s sales, scaled by average assets in the 
preceding three years.
SUBS A company’s number of subsidiaries.
TA Total accruals, defined as a company’s change in non-cash 
current assets minus the change in current liabilities excluding 
the current portion of long-term debt, minus depreciation and 
amortization, scaled by lagged total assets.
Y2009 An indicator variable equal to 1 if the year is 2009, and otherwise 
0.
Table 2 - continued
This approach leads to a sample of 920 observations for the audit fee analysis. Although 
any resulting differences between the business relationship observations and observations 
without business relationships should reflect the ‘treatment’ effect and not pre-existing 
characteristics, and differences in means between these two groups should be sufficient 
to estimate the treatment effect, I follow Lawrence et al. (2011) and also use multivariate 
analyses to further control for any remaining characteristic imbalances between the two 
client groups as well as general cross-sectional characteristic variations.
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Earnings Quality Analysis Sample
Abnormal total accruals is an earnings quality measure commonly used as a proxy for the 
output-side of audit quality. DeFond and Zhang (2014) review and critique various audit 
quality proxies used in archival auditing research. They conclude that no single proxy 
paints a complete picture of audit quality and recommend researchers to use multiple 
proxies from different categories to take advantage of their strength and attenuate their 
weaknesses. Earnings quality measures attempt to measure how well reported earnings 
map into the company’s underlying economic activities. Since the earnings quality 
measure used in this analysis, abnormal total accruals, is continuous, it captures variations 
in audit quality even in relatively small samples, and within samples with clients that not 
necessarily violate GAAP, and therefore appears to be well suited for measuring audit 
quality at a conceptual level. 
 To measure abnormal total accruals, the performance-adjusted cross-sectional 
modified Jones (1991) model as described by Dechow et al. (1995) and Kothari et al. 
(2005) is used. This model has also been used in prior accruals quality research in the 
Netherlands (e.g., Van de Poel and Vanstraelen 2011). The first step is to estimate the 
following OLS regression (all variables are defined in Table 2):17 
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 Equation (2) is estimated by year and by three-, two-, or one-digit SIC codes 
conditional on having at least 10 companies in each SIC group. A company’s unadjusted 
abnormal accruals are set equal to the difference between total accruals and the fitted 
normal accruals estimated by the appropriate residuals from equation (2). Subsequently, 
abnormal accruals are adjusted for performance as described in Kothari et al. (2005). To 
this end, companies are ranked within each industry-year group into ten groups based on 
their return-on-assets (ROA). Performance-adjusted abnormal total accruals (ATA) are 
the difference between the sample company’s ‘unadjusted abnormal accruals’ and the 
median abnormal accruals for companies in the same industry-year-ROA decile. I analyze 
the absolute value of ATA, and income-increasing (ATA>0) and income-decreasing 
abnormal accruals (ATA<0) separately, since ex ante it is not clear what the direction of 
earnings management is, given that the sample includes both listed and private 
companies. Hence, companies are expected to exhibit both income-increasing and 
income-decreasing accruals (Warfield et al. 1995). 
 The abnormal total accruals are estimated using all companies in the Orbis 
database for which sufficient financial statement data are available. Similar to prior 
17 Observations for which any value of the variables in equation (3) is above the 0.99 or below the 
0.01 percentile of all companies are excluded from the calculation of parameter values for equa-
tion (3) to mitigate the e$ect of these extreme values on the calculation of ‘expected’ accruals. 
However, these companies are included in the !nal sample, a'er winsorizing extreme values.
65Business Relationships and Auditor Independence: When Audit Firms are Their Clients’ Clients
3
studies, financial companies with Standard Industrial Classifications (SICs) between 600 
and 699 are excluded because computing discretionary accruals for these companies is 
problematic. Utility companies (SICs between 490 and 499) are also excluded because 
regulation may make the incentives to manage earnings different from the incentives in 
unregulated industries (e.g., Becker et al. 1998). This reduction in the research sample 
leads to a total of 592 observations for the earnings quality analysis. 
3.4.2 Audit Fee Model
To test the formulated hypotheses H1a and H1b, i.e., the association between business 
relationships and audit fees, an audit fee model is estimated. Building on prior audit fee 
studies, I use the following audit fee model, with robust standard errors that are 
heteroscedasticity-consistent (White 1980):
 LNAUDITFEE
t
 = β
0
 + β
1
BR
t 
+ β
2
LNASSETS
t
 + β
3
INVREC
t
 + β
4
LEV
t
 + β
5
ROA
t  
   
+ β
6
LOSS
t
+ β
7
LISTED
t 
+ β
8
MAINEX
t 
+ β
9
LNSUBS
t
 + β
10
BIG4
t  
   
+ β
11
FYAUDIT
t
 + β
12
LNNASFEE
t
 +YEAR/INDUSTRY #xed e$ects + ε                           (3)
 All variables used are defined in Table 2. The audit fee model follows the structure 
originally introduced by Simunic (1980) in which audit fees are expected to depend on 
the treatment variable (i.e., BR), and control variables for client size (i.e., LNASSETS), 
client risk (i.e., INVREC, LEV, ROA, LOSS, LISTED, and MAINEX), client complexity (i.e., 
LNSUBS), auditor characteristics (i.e., BIG4, FYAUDIT, and LNNASFEE), and year and 
industry dummies. These control variables are found in prior work to be associated with 
audit fees (e.g., Simunic 1980; Palmrose 1986b; Langendijk 1997; Ashbaugh et al. 2003; 
Hay et al. 2006; Schelleman and Knechel 2010).
 The dependent variable in equation (3), LNAUDITFEE, is the natural logarithm of 
the fees in euros in year t paid by the client company to the audit firm for performing the 
statutory audit of its financial statements. I obtained audit fee information from the 
AFM’s proprietary files. Audit firms have provided the AFM with excerpts from their 
client account records, including data on the fees charged to their audit clients. All fees 
charged for performing the statutory audit of the company’s financial statements are 
considered audit fees. All other fees, including fees for audit-related engagements and 
fees for other services, are considered non-audit fees. 
 Prior research has found audit fees to be lower for companies that are financially 
more successful and companies that have a new auditor, and higher for larger, more 
complex, and riskier clients. Audit fees are also found to be higher for Big 4 audits, and 
when non-audit fees are higher. Therefore, the signs for the control variables ROA and 
FYAUDIT are predicted to be negative, and positive for the remaining control variables, 
with the exception of the year and industry dummy variables, for which no sign is 
predicted. 
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 Furthermore, in order to test the individual effects of the different types of 
business relationships on audit fees, the variable BR in equation (3) is replaced by 
individual dummy variables for the seven specific types of business relationships (see 
Table 1, Panel A). 
3.4.3 Earnings Quality Model
To test the formulated hypotheses H2a and H2b on the association between business 
relationships and earnings quality, I estimate an earnings quality model. In addition to 
the variable of interest, i.e., BR measuring the presence of a business relationship, I 
include the following control variables found in prior studies to be associated with 
abnormal accruals (e.g., Dechow and Dichev 2002; Francis et al. 2013; Hribar and Nichols 
2007; Young 1999): LNASSETS, to control for company size, LEV, to control for a 
company’s leverage, CFO and LOSS, to control for a company’s performance, SALES_
GROWTH, PPE_GROWTH, and SALESVOL, to control for a company’s natural volatility 
of its accruals, LISTED, to control for a company’s stock listing, and YEAR and INDUSTRY 
dummies. Hence the empirical model is as follows (all variables are defined in Table 2):18
 |ATA
t 
|, ATA
t
>0
 
or ATA
t
<0 =  β
0
 + β
1
BR
t
 + β
2
LNASSETS
t
 + β
3
LEV
t
 + β
4
CFO
t 
 
             + β
5
SALES_GROWTH
t 
+ β
6
PPE_GROWTH
t
 + β
7
SALESVOL
t
 + β
8
LOSS
t
  
                 + β
9
LISTED
t
 + YEAR/INDUSTRY #xed e$ects + ε                                                                            (4)
3.5 Results
3.5.1 Descriptive Statistics and Univariate Results
Table 3 presents the descriptive statistics of the company characteristics for the full 
sample (920 observations for the audit fee analysis in Panel A and 592 observations for 
the earnings quality analysis in Panel B). Furthermore, the descriptive statistics are 
presented for subsamples of observations with and without business relationships with 
their audit firms separately, including the t-statistics and significance levels of the 
differences between these two subsamples. The mean values of LNAUDITFEE are 
significantly higher for companies with business relationships with their audit firms (p = 
0.000). This suggests a positive association between business relationships and audit fees 
(consistent with H1a and not with H1b). The mean values of ATA (absolute and signed) 
are not significantly different for the two subsamples (not consistent with either H2a or 
18 Observations for which any value of the variables (dependent, test, and control variables) in 
equation (4) is above the 0.99 value or below the 0.01 value of all companies are winsorized to miti-
gate the e$ect of these extreme values. 
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3
H2b). Further comparison of the business relationship and no business relationship 
subsamples shows that companies with business relationships with their audit firms are 
more often listed at the two main stock exchanges (MAINEX), have more subsidiaries 
(SUBS), pay higher non-audit fees to their audit firms (LNNASFEE), and have lower sales 
volatility (SALESVOL). The variables used to calculate the propensity score to match the 
‘treated’ observations (i.e., companies with a business relationship with their audit firm) 
with ‘untreated’ observations (i.e., companies without such a business relationship), are 
not significantly different, except for the number of subsidiaries (SUBS). This suggests 
that the matching procedure was effective in forming a balanced sample of business 
relationships and no business relationships observations. 
 Table 4 presents the Pearson correlation coefficients between the variables 
included in the audit fee model (Panel A) and the earnings quality model (Panel B). The 
absence of very high correlations and (untabulated) average VIF values well below the 
commonly used threshold of 10 (2.01 for the audit fee analysis and 1.73 for the earnings 
quality analysis), show that the risk of bias in the multivariate analyses due to 
multicollinearity is minimal (Hair et al. 2006). 
3.5.2 Multivariate Results
Table 5 presents coefficient estimates and t-values for the audit fee model presented in 
equation (3). Column (1) includes the dummy variable BR, which is 1 if there is a business 
relationship between the audit firm and the audit client, and otherwise 0. In Column (2) 
the dummy variable BR is replaced by seven individual dummy variables for the different 
types of business relationships. Both regressions are statistically significant (p = 0.000) 
and explain a relatively large proportion of the variation in audit fees (adjusted R-squared 
= 0.578 and 0.577, respectively). The coefficient for the variable of interest in Column 
(1), BR, is positive and significant (p = 0.000). This suggests a significant positive 
association between the occurrence of a business relationship and the level of audit 
fees. 
 The regression in Column (2) distinguishes among the different types of business 
relationships. The coefficients for all seven types of business relationships are positive 
and significant (p < 0.05 for personnel services and car leasing and p < 0.01 for the other 
types of business relationships). This suggests that the overall positive association 
between the occurrence of a business relationship and the level of audit fees is not 
dependent on the type of business relationship.19
19 To examine whether the association between audit fees and the type of business relationships is 
di$erent for the various types of business relationships, I re-performed the regression analysis of 
Column (2) in Table 5 for the business relationship observations only (n = 184) (with BR_OTHER 
as reference). Unreported results show that only the business relationships regarding the o&ce 
buildings are signi!cantly associated with higher audit fees compared to the other types of busi-
ness relationships. "e insigni!cant coe&cients for the other types of business relationships in-
dicate that these are all equally associated with audit fees. 
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Table 5
Multiple Regressions for Business Relationships 
and Types and Audit Fees
Dependent Variable: LNAUDITFEE
(1) (2)
Independent Variables Pred. Sign Coef. t-stat. Coef. t-stat.
Business Relationship Variables
BR ? 0.570 7.52 ***
BR_FACILITY_SERVICES ? 0.474 3.32 ***
BR_OFFICE_BUILDING ? 0.865 4.26 ***
BR_ICT ? 0.511 3.80 ***
BR_PERSONNEL ? 0.332 2.13 **
BR_FINANCIAL_SERVICES ? 0.672 3.19 ***
BR_CARLEASE ? 0.517 2.30 **
BR_OTHER ? 0.514 3.61 ***
Control Variables
LNASSETS + 0.193 9.85 *** 0.191 9.56 ***
INVREC + 0.154 1.20 0.132 1.03
LEV + 0.064 0.63 0.064 0.62
ROA - -0.406 -2.11 ** -0.423 -2.19 **
LOSS + 0.009 0.09 0.004 -0.04
LISTED + 0.006 0.05 0.015 0.12
MAINEX + 0.928 6.13 *** 0.931 6.06 ***
LNSUBS + 0.200 6.78 *** 0.199 6.53 ***
BIG4 + 0.236 2.18 ** 0.250 2.30 **
FYAUDIT - -0.014 -0.07 -0.005 -0.03
LNNASFEE + 0.073 9.21 *** 0.073 9.23 ***
Constant ? 7.147 23.90 *** 7.116 22.72 ***
Fixed effects INDUSTRY/YEAR INDUSTRY/YEAR
Observations 920 920
F-stat. 78.24 *** 58.82 ***
Adjusted R2 0.578 0.577
This table reports the multiple regression results for the audit fee model presented in equation (3). In 
Column (1), the variable of interest is the presence of a business relationship (BR), and in Column (2), 
the variables of interest are the seven types of business relationships. The coefficients estimates and 
t-values are based on robust standard errors that are White’s (1980) heteroscedasticity-consistent. *, **, 
*** indicates significant at the α = 0.10; 0.05; 0.01 level, respectively (two-tailed). See Table 2 for variable 
definitions.
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 Regarding the control variables, audit fees are significantly higher for companies 
that are larger (p = 0.000), are listed at one of the main exchanges (p = 0.000), have more 
subsidiaries (p = 0.000), are audited by a Big 4 auditor (p = 0.030), and purchase more 
non-audit services (p = 0.000). Audit fees are significantly lower for companies with 
higher return on assets (p = 0.035). All significant control variables have signs as previously 
predicted. No significant associations were found for inventories and receivables over 
total assets, leverage, loss, listing, and first-year audits. 
 Overall, the results presented in Table 5 support H1a and not H1b. They show that 
there is a positive association between the presence of a business relationship and audit 
fees. This suggests that audit firms are extending their audit effort and/or are charging a 
premium in order to safeguard their independence which may be threatened by the 
business relationship or compensate for any losses they may incur from such a threat in 
the future. 
 Table 6 presents coefficients estimates and t-values from the earnings quality 
model in equation (4). Columns (1)-(3) present results of tests of the association between 
business relationships and abnormal accruals (ATA) using a performance-adjusted 
modified Jones model (absolute, income-increasing (ATA>0), and income-decreasing 
(ATA<0), respectively) with BR as independent variable of interest. The coefficients for BR 
are insignificant, suggesting no association between the presence of a business relationship 
and earnings quality. Columns (4)-(6) present results of tests of the associations between 
the different types of business relationships and abnormal total accruals (absolute, 
income-increasing (ATA>0), and income-decreasing (ATA<0), respectively). The 
coefficients for the business relationships involving ICT services and car leases are negative 
and significantly different from 0 (p = 0.063 and 0.007 respectively) in the regression on 
absolute ATA. In the regression on income-increasing ATA only the coefficient for the 
business relationships involving car leases is negative and significantly different from 0 (p 
= 0.015). These results suggest a negative association between the presence of such a 
business relationship and abnormal total accruals. The coefficients for the other types of 
business relationships are not significant.
 In Table 7 the analyses on audit fees and earnings quality are re-performed taking 
into consideration the combination of business relationships with non-audit services. 
The table presents the coefficients estimates and t-values for the variables of interests. 
The results for the control variables are unreported for brevity. First, separate tests were 
performed for the observations with above- and below-median non-audit fees relative to 
audit fees. For the audit fee model (Columns (1) and (2)), the results are qualitatively 
similar to those presented in Table 5. The presence of a business relationship is associated 
with higher audit fees, irrespective of the level of non-audit fees relative to audit fees. For 
the earnings quality model, the results in Column (4) show the coefficient for BR to be 
significantly negative (p = 0.034) suggesting a negative association between the presence 
of a business relationship and abnormal total accruals for observations with high non-
audit fees relative to audit fees. For observations with below-median non-audit fees BR is 
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insignificant (Column (5)). Second, tests were performed on the full sample including an 
interaction term between the presence of a business relationship and a dummy variable 
equal to 1 if the non-audit fees relative to audit fees are above median (HIGHNAS). For the 
audit fee model (Column (3)), the coefficients for BR and HIGHNAS are significant, while 
the coefficient for the interaction term is insignificant. This suggests that both a business 
relationship and high non-audit fees relative to audit fees are associated with higher 
audit fees, but there appears to be no interaction effect. For the earnings quality model 
(Column (6)), the coefficient for the interaction term is significantly negative 
(p = 0.055). 
 Overall, the results presented in Tables 6 and 7 provide some support for H2a and 
no support for H2b. The results show that, while audit fees are consistently higher in the 
presence of a business relationship, abnormal total accruals appear to be mostly 
unchanged, except when the business relationship coincides with high non-audit fees 
relative to audit fees. For those observations, abnormal total accruals are found to be 
lower, indicating higher earnings quality. This suggests that the increase in audit fees 
appears to be due to an increase in audit effort, particularly when the independence 
threat is larger due to simultaneous higher non-audit fees. However, for the observations 
with a business relationship and lower non-audit fees, the results provide no support for 
either H2a or H2b and therefore do not completely rule out alternative explanations for 
higher audit fees, such as the audit firm charging a risk premium to the audit client with 
whom it maintains a business relationship.20
3.5.3 Sensitivity Analyses
A number of sensitivity analyses were conducted to determine if the results are robust. 
The results are summarized below.
High Accrual Companies
H1a incorporates the expectation that increased risk, as caused by a business relationship, 
will be associated with higher audit fees. Prior studies show that clients’ accruals pose a 
risk to the auditor, since high-accrual companies have greater potential for asset 
realization problems and, in more extreme cases, going concern problems (Francis and 
Krishnan 1999). Hribar et al. (2014) find auditors to increase both audit hours and audit 
fees in cases where the auditors perceive a client’s accounting quality to be low (i.e., 
clients with high accruals). Based on these prior findings, it may be that the positive 
20 Church et al. (2015, 228) provide some explanation for why one might !nd di$erent results for 
di$erent audit quality proxies: “Our examination of experimental studies suggests that cognitive 
and motivational biases have the potential to impair independence and, consequently, weaken 
the audit process. By comparison, our examination of archival studies fails to de!nitively link test 
variables (i.e., auditor fees and lengthy auditor tenure) with evidence of compromised indepen-
dence. Taken as a whole, the !ndings suggest that, although judgmental biases may hinder the 
audit process, such biases do not necessarily degrade audit outputs.”
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association between business relationships and audit fees is primarily driven by high-
accrual audit clients. 
 As a sensitivity test, the audit fee regressions (untabulated) are performed 
separate ly for audit clients with income-increasing or income-decreasing abnormal total 
accruals, and with above-median or below-median absolute abnormal total accruals.21 
The coefficient for the variable BR is positive and significant in all these tests. Furthermore, 
a fifth regression is performed on the full sample including an interaction term between 
the presence of a business relationship and a dummy variable equal to 1 if the audit 
client’s absolute abnormal total accruals are above median. In this test, only the coefficient 
for BR is positive and significant. The coefficient for the interaction term is insignificant. 
This suggests that audit fees are higher in the presence of a business relationship, 
irrespective of the level of abnormal total accruals. Overall, these findings suggest that 
the positive association between business relationships and audit fees is not primarily 
driven by high-accrual audit clients.
 For the earnings quality analysis, in addition to the separate regression tests for 
income-increasing and income-decreasing abnormal total accruals already presented in 
Table 6, additional regression tests are performed for above-median and below-median 
absolute abnormal total accruals. In neither of these tests (untabulated) is the coefficient 
for BR significant. However, the coefficient for BR is found to be negative and significant 
for the observations with both above-median absolute abnormal total accruals and 
above-median non-audit fees relative to audit fees, consistent with the results in Table 7.
Audit Firm Size
The research sample used in this study includes companies audited by 12 audit firms with 
a license to perform statutory audits for both PIEs and other companies.22 These 12 audit 
firms include the Big 4 and mid-tier network firms as well as a few relatively small local 
audit firms. Big N auditors are generally found to charge on average higher audit fees to 
their clients (e.g., Craswell et al. 1995; Ettredge and Greenberg 1990; Francis and Simon 
1987). In addition, prior research has shown that audit quality is not homogeneous 
across audit firms and that the largest firms, i.e., the Big N audit firms, provide higher-
quality audits than smaller, non-Big N, audit firms (e.g., Boone et al. 2010; Francis 2004; 
Francis and Krishnan 1999; Becker et al. 1998). In order to test whether the results hold 
throughout the entire sample or are primarily driven by the Big 4 observations, the 
following sensitivity tests are performed. 
 First, the regression of equation (3) is estimated separately for Big 4 audit clients 
and for non-Big 4 audit clients to test whether the positive association between business 
relationships and audit fees as found for the full sample holds for these two subsamples. 
21 Abnormal total accruals are estimated using the performance-adjusted cross-sectional modi!ed 
Jones model described before. 
22 "ree of the 15 audit !rms with a PIE license included in the AFM review indicated that they 
maintained no business relationships with audit clients. 
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Untabulated results show that the coefficient of BR is positive and significant for both Big 
4 audit clients and non-Big 4 audit clients (p = 0.000 and 0.007 respectively). This suggests 
that Big 4 and non-Big 4 auditors respond similarly to the presence of a business 
relationship with an audit client. In a further analysis on the full sample, the Big 4 dum my 
variable is interacted with the business relationship dummy variable. The coefficient for 
this interaction term is insignificant and the coefficients for the business relationships 
and Big 4 variables are both positive and significant (p = 0.001 and 0.067 respectively). 
This suggests that, while the presence of a business relationship and Big 4 auditors are 
both individually associated with higher audit fees, there appears to be no specific Big 4 
effect regarding the association between business relationships and audit fees. 
 The same tests are performed for the earnings quality analyses of equation (4) 
presented in Table 6. No significant association between business relationships and 
earnings quality was found in these tests. For the analyses presented in Table 7, separate 
regressions for Big 4 and non-Big 4 observations show that the results hold only for the 
Big 4 observations. However, the insignificant results for the (relatively few) non-Big 4 
observations may be due to a lack of power.
Public Interest Entities
In Dutch audit regulation an important distinction is made between the audits for PIEs 
(i.e., listed companies, banks and insurance companies) and non-PIE audit clients. For 
audits of PIEs, additional standards and in particular additional independence 
requirements apply. Since the audits of PIEs are arguably under higher scrutiny of both 
the audit oversight body and the general public, I test whether the results hold throughout 
the entire sample or are primarily driven by PIE client observations. In both separate 
audit fee regressions for PIE and non-PIE audit client observations, BR is positive and 
significant (p = 0.000). In the regression for the full sample including the interaction 
between BR and a PIE dummy, BR is still positive and significant, while both PIE and the 
interaction between BR and PIE are insignificant. These results suggest that there is no 
specific PIE effect in the association between business relationships and audit fees. 
 For the earnings quality analysis, BR is found to be consistently insignificant. In 
the regression for the full sample with the interaction between BR and PIE, only the 
coefficient for PIE is negative and significant (p = 0.001), indicating that while business 
relationships appear to have no association with earnings quality, the abnormal total 
accruals of PIE audit clients are significantly lower than those of non-PIE audit clients. 
For the analyses presented in Table 7, separate regressions for PIE and non-PIE observations 
show that the results hold only for the non-PIE observations. However, the insignificant 
results for the (relatively few) PIE observations may be due to a lack of power.
Demand for Audit Quality
Agency theory provides an explanation of why different levels of audit quality are 
demanded. There are economic incentives for some companies to demand higher 
quality audits, even though these audits cost more than lower quality audits (Francis 
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1984). Indeed, Lennox and Pittman (2011) find that companies with a low demand for 
audit quality were only passively complying with mandatory audit requirements, which 
was evident in their attempts to reduce costs through auditor choice and fees. Further, 
Griffin et al. (2010) find that companies with a high demand for audit quality, i.e., 
companies with high free cash flows and low growth opportunities, are charged higher 
audit fees by their auditors. Based on these prior findings, it may be that the positive 
association between business relationships and audit fees is primarily driven by 
companies with a higher demand for audit quality. 
 A dummy variable is constructed to distinguish companies with a higher versus 
lower demand for audit quality (HIGHDEM). This dummy variable is equal to 1 if the 
company’s values for total assets, leverage, ratio of inventory, receivables and payables to 
total assets, sales growth, and number of shareholders, are above the median for at least 
three of these values. These items are expected to be indicative of higher agency costs 
leading to a higher demand for audit quality. Subsequently, the audit fee regressions are 
estimated separately for audit clients with a higher demand for audit quality and for 
audit clients with a lower demand for audit quality to test whether the positive association 
between business relationships and audit fees as found for the full sample holds for these 
two subsamples. The coefficient of BR is positive and significant in both regressions 
(untabulated). In a third audit fee regression (untabulated), the high demand dummy 
variable is interacted with the business relationship dummy variable. The coefficient for 
this interaction term is insignificant, implying that the auditor’s response to the presence 
of a business relationship with an audit client is not dependent on the audit client’s 
demand for audit quality. In similar sensitivity tests for the earnings quality analysis, BR 
is found to be consistently insignificant.
Monetary value of business relationships
To further test the robustness of the results, I use two alternative measures for business 
relationships. First, the BR dummy variable used in the analyses is replaced by the natural 
logarithm of the monetary values involved in the business relationships. These concern 
the fees paid for goods or services provided by audit clients.23 Second, the BR dummy 
variable is replaced by the monetary values involved in the business relationships scaled 
by the audit firm’s total revenue (i.e., a measure for audit firm size). Untabulated results 
show the same outcomes for both alternative measures for business relationships, both 
for the audit fee and the earnings quality analyses. 
23 And in case of !nancial companies (only included in the audit fee analysis) the amounts of money 
borrowed by the audit !rm from the audit client that is a bank, or the amounts of insurance pre-
mium paid by the audit !rm to the audit client that is an insurance company. 
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3.6 Conclusion 
This paper investigates how audit firms respond to the existence of a business relationship 
with an audit client, in terms of adjusting their audit efforts or risk premiums, by 
examining the association of the business relationship with audit fees and earnings 
quality. For all Dutch companies audited by one of the audit firms with a so-called PIE 
license, a propensity-score matching approach is used to construct a sample of all Dutch 
companies maintaining a business relationship with their audit firm matched with 
companies without such business relationships. Data on business relationships and 
audit fees were obtained from the proprietary files of the Dutch audit oversight body. The 
results show that audit fees are higher in the presence of an auditor-client business 
relationship. Further, results from the analysis of abnormal total accruals suggest that 
the increase in audit fees appears to be at least partly due to an increase in audit effort. 
Results show some evidence of a business relationship being associated with higher 
earnings quality, particularly in those situations where the business relationship 
coincides with high non-audit fees relative to audit fees, suggesting that increased audit 
fees are likely explained by increased audit effort or quality control safeguards. These 
results are robust to a number of sensitivity tests on cross-sectional subsamples (e.g., 
based on the audit firm size (Big 4 or non-Big 4), type of audit client (PIE or non-PIE), 
demand for audit quality, and client risk), as well as for an alternative measure of business 
relationships (i.e., the monetary value of these business relationships) and alternative 
matching methods. 
 Overall, the results suggest that audit firms respond to the circumstances in which 
they maintain a business relationship with an audit client, most likely by adjusting their 
audit efforts, resulting in higher audit fees and higher earnings quality. No evidence of 
impaired independence is found, which would likely have resulted in lower audit fees 
and lower earnings quality. 
 I acknowledge a number of limitations in my analyses. An important disadvantage 
of using audit fees as the dependent variable is that in addition to audit effort, audit fees 
also measure the auditor’s risk premium for expected legal liability (Simunic 1980) as 
well as audit efficiency (e.g., Knechel and Sharma 2012), which may be difficult to 
entangle. Furthermore, Johnstone and Bedard (2001, 2003) argue that audit effort itself 
is endogenous: in addition to charging a risk premium, the auditor responds to higher 
audit risk by increasing audit effort. The second dependent variable, abnormal total 
accruals as a proxy for earnings quality, also has a number of limitations, including 
measurement error. Although measurement error may prevent incorrect significant 
associations, it is problematic when conclusions are drawn based on insignificant 
associations (e.g., DeFond and Zhang 2014). Finally, since earnings quality is influenced 
by factors other than audit quality, low audit quality will not necessarily be associated 
with low earnings quality (Gaynor et al. 2015).
 There are also some limitations caused by the use of the propensity-score matching 
approach to construct the research sample (e.g., Lawrence et al. 2011). For instance, 
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Abstract
This study examines the association between audit firm governance characteristics and 
three firm-level output measures of audit quality: (a) stakeholder dissatisfaction; (b) 
regulatory attention; and (c) audit market exit. The purpose is to identify audit quality 
indicators and increase the understanding of audit firms and their governance. Audit 
firm governance is operationalized by constructing organizational and quality control 
variables based on data obtained from the proprietary files of the Dutch public oversight 
body. Using the population of Dutch audit firms licensed to perform statutory audits 
over the period 2009-2014, the results show that several audit firm governance 
characteristics are associated, albeit to a different extent, with the three firm-level output 
measures of audit quality. Additional tests show that the informational value of the audit 
firm governance characteristics has increased over time. This study contributes to the 
growing literature on audit firm governance characteristics and audit quality indicators. 
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4.1 Introduction
Audit firm governance has become an important issue on the agenda of regulators, 
standard setters and public oversight bodies. It is a broad concept which relates to factors 
like governance structure, quality control policies, human resource policies, independence 
and ethics of the audit firm (IOSCO 2009). The governance of an audit firm is expected to 
have a significant influence on the audit quality delivered by that firm. Regulation has 
been introduced including requirements for audit firm governance (e.g., The Sarbanes-
Oxley Act of 2002 (U.S. House of Representatives 2002), Directive 2006/43/EC on 
Statutory Audits of Annual and Consolidated Accounts (European Union 2006), and the 
Audit Firm Governance Code in the U.K. (ICAEW/FRC 2010)). Increasing transparency 
with regard to the governance and professional practices of audit firms, particularly in 
the form of publishing audit quality indicators and thereby increasing the availability of 
data on audit firm characteristics, has been on the agendas of several standard-setters, 
regulators, and legislators (e.g., PCAOB 2013; IOSCO 2009; ACAP 2008; FRC 2008; 
European Union 2006, Article 40).2 The purpose of the transparency recommendations 
is to increase market participants’ ability to observe audit quality, thus enabling 
differentiation among audit firms on the basis of publicly available data. Audit quality 
indicators are expected to benefit auditors, issuers, and financial statement users by 
providing indicators of audit quality that improve observability of audit processes 
(Martin 2013), provide incentives for firms to increase audit quality (Bedard et al. 2010), 
and increase competition. In the words of James R. Doty, PCAOB Chairman, in his 
statement on the PCAOB’s Concept Release on Audit Quality Indicators (PCAOB 2015): 
“In an environment where all audits look alike on paper, it should be no surprise that there 
is considerable pressure and competition on the basis of fees. With more information 
about the inputs to audits, I hope to balance that pressure with more competition on 
quality as well.”
In response to recent calls for more transparency, a number of jurisdictions (including 
the E.U.) now require audit firms with public interest entities (PIEs) as audit clients, i.e., 
listed companies, insurance companies, and credit instituations, to publicly disclose 
information on their governance practices. However, research on audit firm governance, 
and its association with audit quality in particular, is considered important (e.g., Bedard 
et al. 2008; Maijoor and Vanstraelen 2012), but thus far limited (e.g., Jenkins et al. 2008; 
McNair 1991; Abdel-khalik and Solomon 1988), partly due to the limited availability of 
data on (governance) characteristics of audit firms (Francis 2011). This study identifies 
audit quality indicators using audit firm governance characteristics, and links those 
2 In November 2015, the Federation of European Accountants published an information paper 
with an overview of audit quality indicators initiatives by nine di$erent organizations worldwide, 
including regulators, oversight bodies, professional bodies, and audit !rms (FEE 2015).
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characteristics to three distinct audit firm-level output measures of audit quality: (a) 
stakeholder dissatisfaction (i.e., the total number of complaints and claims filed directly 
to the audit firm, complaints filed with the disciplinary court for auditors, and other legal 
proceedings); (b) regulatory attention (i.e., the number of inspections and sanctions by 
the public oversight body); and (c) audit market exit.
 This study contributes to the emerging literature on audit quality indicators and 
audit firm governance by providing the first descriptive analysis of audit firm governance 
(i.e., organizational and quality control) characteristics associated with firm-level output 
measures of audit quality. Even though detailed information about large samples of audit 
firms is usually difficult to obtain (Casterella et al. 2010), this study includes all active 
audit firms on the Dutch statutory audit market.3 I obtained the governance characteris-
tics from the proprietary files of the Dutch audit oversight body, the Netherlands 
Authority for the Financial Markets (AFM), since they are for the most part not publicly 
disclosed. I differentiate the descriptive statistics by type of audit firm (Big 8 versus non-
Big 8), earlier versus later years of public oversight, whether or not the audit firm faced 
stakeholder dissatisfaction, experienced increased regulatory attention or exited the 
audit market. In multivariate analyses, I examine the association between these audit 
firm governance characteristics and the three output measures in order to assess their 
value in explaining audit quality at the firm level (Martin 2013). 
 In univariate tests, I find that many audit firm governance characteristics are 
significantly different for Big 8 and non-Big 8 audit firms, for the earlier years of public 
oversight (i.e., 2009-2011) versus later years (i.e., 2012-2014), and whether or not audit 
firms faced stakeholder dissatisfaction, experienced increased regulatory attention, or 
exited the audit market. Multivariate analyses provide support that several audit firm 
governance characteristics are associated with distinct firm-level output measures of 
audit quality, albeit to a different extent. Specifically, I document stakeholder 
dissatisfaction to be associated with the audit firm expecting organizational change or 
discontinuity and a higher proportion of audit clients for which audit fees are smaller 
than fees for other services. Further, I document regulatory attention to be associated 
with a lower proportion of audit-qualified directors, a higher proportion of audit clients 
for which audit fees are smaller than fees for other services, no SRA membership4, 
increased stakeholder dissatisfaction in the previous year, more registered signals, and 
more and larger audit engagements. Finally, I document audit market exits to be 
associated with the audit firm expecting organizational change or discontinuity, more 
stakeholder dissatisfaction, increased regulatory attention in the previous year, more 
registered signals, a lower likelihood of having appointed a compliance officer, and fewer 
and smaller audit engagements. Interestingly, additional tests provide evidence that the 
3 I.e., all audit !rms that have a license to perform statutory audits in the Netherlands and actually 
perform such audits. 
4 SRA is the association for cooperating registered accountants and accounting administration 
consultants, which performs regular quality reviews for its members. 
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informational value of the audit firm governance characteristics has increased over time. 
Collectively, these findings contribute to the growing literature on audit firm governance 
characteristics and audit quality indicators. 
 The remainder of this study proceeds as follows. The next section reviews prior 
literature on audit firm governance and audit quality indicators, and describes the 
development of the general research hypothesis. The third section describes the data 
collection and research design. The fourth section describes the hypothesis development. 
The empirical findings are reported in the fifth section. Finally, the last section provides 
the conclusion, limitations, and suggestions for further research.
4.2 Background
4.2.1 Audit Firm Governance Definition and Regulation
Audit firm governance consists of mechanisms and procedures such as authority 
structures, rules, policies, standard operating procedures, and reward and incentive 
systems (Hopwood 1976). The IOSCO report (2009) considers audit firm governance to 
include policies and structures that comprise how the entity is organized as well as the 
systems, policies, and procedures in place to achieve various goals, including audit 
quality. The governance, including the organizational structure and the system of 
quality control, of audit firms is perceived to have a significant influence on audit quality 
and an audit firm’s ability to continuously provide audit services to the market. Therefore, 
it supports audit firms in their objectives of performing high quality work that gives 
confidence to shareholders, according to the U.K. Audit Firm Governance Code (ICAEW/
FRC 2010, 2).
 Since audit firm governance is expected to have a significant influence on the 
audit quality delivered by the firm, regulations have been introduced to enhance audit 
firm governance (e.g., The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (U.S. House of Representatives 
2002), Directive 2006/43/EC on Statutory Audits of Annual and Consolidated Accounts 
(European Union 2006), and the Audit Firm Governance Code in the U.K. (ICAEW/FRC 
2010)). In the Netherlands, these requirements have been implemented in the Audit 
Firms Supervision Act (AFS Act 2006) which came into force in October 2006 and 
concerns the Dutch implementation of the aforementioned E.U. Directive (European 
Union 2006). These requirements concern the audit firms’ organizational characteristics 
and their systems of quality control. The organizational aspects apply for instance to the 
good reputation of the audit firm’s leadership, ownership and voting rights in the audit 
firm, appointment of independent non-executives or installment of an indepen dent 
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supervisory body5, and generally the controlled and sound business operations that 
should prevent the involvement of the audit firm or its employees in any integrity issue 
which could be detrimental to the confidence in the audit firm or in the financial 
markets. Furthermore, the AFS Act requires audit firms to comply with the regulations 
and standards set by the professional body. Quality control requirements applicable in 
the Netherlands are primarily stipulated by the auditing standards set by the IAASB, e.g., 
ISA 220 and ISQC 1 (IAASB 2009a, 2009c) and implemented by the Dutch professional 
body for auditors. Audit firms must have and maintain a system of quality control that 
includes policies and procedures that address each of the following elements: (a) 
leadership responsibilities for quality within the firm; (b) relevant ethical requirements; 
(c) acceptance and continuance of client relationships and specific engagements; (d) 
human resources; (e) engagement performance (including direction, supervision and 
performance, reviews, consultation, and engagement quality control review (EQCR)); 
and (f) monitoring (IAASB 2009c, paragraph 16). The Dutch audit oversight body 
supervises the compliance with all applicable legislation, regulation and standards by 
audit firms performing statutory audits. 
4.2.2 Prior Literature
There is ample research on the positive effects of strong corporate governance on 
companies. For instance, better-governed companies are found to have a lower incidence 
of (accruals-based) earnings management, fraud and fraudulent reporting (e.g., Klein 
2002; Beasley et al. 2000; Niu 2006), to have higher operating performance (e.g., Klein 
1998; Klapper and Love 2004; Vander Bauwhede 2009), and to be relatively more 
profitable, more valuable, and pay out more cash to their shareholders (Brown and 
Caylor 2004).6 However, Jenkins et al. (2008) argue that while there is a significant body 
of literature on governance structures within corporations, much of the findings reported 
in that literature are not applicable to audit firms because of their distinct operating and 
ownership characteristics. For instance, while corporate governance typically recognizes 
stockholders as the primary stakeholder, the auditor’s responsibility to act in the public 
interest suggests that audit firm governance should recognize a diverse set of stakeholders 
(e.g., investors, regulators, clients, and employees) (Jenkins et al. 2008). Further, audit 
firms are generally regarded as professional services firms (Morris and Empson 1998) or 
knowledge-intensive firms (Ditillo 2004) since they provide intangible solutions to 
5 In 2014, the Future Accountancy Profession Working Group, consisting of a number of young 
audit partners of various large and smaller audit !rms, dra'ed a sector-wide report with measures 
to improve the quality and independence of the audit in the Netherlands (Future Accountancy 
Profession Working Group 2014). "e Dutch audit !rms with PIE audit clients have committed 
themselves to implementing these measures. One of these measures involves the installment of 
independent supervisory bodies at audit !rms with PIE clients. "e Dutch legislator has em-
braced this measure and is expected to implement this requirement in the AFS Act on 1 July 
2017. 
6 It should be noted that it is challenging in these types of studies to control for endogeneity.
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customer problems by using mainly the knowledge of their individuals. For this reason, 
Covaleski et al. (1998) suggest that the traditional view of control or governance within 
organizations (i.e., bureaucratic versus professional controls) fails to recognize that for 
audit firms elements of each form of control may be present. Greenwood et al. (1990) 
point out that in corporate governance there is separation between ownership, 
management, and operational employees. However, in audit firms, often organized as 
partnerships, ownership, management, and operations are combined.
 Research on audit firm governance, and audit firm characteristics in general, is 
limited. Studies on audit firm characteristics appear to have started with a focus on 
management or cost control (e.g., McNair 1991; Abernethy and Stoelwinder 1995; Otley 
and Pierce 1996; Ditillo 2004; Pierce and Sweeney 2005; Sweeney and Pierce 2005, 2006) 
or with a focus on one specific audit firm aspect, such as size (Big 4/ non-Big 4 dichotomy) 
or industry specialization (Francis 2011). A number of prior studies have examined a 
broader set of audit firm characteristics and their association with various audit quality 
measures. For instance, Casterella et al. (2010) examined the association between certain 
audit firm characteristics and audit firm litigation risk. They find that larger firms, firms 
experiencing rapid growth, firms that sue their clients, firms with a history of (regulatory) 
problems, and firms that choose smaller deductibles all face greater litigation risk. Other 
studies relate various audit firm characteristics to PCAOB-identified audit deficiencies, 
and find these deficiencies positively associated with the number of issuer clients and 
audit firm growth and negatively associated with audit firm size, the number of branch 
offices, the human capital leverage and the organization structure as Limited Liability 
Partnership firms (Hermanson et al. 2007; Kang et al. 2014). DeFond and Lennox (2011) 
studied the characteristics of audit firms exiting the audit market following SOX and find 
that the over six hundred exiting firms are of lower quality, where quality is measured by: 
(1) avoidance of AICPA peer reviews and failure to comply with PCAOB rules, and (2) 
severity of the peer review and inspection reports. Christensen et al. (2015a) add to this 
study by examining characteristics of audit firms merging with other audit firms 
following SOX and find that small audit firms with a higher inspection burden (i.e., that 
were inspected by the PCAOB and/or had a higher number of engagements inspected by 
the PCAOB) had a higher likelihood to be acquired, while larger firms (with more partners 
and more clients) were more likely to be on the acquiring side of the merger. Lee and Bae 
(2012) operationalize and calculate eight input-based and two output-based audit firm 
quality indicators7 and find that these generally relate positively to audit hours, audit 
fees, and negatively to discretionary accruals, and prior year error corrections at the 
engagement-level. However, when examining audit firm governance disclosures in 
7 I.e., professional sta$-to-partner ratio, partner-to-public company client ratio, professional 
sta$-to-public company client ratio, professional chargeable hours managed per audit partner, 
chargeable hours per audit professional sta$, annual sta$ retention, percentage of an audit !rm’s 
revenues spent on training, and average years of professionals’ experience (input-based indica-
tors), and assurance revenue ratio and average pro!ts per partner (output-based) (Lee and Bae 
2012). 
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transparency reports, Deumes et al. (2012) do not find an association with actual audit 
quality measured by abnormal working capital accruals. They conclude that current 
transparency report disclosures do not appear to reveal underlying audit firm quality. 
Based on a summary of disclosures made in the 2013 transparency reports by Australian 
audit firms, Fu et al. (2015) find diversity in the disclosures, especially in the areas which 
may impact audit quality (i.e., the audit firms’ internal quality control systems, 
independence practices, continuing education policies and partners’ remuneration 
structures). 
4.3 Development of Hypothesis 
As Knechel et al. (2013) point out, users, auditors, regulators, and society—all stakeholders 
in the financial reporting process—may have very different views as to what constitutes 
audit quality. This will influence the type of indicators one might use to assess audit 
quality. Since the purpose of audit quality indicators is to improve transparency of audit 
firms and their audit processes, and thereby providing incentives for firms (e.g., through 
increased competition) to increase audit quality (Bedard et al. 2010; Martin 2013; PCAOB 
2015), the primary focus of the audit quality indicators appears to be at the audit firm-
level (as opposed to the audit engagement-level). In fact, a distinguishing feature of 
auditor characteristic measures when compared to the other audit quality measures is 
that they are not engagement specific (DeFond and Zhang 2014). Therefore, I infer audit 
quality from three direct firm-level output measures: (a) stakeholder dissatisfaction; (b) 
regulatory attention; and (c) audit market exit. I examine the association of various audit 
firm governance characteristics with these three output measures (which are further 
operationalized in the next section). Based on the assumptions and expectations 
underlying the audit firm governance requirements, I posit the following research 
hypotheses:
 H1:  Audit firms with stronger governance mechanisms in place are less likely to 
  be confronted with stakeholder dissatisfaction. 
 H2:  Audit firms with stronger governance mechanisms in place are less likely to 
  trigger regulatory attention. 
 H3:  Audit firms with stronger governance mechanisms in place are less likely to 
  exit the audit market. 
4.4 Research Design
4.4.1 Sample
I obtained the data for this study from the proprietary files of the Dutch oversight body, 
the AFM. The AFM is responsible for public oversight of audit firms performing statutory 
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audits in the Netherlands. It grants licenses to audit firms that wish to perform statutory 
audits and revokes licenses if audit firms no longer perform statutory audits and request 
the AFM to do so or if an audit firm is severely non-compliant with the applicable 
requirements. The AFM keeps a public register of licensed audit firms, including detailed 
information about for instance the audit firms’ management, auditors, and legal form. 
Audit firms have been required to apply for a license to perform statutory audits since 
October 2006. In the first two years, i.e., until 2008, a transitional regime was applicable 
in which the AFM assessed the license applications of all audit firms already active in the 
audit market in 2006. In 2009, the AFM started its ‘regular’ inspections of licensed audit 
firms. As part of its risk-based supervision, the AFM requests licensed audit firms to 
complete a yearly monitoring questionnaire including, amongst other topics, questions 
regarding the audit firms’ governance and client portfolios. Furthermore, the AFM 
maintains records of its internally registered signals about licensed audit firms, performs 
inspections and investigations, and imposes sanctions.
 From this data, I created a panel dataset for the period 2009 to 2014 consisting of 
audit firm observations for each year in which the audit firm was licensed to perform 
statutory audits. Observations of audit firms ceasing to exist due to a merger with another 
audit firm, death or retirement of management (i.e., mostly the sole proprietor) were 
excluded. Observations of audit firms not performing any statutory audits were also 
excluded.8 After excluding audit firm-year observations with insufficient data to perform
8 Audit !rms not performing any statutory audits are excluded for two reasons. First, these audit 
!rms may have had other incentives to apply for a license, since they legally do not require one. 
Second, many audit !rm governance variables are by default equal to 0 if the audit !rm performs 
no statutory audits. 
Table 1
Sample Composition
Active licenses Observations
Year Total New Revoked Deleted Missing 
data
Total
2009 501 18 22 73 99 329
2010 501 22 29 108 16 377
2011 490 18 16 92 9 389
2012 487 13 30 92 6 389
2013 467 10 27 89 4 374
2014 445 5 31 66 2 377
Total 86 155 515 141 2,235
This table reports the number of active licensed audit firms (total, newly granted licenses, and 
revoked licenses), observations deleted because of mergers, death, retirement, or because the audit 
firm performs no statutory audits, audit firms with missing data, and the number of observations in 
the sample for each year (2009-2014), respectively.
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multivariate tests, the final sample consists of 2,235 observations. The sample 
composition for each of the years 2009-2014 is reported in Table 1.9 This table shows that 
the number of actively licensed audit firms steadily declined by 11 percent in the 2009-
2014 period (from 501 to 445).
4.4.2 Empirical Model
I examine the relationship between audit firm governance characteristics, i.e., audit 
firms’ organizational and quality control characteristics, and audit firm quality, using 
variations of the following regression model:
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where AFQ reflects audit firm quality operationalized by three distinct audit firm-level 
output measures, as described below and summarized in Table 2.
Dependent Variables: Audit Firm Quality Measures
In Model (1), AFQ is operationalized by (a) stakeholder dissatisfaction (DISSAT); (b) 
regulatory attention (REGATT); and (c) audit market exit (EXIT), which are all indicative 
of lower audit firm quality.10 By inferring audit quality from these audit firm-level 
measures, the unit of analysis is similar on both sides of the equation: the dependent 
variables (i.e., DISSAT, REGATT, and EXIT) and the explanatory variables are quality 
indicators at the audit firm level. Further, these measures enable an analysis of all active 
audit firms in the Dutch statutory audit market, including both large and small audit 
firms. Many audit quality proxies are measures on the audit engagement level (e.g., 
discretionary accruals, going-concern opinions, restatements, audit hours, audit fees), 
which are practically only measurable for large audit firms, i.e., audit firms with a 
substantive number of audit clients for which sufficient data are available (e.g., financials 
statements, stock listings, trading information, auditor reports). This means that these 
audit quality measures are not applicable to the small(est) audit firms.
9 Table 1 shows that the number of observations excluded due to missing data is relatively high in 
2009. Additional tests (untabulated) show that excluding all observations for the year 2009 does 
not inXuence the main !ndings. 
10 Since DISSAT and REGATT are both count variables with limited range and a large proportion of 
zero-observations, I use zero-inXated negative binomial regressions for models with these mea-
sures as the dependent variables. As EXIT is a binary variable, I use a probit regression when this 
measure is the dependent variable.
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 DISSAT indicates the amount of stakeholder dissatisfaction and is measured as 
the total number of complaints and claims filed directly to the audit firm, complaints 
filed with the disciplinary court for auditors, and other legal proceedings. Since these 
events are directly related to the size of the audit firm, the individual components are 
scaled by either the total number of audit engagements or auditors of the audit firm (see 
Table 2 for more details). This measure is expected to be a broad approximation of 
litigation risk. 
 REGATT is the measure of regulatory attention the audit firm receives, i.e., the 
total number of inspections performed and sanctions imposed by the public oversight 
body to the audit firm.11 Increased attention from the public oversight body may impose 
costs on audit firms (particularly small firms), which may incentivize them to exit the 
audit market (DeFond and Lennox 2011). Further, regulatory indicators, such as the 
number of identified deficiencies, are found to be viewed by investors as important 
indicators of overall audit firm quality (Christensen et al. 2015b). 
 EXIT is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the audit firm exits the statutory audit 
market by having its license revoked, and otherwise 0. Audit firms may for instance leave 
the statutory audit market because they deliberately choose to resign from all their 
statutory audit engagements, their clients are no longer required to have their accounts 
audited, they are no longer able or willing (e.g., due to costs) to comply with the quality 
requirements and to be subject to public oversight. Audit firms leaving the statutory 
audit market because their sole proprietor died or retired, and audit firms that had their 
license revoked because they merged with or were acquired by another audit firm are 
eliminated from the sample. A few prior studies have examined audit firms exiting the 
markets for auditing issuers (Read et al. 2004; DeFond and Lennox 2011) and U.S. broker-
dealers (Bedard et al. 2015). These studies focus on exits in the period right before audit 
firms were required to register with the PCAOB. The audit market exits included in the 
current study concern audit firms that already entered the market and obtained the 
required license from the public oversight body, but later had that license revoked and 
left the statutory audit market. The characteristics of audit firms deciding not to enter a 
market may be different from the characteristics of audit firms deciding to exit that 
market after they had already entered.12 
11 An inspection consists of an assessment by the public oversight body of the audit !rm’s compli-
ance with the applicable legislation and regulations. "is assessment includes the review of a 
risk-based selection of audit !les. "e number of audit !les reviewed and the duration and extent 
of the inspection is dependent on the size of the audit !rm (i.e., one inspection at a large audit !rm 
may include more audit !les and last longer and one inspection at a small audit !rm may include 
fewer audit !les and last shorter). "erefore, scaling of the number of inspections is deemed re-
dundant, since it already takes into account audit !rm size. 
12 "e Dutch public oversight body has not yet revoked any licenses as part of its sanctioning pow-
ers. Rather, all audit market exits were initiated by the audit !rms. 
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Test Variables: Audit Firm Organizational Characteristics
 EXDIRECTOR_AUDIT measures the proportion of the audit firm’s executive 
directors managing the audit firm having an audit qualification. Article 3(4)(b) of the 
Statutory Audit Directive (European Union 2006) and Article 16 of the Dutch AFS Act 
state that a majority of the members of the administrative or management body of the 
audit firm (i.e., its executive directors) must be audit firms which are approved in any 
Member State or natural persons who satisfy at least the conditions imposed on individual 
auditors (i.e., hold an audit qualification). Since the management of a large professional 
service organization, such as an audit firm, involves specific knowledge (Van Lent 1999), 
I expect audit firms with more competent boards, i.e. with a higher proportion of 
qualified auditors on the board of directors, to be indicative of higher audit firm quality. 
 SUPERVISORYBODY is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the audit firm has a 
supervisory body of some sort (e.g., a board or committee with either formal monitoring 
powers or an informal advisory role), and otherwise 0. Jenkins et al. (2008) describe the 
PCAOB’s consideration of requiring audit firms to establish independent monitoring 
boards as part of their formal governance mechanisms. In the Netherlands, supervisory 
boards are expected to be legally required as from 2017. Audit firms have already 
experimented with various types of supervisory or advisory boards in their governance 
structures. I expect having a supervisory board in place increases the quality of audit 
firm’s governance, and to be indicative of higher audit firm quality.
 LIMLIAB is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the audit firm is a legal entity with 
limited liability (as opposed to some sort of partnership with unlimited liability), and 
otherwise 0. In the Netherlands, audit firms are free to choose their preferred legal form. 
Kang et al. (2014) argue that the audit firm’s organizational structure (legal form) is 
impacted by three main factors: need for independence from clients, need for competence, 
and litigation risk. Both Van Lent (1999) and Greenwood and Empson (2003) argue that 
even though audit firms may adopt the legal form of corporation, they will still be likely 
to maintain the organizational characteristics of partnerships, since these will be efficient 
in the audit market suited to the management of knowledge workers. While Lennox and 
Li (2012) find that audit fees and market shares of LLP audit firms do not change 
significantly subsequent to LLP adoption, they do find these firms to extend their services 
to riskier types of companies. Firth et al. (2012) find empirical evidence that the 
organizational form of an audit firm affects its reporting conservatism (i.e., auditors in 
partnerships are more likely to issue modified audit reports than auditors in limited 
liability firms), due to the threat of liability. If audit firms with limited liability have 
riskier clients and lower reporting conservatism, I consider the audit firm’s choice for a 
legal form with limited liability a sign of weaker audit firm governance and expect it to be 
indicative of lower audit firm quality.
 ORGDISCONT is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the audit firm has indicated in 
the AFM’s yearly monitoring questionnaire to expect any organizational change or 
discontinuity in the following year (e.g., merger, acquisition, reorganization, change in 
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voting rights, participation in or resignation from a network), and otherwise 0. I expect 
organizational change or discontinuity to be associated with lower audit firm quality.
Test Variables: Audit Firm Quality Control Characteristics
Audit firm quality control refers to the audit firm’s assessment and control of risk that 
auditing standards, professional values or the public interest might be violated. Prior 
studies suggest that audit firms can make a difference in their incidence and severity of 
‘quality threatening behavior’ by careful attention to policies and procedures for 
assessing, monitoring, and controlling risk of violation of professional standards (Bedard 
et al. 2008). Stronger quality control is therefore expected to be associated with higher 
audit firm quality. The following variables are operationalized as measures for audit firm 
quality control. 
 COMPLOFF is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the audit firm has appointed a 
specific person as compliance officer, i.e., an officer responsible for internal oversight of 
compliance with applicable quality requirements by the audit firm and its employees. 
Dutch law requires audit firms with a license to audit PIEs to have a compliance officer. 
For the audit firms only auditing non-PIEs, having a compliance officer is not legally 
required. Having appointed a compliance officer is arguably a sign of stronger audit firm 
governance, which is expected to be associated with higher audit firm quality. 
 EQCR measures the proportion of an audit firm’s statutory audits of non-PIEs for 
which an engagement quality control review13 (EQCR) was performed. In line with the 
requirements of ISQC 1 (IAASB 2009c), Dutch law requires audit firms to have EQCRs 
performed for all PIE audits (i.e., audits of listed companies, banks and insurers). For 
non-PIEs audits, audit firms are required to set criteria to evaluate for which non-PIE 
audits an EQCR should be performed. EQCRs involve a second look at significant audit 
decisions by a partner with appropriate technical expertise and without direct 
involvement in the conduct of the engagement (Johnstone et al. 2001), making them 
more like a peer review than a supervisor-subordinate review (Epps and Messier 2007b). 
Reviewers describe the EQCR as a professional, collegial, non-adversarial process, 
primarily focused on the objective of resolving difficult and complex client accounting 
issues (Emby and Favere-Marchesi 2010). EQCRs have the advantage of a mid-engagement 
assessment which improves quality as the audit is being conducted as opposed to 
identifying issues after they occur (Martin 2013). Prior research indicates that an EQCR 
may reduce audit risk and increase audit quality through a variety of means. EQCRs 
reduce reporting bias (Tucker and Matsumura 1997), cause engagement partners to 
report with greater independence and to sample more (Matsumura and Tucker 1995), 
and reduce objectivity impairment resulting from prior involvement with a client (Tan 
1995). Luehlfing et al. (1995) examine the relationship between various risk factors and 
the extent of actual EQCRs performed for clients. They find significant differences across 
13 In prior studies also referred to as concurrent or second partner reviews.
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audit firms with client industry being the only risk factor that impacted the extent of 
EQCRs. However, Epps and Messier (2007a) find a moderate level of consistency across 
firms when they performed a review of firm guidance for performing EQCRs. Based on 
these findings, I expect that more EQCRs (i.e., a higher proportion of non-PIEs for which 
an EQCR was performed) is indicative of stronger audit firm governance and to be 
associated with higher audit firm quality. 
 LOWAFCLIENTS is an indicator of the audit firm’s independence. It measures 
the proportion of the audit firm’s audit clients for which the fees for performing the 
statutory audit are lower than the fees for other services. While prior research indicates 
that the provision of non-audit services has rarely been associated with impaired audit 
quality, and in some cases it is associated with higher audit quality (Church et al. 2015; 
DeFond and Zhang 2014; Gramling et al. 2010), regulators are generally concerned that 
non-audit services make auditors financially dependent on their clients and that the 
consulting nature of many non-audit services puts auditors in managerial roles (DeFond 
et al. 2002). Therefore, I expect lower values for LOWAFCLIENTS to be indicative of 
stronger auditor independence and audit firm governance, associated with higher audit 
firm quality.
 LNTOTALFEE_AUDITOR measures the natural logarithm of the total fees 
charged to audit clients per auditor and is a measure of auditor workload. Buchheit and 
Buslepp (2014) find that audit firms under a relatively heavy workload produce lower 
quality audits. Hence, I expect a higher value of LNTOTALFEE_AUDITOR to be indicative 
of higher workloads and weaker audit firm governance, associated with lower audit firm 
quality.
 AUDITORS_RA measures the proportion of the audit firm’s auditors with a RA 
(i.e., registered accountant) qualification. In the Netherlands, two types of auditors may 
perform statutory audits: registered accountants (RA), which have completed university-
level education and are more specialized in performing audits, and accounting 
administration consultants (AA), which have completed higher vocational education, 
and are more specialized in providing administrative services to mid-sized and smaller 
companies. In the statutory audit context of this study, I expect audit firms with a higher 
proportion of auditors with a RA qualification to have stronger audit firm governance 
and to be associated with higher audit firm quality.
 QUESTIONS is the number of questions asked by the audit firm to the public 
oversight body, scaled by the number of audits performed by the audit firm. A higher 
number of questions is expected to be indicative of appropriate consultation taking place 
on difficult or contentious matters, and therefore to be a signal of stronger audit firm 
governance, and associated with higher audit firm quality.
 SRA is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the audit firm is a member of the 
association for cooperating registered accountants and accounting administration 
consultants (i.e., the SRA), and otherwise 0. The SRA is the largest association of audit 
firms which are mainly active for small and medium enterprises and provides practical 
and strategic support to its members. To become a SRA member, balloting takes place. 
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Furthermore, to ensure a constant and high level of quality of its members, the SRA 
performs regular quality reviews. Because of this activity, the public oversight body has 
signed a covenant with the SRA in which it is stipulated that the public oversight body 
takes into consideration the outcomes of the SRA reviews in its risk analyses for its 
supervision of audit firms. As a matter of policy, voluntary participation in a quality 
(peer) review process, such as performed by the SRA, represents a commitment to quality 
by the audit firm (Johnstone et al. 2001). In their examination of audit firms exiting the 
audit market, DeFond and Lennox (2011) interpret the exiting audit firms’ avoidance of 
AICPA peer reviews as lower quality. I expect an audit firm’s membership of the SRA (and 
hence its participation in the SRAs quality review process) to be indicative of stronger 
audit firm governance and to be associated with higher audit firm quality.
 AUDITSCHANGE approximates the volatility in the audit firm’s audit 
engagement portfolio by dividing the sum of newly acquired and lost audit engagements 
by the total number of audit engagements performed. Audit firms are required to 
establish policies and procedures for the acceptance and continuance of audit 
engagements, and to notify the public oversight body of all statutory audit engagements 
that are prematurely terminated (i.e., before the issuance of the auditor’s report). A 
highly volatile engagement portfolio is expected to put strains on the audit firm’s quality 
controls and to be associated with lower audit firm quality.
Control Variables
Audit firm size and risk, client portfolio characteristics and year dummies are included as 
control variables in the estimation model. 
 Academic literature generally concludes that audit quality is higher among larger 
firms (e.g., Watkins et al. 2004; Francis 2004), because they are likely to be more 
independent (DeAngelo 1981b) and because risk sharing reduces agency costs 
(Balachandran and Ramakrishnan 1987). While universal application of standards (e.g., 
regarding audit firm governance) might result in quality improvement among all audit 
firms regardless of firm size, small firms are likely to be less able to bear the associated 
costs (Bedard et al. 2008). In the Netherlands there are eight large audit firms that are all 
part of a worldwide audit network: Deloitte, EY, KPMG, PwC, Baker Tilly, BDO, Grant 
Thornton, and Mazars. In this study, these eight audit firms are referred to as the Big 8. 
Further, the non-Big 8 audit firms can be divided into three size categories: audit firms 
with more than 25 audit engagements are considered large firms; firms with 6 to 25 audit 
engagements are considered medium-sized firms; and firms with fewer than 6 audit 
engagements are considered small firms. In order to control for the differences in audit 
firm characteristics caused by audit firm size, the natural logarithm of the number of 
audit performed by the audit firm (LNAUDITS) is included in the estimation model.14
 Audit firm risk is approximated by the number of signals registered by the public 
14 In additional analyses, three indicator variables are included in the estimation model: BIG8, 
LARGEFIRMS, and MEDFIRMS (with the small audit !rms as the reference category).
96 Chapter 4
oversight body regarding the audit firm (SIGNALSCOUNT). Signals are information from 
public and proprietary sources (e.g., news media, other oversight departments within the 
AFM, or other authorities) indicating potential non-compliance with applicable 
legislation and regulation or other risks for the audit firm’s reputation, quality or 
continuity. A higher number of registered signals is expected to be indicative of higher 
audit firm risk and potentially lower audit firm quality. 
 Two variables are included to account for client portfolio characteristics. LNAV_
AUDITFEE approximates the audit firm’s average client size by measuring the natural 
logarithm of the audit firm’s average audit fees per audit client. SPECIALIST measures the 
diversity in the audit firm’s client portfolio and is equal to 1 if the audit firm performs over 
60 percent of its statutory audits for audit clients in the same industry, and otherwise 0.
 In addition to the variables presented in equation (1), the stakeholder dissatis-
faction measure (DISSAT) is added to the equation as a test variable when REGATT and 
EXIT are the dependent variables, to measure whether stakeholder dissatisfaction is 
associated with increased regulatory attention and more frequent audit market exits. The 
previous year’s value of the regulatory attention measure (REGATT_LAG) is added to the 
equation as a test variable when EXIT is the dependent variable, to measure whether 
regulatory attention is associated with an increase in audit market exits in the subsequent 
year.
 Table 2 summarizes all variable definitions. 
4.5 Results 
4.5.1 Descriptive Statistics and Univariate Results
Descriptive statistics are presented in Table 3. The columns present descriptive statistics 
for the full sample of 2,235 audit firm-year observations and for the various subsamples 
of observations (Big 8 and non-Big 8, 2009-2011 and 2012-2014, stakeholder 
dissatisfaction and no stakeholder dissatisfaction, regulatory attention and no regulatory 
attention, and exit and non-exit, respectively). The last column reports the t- or z-statistics 
for the difference between the two subsamples.15 
 The organizational characteristics in the first columns of Panel A show that a large 
majority of the audit firms’ executive directors are qualified auditors (87.5 percent), 
which is well above the legal minimum of more than 50 percent. Only a few audit firms 
have a supervisory body installed (6 percent) and most audit firms are organized as a legal 
entity with limited liability (71.3 percent). Almost 16 percent of the audit firms indicated 
to expect some organizational change or discontinuity within the following year (e.g., 
15 I perform two-sample t-tests on characteristics measured by continuous variables, and two-
sample tests of proportion on characteristics measured by binary (indicator) variables or variables 
that represent a proportion (between 0 and 1). 
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Table 2
 Variable Definitions
Variable Definition
Organizational Characteristics
EXDIRECTOR_AUDIT Proportion of the audit firm’s executive directors with an 
audit qualification (i.e., number of executive directors 
with an audit qualification divided by the total number of 
executive directors).
SUPERVISORYBODY An indicator variable equal to 1 if the audit firm has a 
supervisory body, and otherwise 0.
LIMLIAB An indicator variable equal to 1 if the audit firm is a legal 
entity with limited liability, and otherwise 0. 
ORGDISCONT An indicator variable equal to 1 if the audit firm has indicated 
to expect any organizational change or discontinuity in the 
following year (e.g., merger, acquisition, reorganization, 
change in voting rights, participation in network), and 
otherwise 0.
Audit Firm Quality Control
COMPLOFF An indicator variable equal to 1 if the audit firm has 
appointed a compliance officer, and otherwise 0.
EQCR Proportion of the audit firm’s non-PIE statutory audits for 
which an engagement quality control review (EQCR) was 
performed.
LOWAFCLIENTS Proportion of the audit firm’s audit clients for which the 
fees for performing the statutory audit are lower than the 
fees for other services provided to those audit clients. 
LNTOTALFEE_AUDITOR Natural logarithm of an audit firms’ average total fees (in 
thousand euros) charged to audit clients per auditor. 
AUDITORS_RA Proportion of auditors with RA qualification (i.e., registered 
accountant).
QUESTIONS Number of questions asked by the audit firm to the public 
oversight body (scaled by the number audits performed). 
SRA An indicator variable equal to 1 if the audit firm is a member 
of the association for cooperating registered accountants 
and accounting administration consultants (SRA), and 
otherwise 0.
AUDITSCHANGE An audit firms’ audit client portfolio volatility (i.e., the 
sum of newly acquired audit engagements and lost audit 
engagements divided by the total number of audits 
performed).
Stakeholder Dissatisfaction
COMPLAINTS Number of complaints and claims received by the audit 
firm concerning the performance of statutory audits (scaled 
by the number of audits performed). 
DISCCOMPL Number of complaints filed with the disciplinary court 
against one of the audit firm’s auditors (scaled by the 
number of auditors).
PROCEEDINGS Number of legal proceedings against the audit firm 
(including criminal, civil, and administrative proceedings) 
(scaled by the number of audits performed).
DISSAT Stakeholder dissatisfaction, i.e., the sum of COMPLAINTS, 
DISCCOMPL, and PROCEEDINGS.
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DISSAT_DUM An indicator variable equal to 1 if the sum of COMPLAINTS, 
DISCCOMPL, and PROCEEDINGS is larger than 0, and 
otherwise 0.
Regulatory Attention 
INSPECTION_COUNT Number of inspections performed by the public oversight 
body at the audit firm. 
SANCTION_COUNT Number of sanctions imposed by the public oversight body 
on the audit firm.
REGATT Number of regulatory events related to the audit firm, i.e., 
the sum of INSPECTION_COUNT and SANCTION_COUNT.
REGATT_DUM An indicator variable equal to 1 if the sum of INSPECTION_
COUNT and SANCTION_COUNT is larger than 0, and 
otherwise 0.
REGATT_LAG Lagged value of REGATT, i.e., previous year’s number of 
regulatory events related to the audit firm.
Audit Market Exit
EXIT An indicator variable equal to 1 if the audit firm exits the 
statutory audit market, and otherwise 0.
Control Variables
LNAUDITS Natural logarithm of an audit firms’ total number of 
statutory audits performed.
BIG8 An indicator variable equal to 1 if the audit firm is a member 
firm of one of eight worldwide network organizations 
(Deloitte, EY, KPMG, PwC, Baker Tilly, BDO, Grant 
Thornton, or Mazars), and otherwise 0.
LARGEFIRMS An indicator variable equal to 1 if the audit firm is not a Big 
8 audit firm and has more than 25 audit engagements, and 
otherwise 0.
MEDFIRMS An indicator variable equal to 1 if the audit firm is not a 
Big 8 audit firm and has 6 to 25 audit engagements, and 
otherwise 0.
SMALLFIRMS An indicator variable equal to 1 if the audit firm is not a Big 
8 audit firm and has fewer than 6 audit engagements, and 
otherwise 0.
SIGNALSCOUNT Number of signals registered by the public oversight body 
regarding the audit firm (scaled by the number of audits 
performed). 
LNAV_AUDITFEE Natural logarithm of an audit firms’ average audit fees (in 
thousand euros) per audit engagement.
SPECIALIST An indicator variable equal to 1 if the audit firm performs 
over 60 percent of its audits for audit clients in the same 
industry, and otherwise 0.
Y2009-Y2014 Indicator variables equal to 1 if the year is 2009, 2010, 2011, 
2012, 2013, or 2014, respectively, and otherwise 0.
Table 2 - continued
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merger, acquisition, reorganization, change in voting rights, or participation in a 
network). The audit firm quality control variables show that 75.5 percent of the audit 
firms have appointed a compliance officer responsible for internal oversight of compliance 
with applicable legislation and regulation. On average, almost 46 percent of all statutory 
audits performed for non-PIE audit clients are subject to an EQCR. For just over 17 
percent of audit clients the audit fee is smaller than the fee for other services performed 
for those clients. The average natural logarithm of the total fees per auditor amounts to 
4.295. Of the auditors employed by or associated with the audit firms, 64.2 are registered 
accountants (i.e., RA, with completed university level education). Relative to the number 
of audits they perform, audit firms ask few questions to the public oversight body (on 
average 1.6 questions per 100 audits). A majority (59.4 percent) of the audit firms are 
members of the SRA. Audit client portfolio volatility, i.e., the sum of newly acquired 
audit engagements and lost audit engagements divided by the total number of audits 
performed, is 26.8 percent.
 Over a quarter of all audit firms (25.6 percent) are faced with dissatisfied 
stakeholders (on average 7.6 per 100 audits), i.e., complaints filed with the audit firm, 
complaints filed with the disciplinary court for auditors, or legal proceedings. Just over 9 
percent of the audit firms are experiencing regulatory attention (i.e., inspections and 
sanctions), with an average of 13.8 inspections and 2.1 sanctions per 100 audit firms. In 
total, 2.1 percent of the observations involves an audit firm exiting the statutory audit 
market by having its license revoked.
 The control variables show the mean natural logarithm of the number of audits 
performed by the audit firms, the division of observations in audit firm size categories 
(i.e., Big 8 and large, medium, and small non-Big 8 audit firms), and the mean natural 
logarithm of average audit fee per audit client. Further, the control variables show that 
for each 100 audits, the public oversight body registers 2.4 signals (i.e., information 
indicating audit firm risk) and approximately 43 percent of the audit firms are characterized 
as specialists, since they perform more than 60 percent of their audits for clients in the 
same industry. 
 Panel A also reports the descriptive statistics and univariate test results for the 
subsamples of Big 8 and non-Big 8 audit firms. Big 8 and non-Big 8 audit firms differ 
significantly on all four organizational characteristics. Big 8 firms have a lower proportion 
of executive directors with an audit qualification (i.e., they have more non-auditors on 
their boards of directors), have installed more often a supervisory body, are all organized 
as legal entities with limited liability, and have indicated more often to expect some sort 
of organizational change or discontinuity in the following year. Big 8 and non-Big 8 audit 
firms also differ significantly on almost all quality control characteristics. Big 8 firms 
have, as legally prescribed, all appointed a specific person as compliance officer, while 
approximately 74 percent of the non-Big 8 audit firms have a compliance officer. Further, 
Big 8 firm auditors have higher workloads (i.e., higher average total fees per auditor), a 
higher proportion of auditors with a university-level education (i.e., RA qualification), 
and ask fewer questions to the public oversight body (relative to the number of audits 
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they perform). Non-Big 8 audit firms subject a higher proportion of their non-PIE audit 
engagements to an EQCR, are more often members of the SRA, and have more volatile 
engagement portfolios. Big 8 and non-Big 8 audit firms do not significantly differ with 
regard to the number of clients with relatively low audit fees relative to total fees. 
 While the average number of stakeholder dissatisfaction issues is smaller for Big 8 
audit firms than for non-Big 8 audit firms (2.9 and 7.7 per 100 audits, respectively), 
almost all Big 8 audit firms (95.8 percent) are faced with at least one such issue (against 
24.1 percent of the non-Big 8 audit firms). Big 8 audit firms also experience significantly 
more regulatory attention. However, none of the Big 8 audit firms exited the audit market 
in the 2009-2014 period. 
 The descriptive statistics for the control variables show that Big 8 firms perform 
more audits, have larger clients (i.e., higher average audit fees per audit engagement), 
and clients in more different industries (i.e., less often over 60 percent of their clients in 
the same industry). 
 Panel B presents the descriptive statistics and univariate test results for two 
subsamples constructed to measure change over time: it compares the observations in 
the first three years of public oversight (2009-2011) to those in the later years (2012-
2014). While organizational characteristics appear unchanged, a number of quality 
control characteristics have changed over time. The percentage of audit firms with a 
compliance officer has risen significantly (from 54.8 to 95.4 percent). The proportion of 
non-PIE audits for which an EQCR is performed, has declined, as well as the number of 
questions asked to the public oversight body. The amount of stakeholder dissatisfaction 
appears unchanged over time. Regulatory attention has increased, particularly due to an 
increase in the number of inspections. The number of audit market exits has almost 
doubled in the second period. The audit firm size variables show a shift in the audit 
market towards larger firms: the proportion of small firms significantly declined and the 
proportion of medium-sized firms increased. However, average audit fee per audit 
engagement declined (which may be due to economic circumstances in the latter 
period). 
 Panel C reports the descriptive statistics and univariate test results for the 
subsamples of audit firms that experienced stakeholder dissatisfaction (DISSAT_DUM = 
1) and audit firms that experienced no stakeholder dissatisfaction (DISSAT_DUM = 0). 
Audit firms experiencing stakeholder dissatisfaction have a lower proportion of audit-
qualified directors, more often a supervisory body, and more often expected to experience 
organizational changes or discontinuity in the following year. Audit firms experiencing 
stakeholder dissatisfaction differ significantly from audit firms without any stakeholder 
dissatisfaction on almost all quality control characteristics: they have more often 
appointed a compliance officer, a lower proportion of non-PIE audits with an EQCR, 
higher total fees per auditor, higher proportion of RA qualified auditors, fewer questions 
asked to the public oversight body, more often a SRA membership, and less volatile 
engagement portfolios. Of the audit firms experiencing stakeholder dissatisfaction, a 
higher proportion is subject to regulatory attention. The audit firm size categories show 
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that, with stakeholder dissatisfaction measured as an indicator variable, Big 8 and large 
non-Big 8 audit firms more often experience at least some stakeholder dissatisfaction. 
 Panel D reports the descriptive statistics and univariate test results for the 
subsamples of audit firms that experienced regulatory attention (REGATT_DUM = 1) and 
audit firms that experienced no regulatory attention (REGATT_DUM = 0). Apparently, 
the public oversight body focused its attention on audit firms with a lower proportion of 
audit-qualified directors, and audit firms that have more often a supervisory body, are 
more often a legal entity with limited liability, and more often expected some sort of 
organizational change or discontinuity in the following year. Further, audit firms with 
regulatory attention more often have a compliance officer, subject a lower proportion of 
their non-PIE audits to an EQCR, have higher total fees per auditor, higher proportions of 
auditors with a RA qualification, ask relatively fewer questions to the public oversight 
body, and are less often SRA members. Also, audit firms with regulatory attention face 
   
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
1. DISSAT 1.000
2. REGATT -0.017 1.000
3. EXIT 0.081 -0.001 1.000
4. EXDIRECTOR_AUDIT -0.027 -0.112 0.057 1.000
5. SUPERVISORYBODY -0.021 0.316 -0.023 -0.073 1.000
6. LIMLIAB -0.026 0.086 0.008 0.135 0.123 1.000
7. ORGDISCONT 0.055 0.077 0.093 -0.083 0.056 0.022 1.000
8. COMPLOFF -0.008 0.087 -0.035 -0.019 0.052 0.076 -0.013 1.000
9. EQCR 0.065 -0.103 0.024 0.072 -0.021 -0.115 0.021 -0.124 1.000
10. LOWAFCLIENTS 0.100 -0.004 0.026 -0.038 0.010 -0.062 -0.001 -0.007 0.126
11. LNTOTALFEE_AUDITOR -0.061 0.305 -0.108 -0.166 0.241 0.085 0.100 0.129 -0.190
12. AUDITORS_RA -0.035 0.116 -0.026 0.039 0.102 0.067 0.045 0.087 -0.139
13. QUESTIONS 0.010 -0.027 -0.024 0.045 0.002 -0.010 0.013 -0.054 0.038
14. SRA 0.017 -0.143 -0.066 -0.119 -0.033 -0.051 0.006 0.093 -0.069
15. AUDITSCHANGE -0.015 -0.033 -0.007 0.014 -0.033 0.015 -0.010 0.010 0.049
16. LNAUDITS -0.072 0.444 -0.110 -0.189 0.378 0.126 0.115 0.138 -0.275
17. BIG8 -0.030 0.698 -0.022 -0.103 0.366 0.094 0.122 0.084 -0.104
18. LARGEFIRMS -0.024 0.008 -0.063 -0.094 0.227 0.118 0.061 0.068 -0.176
19. MEDFIRMS -0.052 -0.097 -0.065 -0.055 -0.150 -0.052 -0.003 0.026 -0.069
20. SMALLFIRMS 0.081 -0.116 0.122 0.161 -0.142 -0.071 -0.083 -0.106 0.242
21. SIGNALSCOUNT 0.012 -0.012 0.126 0.022 -0.029 -0.014 0.006 -0.060 0.030
22. LNAV_AUDITFEE -0.026 0.225 -0.062 -0.047 0.086 0.026 0.033 0.042 0.093
23. SPECIALIST 0.023 -0.111 0.071 0.132 -0.110 -0.069 -0.066 -0.043 0.151
Table 4 
Correlation Matrix
The correlations shown in bold are significant at the α = 0.01 level. See Table 2 for variable definitions.
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relatively fewer complaints filed directly with the audit firm. However, the proportion of 
audit firms experiencing regulatory attention are significantly more often facing at least 
one stakeholder dissatisfaction issue. The audit firm size variables show that, with 
regulatory attention measured as an indicator variable, Big 8 and large non-Big 8 audit 
firms are more often experiencing attention from the public oversight body.
Panel E reports the descriptive statistics and univariate test results for the subsamples of 
audit firms exiting the audit market (EXIT = 1) and continuing audit firms (EXIT = 0). 
Exiting firms more often indicated to expect organizational changes or discontinuity in 
the following year. Concerning quality control characteristics, exiting audit firms have 
lower total fees per auditor, asked fewer questions to the public oversight body, and are 
less often SRA members. Stakeholder dissatisfaction is somewhat larger for exiting audit 
firms: on average they face a higher total number of (disciplinary) complaints and 
10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23
1.000
0.075 1.000
-0.207 0.261 1.000
-0.014 -0.126 0.003 1.000
-0.025 0.236 0.318 -0.012 1.000
-0.011 -0.124 -0.011 0.025 -0.011 1.000
-0.080 0.785 0.295 -0.129 0.255 -0.099 1.000
-0.008 0.332 0.107 -0.023 -0.179 -0.044 0.497 1.000
-0.024 0.486 0.250 -0.059 0.301 -0.048 0.604 -0.072 1.000
-0.048 0.127 -0.021 -0.069 0.145 -0.012 0.101 -0.119 -0.392 1.000
0.069 -0.616 -0.212 0.123 -0.334 0.064 -0.735 -0.119 -0.392 -0.649 1.000
0.009 -0.098 -0.004 0.018 -0.001 0.049 -0.097 -0.019 -0.057 -0.030 0.082 1.000
-0.146 0.417 0.084 -0.000 -0.004 0.007 0.140 0.249 0.018 -0.082 -0.006 -0.008 1.000
0.051 -0.413 -0.135 0.076 -0.184 0.064 -0.484 -0.092 -0.315 -0.159 0.439 0.039 -0.083 1.000
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proceedings. Regulatory attention appears not significantly different for the two 
subsamples. The number of signals registered by the public oversight body is larger for 
audit firms exiting the audit market. Finally, exiting audit firms are most often small firms 
with fewer audits, smaller clients and more clients in the same industry.
 Table 4 presents the Pearson correlation coefficients between the variables 
included in the estimation model. The absence of very high correlation coefficients and 
(untabulated) VIF values of well below the commonly used threshold of 1016, show that 
the risk of bias in the multivariate analyses due to multicollinearity is minimal (Hair et al. 
2006). 
4.5.2 Multivariate Results
Table 5 reports the results of estimating the multivariate models presented in equation 
(1) for the three output measures: DISSAT, REGATT and EXIT, respectively. The table 
reports coefficients estimates and z-values based on standard errors corrected for 
heteroskedasticity and for clustering of observations by audit firm. All three models are 
statistically significant (p < 0.001).
 I first consider the association between the audit firm governance characteristics 
and the amount of stakeholder dissatisfaction (i.e., the total number of complaints and 
claims filed directly with the audit firm, complaints filed with the disciplinary court for 
auditors, and other legal proceedings, scaled by the number of audits performed by the 
audit firm) by estimating equation (1) using zero-inflated negative binomial regression 
with DISSAT as the dependent audit firm output variable. As predicted, the results show 
that audit firms with more stakeholder dissatisfaction have indicated they expect some 
sort of organizational change or discontinuity in the following year (ORGDISCONT) and 
have more audit clients with audit fees lower than fees for other services (LOWAFCLIENTS). 
Further, the results show that these audit firms and are more often SRA member (SRA).17 
 Next, I consider the association between the audit firm governance characteristics 
and the level of regulatory attention (i.e., the number of inspections and sanctions) by 
estimating equation (1) using zero-inflated negative binomial regression with REGATT as 
the dependent audit firm output variable. As predicted, the results show that audit firms 
receiving more regulatory attention have a lower proportion of audit-qualified directors 
(EXDIRECTOR_AUDIT), have more audit clients with audit fees lower than fees for other 
services (LOWAFCLIENTS), are less often SRA member (SRA), and have more signals 
16 "e highest VIF value for an individual variable is 4.87 and the average VIF values for the regres-
sions for the three output measures are 1.65, 1.63, and 1.70, respectively.
17 Note that the variable SRA has a coe&cient with a sign opposite of the one predicted. Regarding 
the positive association between stakeholder dissatisfaction and SRA membership, one could 
speculate that stakeholders !nd easier excess to complaints procedures when the audit !rms are 
recognizably member of a collective association promoting high quality.
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registered by the public oversight body (SIGNALSCOUNT)18. I also include the variable 
DISSAT as an independent variable and find no association between stakeholder 
dissatisfaction and regulatory attention. However, additional analysis (untabulated; 
excluding observations for the year 2009) shows that the lagged values for DISSAT are 
significantly associated with more regulatory attention. Further, the results show that 
audit firms receiving more regulatory attention have more auditors with a university 
level education (AUDITORS_RA)19, more audit clients (LNAUDITS) and larger audit clients 
(LNAV_AUDITFEE). These results suggest that the public oversight body focuses its 
attention on larger audit firms with more audit-oriented auditors20 and on audit firms 
with a higher ‘risk profile’ (i.e., audit firms with a higher proportion of non-auditors on 
the board of directors, more audit clients with audit fees lower than fees for other services, 
not subject to SRA quality reviews, with increased stakeholder dissatisfaction in the 
previous year, and with a higher cumulative number of registered signals).
 Lastly, I consider the probability of an audit firm exiting the statutory audit market 
by estimating equation (1) using probit regression with EXIT as the dependent audit firm 
output variable. As predicted, the results show that audit firms that exit the statutory 
audit market have indicated they expect some sort of organizational change or 
discontinuity (ORGDISCONT), less often have appointed a compliance officer 
(COMPLOFF), have fewer audit clients (LNAUDITS) and smaller audit clients (LNAV_
AUDITFEE), and have more signals registered by the public oversight body 
(SIGNALSCOUNT). I also include the variables DISSAT and the lagged value of REGATT as 
independent variables and find that audit firms that exit the statutory audit market are 
associated with more stakeholder dissatisfaction and more regulatory attention in the 
previous year (REGATT_LAG).21 Further, the results show exiting firms have a higher 
18 In the analysis of REGATT, the variable SIGNALSCOUNT is measured as the cumulative number 
of signals registered by the public oversight body up to that year, since the public oversight body 
is expected to increase its attention for a particular audit !rm based on the total number of signals 
registered rather than the number of signals registered within that year. Additional analysis (unt-
abulated) show that the number of signals in a speci!c year is not signi!cantly associated with 
regulatory attention. 
19 Note that the variable AUDITORS_RA has a coe&cient with a sign opposite of the one predicted. 
Although more academically educated auditors were expected to be a sign of stronger audit !rm 
governance and to be associated with less regulatory attention, an alternative explanation could 
be that the public oversight body focuses its attention on audit !rms that are more specialized in 
performing audits, which are more o'en performed by RA quali!ed auditors, rather than on 
performing administrative services, mostly performed by AA quali!ed auditors. 
20 Registered accountants (RA), who have completed university-level education, are more special-
ized in performing audits, while accounting administration consultants (AA), who have com-
pleted higher vocational education, are more specialized in providing administrative services to 
mid-sized and smaller companies.
21 Additional analysis (untabulated) shows that current year’s regulatory attention (REGATT) is 
insigni!cantly associated with an audit market exit, suggesting that the public oversight body’s 
inspection and sanctions have a lagged e$ect on the audit !rm’s decision to exit the audit market.
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proportion of audit-qualified directors (EXDIRECTOR_AUDIT).22 These results suggest 
that audit firms that exit the statutory audit market are smaller and more often 
experiencing ‘trouble’ (i.e., a higher likelihood of expected organizational change or 
discontinuity, more stakeholder dissatisfaction, increased regulatory attention in the 
previous year, and more signals registered by the public oversight body). Furthermore, 
these results suggest that exiting audit firms did not make the quality investment of 
appointing a compliance officer, while on average the percentage of audit firms with a 
compliance officer had increased from 55 percent in the earlier years of public oversight 
(2009-2011) to 95 percent in the later years (2012-2014) (see Table 3, Panel B).
 Overall, I find some support for all three posited hypotheses that stronger audit 
firm governance mechanisms are associated with less stakeholder dissatisfaction, less 
regulatory attention, and more audit market exits, albeit to a different extent. 
4.5.3 Sensitivity Analyses
I perform several sensitivity tests (untabulated) for the results presented in Table 5. First, 
I run an analysis for only non-Big 8 observations. For the analysis of REGATT the results 
are qualitatively similar to those presented in Table 5. For DISSAT, the variable SRA is 
insignificant for the non-Big 8 observations. For EXIT, the variable LNAV_AUDITFEE is 
insignificant.
 Second, I perform the regressions separately for the periods 2009-2011 and 2012-
2014. In the analysis of stakeholder dissatisfaction, the results show that the association 
with ORGDISCONT and LOWAFCLIENTS are significant in both periods. The variable 
SRA, which is significant in the overall time period, is not significant in the two separate 
periods. In the period 2009-2011, audit firms with lower client portfolio volatility 
(AUDITSCHANGE) experience more stakeholder dissatisfaction. The public oversight 
body appears to have focused its attention in the earlier period (2009-2011) on audit 
firms with a lower proportion of audit-qualified directors (EXDIRECTOR_AUDIT), 
without SRA membership (SRA), with higher client portfolio volatility (AUDITSCHANGE), 
and with more and larger audit clients (LNAUDITS and LNAV_AUDITFEE, respectively). 
Its attention appears to take into consideration a number of additional audit firm 
characteristics in the later period (2012-2014) (i.e., LOWAFCLIENTS, AUDITORS_RA, 
DISSAT, and SIGNALSCOUNT). In addition to the significant variables presented in Table 
5, audit firms exiting the statutory audit market in the earlier period are associated with a 
higher proportion of audit clients for which audit fees are smaller than fees for other 
services (LOWAFCLIENTS) and lower client portfolio volatility (AUDITSCHANGE). 
22 "is result is inconsistent with the predicted negative sign for this variable. "is may be due to its 
relation with audit !rm size. Untabulated results show that the average proportion of audit-
quali!ed directors decreases with audit !rm size (75.1 percent for Big 8 audit !rms, 84.1 percent 
for large non-Big 8 audit !rms, 86.3 percent for medium-sized non-Big 8 audit !rms, and 91.0 
percent for small non-Big 8 audit !rms). As described later, sensitivity analyses show that particu-
larly the smallest audit !rms exit the statutory audit market. 
113Audit Firm Governance and Audit Firm Quality: An Examination of Audit Quality Indicators
4
However, they appear not associated with having a compliance officer (COMPLOFF), 
stakeholder dissatisfaction (DISSAT), regulatory attention (REGATT), the number of 
audit clients (LNAUDITS) or audit client size (LNAV_AUDITFEE). In the later period, in 
addition to the significant variables presented in Table 5, audit firms exiting the statutory 
audit market are more often organized as legal entities with limited liability (LIMLIAB) 
and have a lower proportion of audit clients for which audit fees are smaller than fees for 
other services (LOWAFCLIENTS). The proportion of audit-qualified directors 
(EXDIRECTOR_AUDIT) and the number of registered signals (SIGNALSCOUNT) are 
insignificant in this later period. 
 Third, I use alternative audit firm size measures and replace LNAUDITS by three 
indicator variables in the estimation model: BIG8, LARGEFIRMS, and MEDFIRMS (with 
the small audit firms as the reference category). The results show a negative association 
between the Big 8 and medium-sized non-Big 8 indicator variables and stakeholder 
dissatisfaction, suggesting that particularly the large non-Big 8 and smallest audit firms 
experience more stakeholder dissatisfaction.23 Further, the analysis of REGATT including 
these audit firm size measures shows that the public oversight body particularly focuses 
its attention on the Big 8 and large non-Big 8 audit firms. Finally, the analysis of EXIT 
shows that the smallest audit firms are more inclined to exit the audit market. 
 Fourth, excluding the output variables DISSAT and REGATT as independent 
variables from the analyses on REGATT and EXIT respectively, leaves the results for the 
audit firm governance characteristics qualitatively similar. 
 Finally, in order to test whether the audit firm governance characteristics have a 
lagged association with the audit firm output variables, I re-perform the analyses with 
next year’s audit firm output measures. Compared with the results presented in Table 5, 
next year’s stakeholder dissatisfaction is associated positively with ORGDISCONT, EQCR 
and LOWAFCLIENTS, and negatively with COMPLOFF, but not with SRA. Next year’s 
regulatory attention is negatively associated with LNTOTALFEE_AUDITOR and positively 
associated with DISSAT in addition to the significant variables for this year’s regulatory 
attention, indicating that there is a time lag for the public oversight body to take auditor 
workloads and stakeholder dissatisfaction into consideration. Next year’s audit market 
exits appear only associated with the audit firm indicating to expect some sort of 
organizational change or discontinuity in the following year (ORGDISCONT), higher 
auditor workloads (LNTOTALFEE_AUDITOR), more regulatory attention (REGATT), and 
fewer and smaller audit clients (LNAUDITS and LNAV_AUDITFEE, respectively).
23 "is !nding may be due to the scaling method applied. "e total number of complaints and pro-
ceedings are scaled by the total number of audits performed by the audit !rm. "e results indicate 
that, compared to the total client portfolio size, smaller !rms receive relatively more complaints 
and proceedings. In absolute terms, the total number of complaints and proceedings is larger for 
the larger audit !rms. 
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Table 5 
Multiple Regressions for Stakeholder Dissatisfaction, Regulatory 
Attention and Audit Market Exits
Dependent Variables: 
DISSAT REGATT EXIT
Independent Variables
Pred.
 Sign Coef. z-stat. Coef. z-stat. Coef. z-stat.
Organizational Characteristics
EXDIRECTOR_AUDIT
– -0.532 -1.24 -1.018 -2.05 ** 1.062 2.31 **
SUPERVISORYBODY
– -0.011 -0.05 -0.135 -0.59 -0.041 -0.09
LIMLIAB
+ 0.010 0.05 0.253 0.94 0.149 0.90
ORGDISCONT
+ 0.453 2.76 *** -0.032 -0.24 0.831 5.95 ***
Audit Firm Quality Control
COMPLOFF
– -0.108 -0.64 0.112 0.34 -0.397 -1.99 **
EQCR
– 0.280 1.53 0.023 0.09 0.088 0.52
LOWAFCLIENTS
+ 0.886 2.91 *** 0.925 2.17 ** -0.019 -0.08
LNTOTALFEE_AUDITOR
+ -0.164 -1.15 -0.257 -1.49 0.052 0.44
AUDITORS_RA
– -0.016 -0.07 0.739 2.12 ** -0.139 -0.75
QUESTIONS
– -0.035 -0.05 -0.449 -0.38 NAa
SRA
– 0.294 1.68 * -1.044 -4.71 *** -0.007 -0.04
AUDITSCHANGE
+ -0.205 -0.96 0.277 1.26 -0.200 -1.05
Stakeholder Dissatisfaction
DISSAT 
+ 0.425 1.52 0.369 2.18 **
Regulatory Attention 
REGATT_LAG 
+ 0.418 3.92 ***
Control Variables
LNAUDITS
– -0.092 -0.84 0.649 6.69 *** -0.400 -3.44 ***
SIGNALSCOUNTc
+ 0.090 0.17 0.469 2.11 ** 0.956 2.51 **
LNAV_AUDITFEE
? 0.082 0.51 0.480 2.46 ** -0.323 -1.83 *
SPECIALIST
? -0.095 -0.62 -0.030 -0.18 0.023 0.15
Constant -1.917 -3.39 *** -4.157 -4.82 *** -2.565 -3.90 ***
Fixed effects YEAR YEAR YEAR
Observations 2,235 2,235 2,235
Wald chi2 61.63 989.55 147.00
Pseudo R2 b b 0.244
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Table 5 - continued
4.6 Conclusion
In this study, I examine the association between audit firm governance characteristics 
and three firm-level output measures of audit quality: (a) stakeholder dissatisfaction; (b) 
regulatory attention; and (c) audit market exits. The purpose was to identify audit quality 
indicators and increase the understanding of audit firms and their governance. Based on 
prior studies—albeit limited in number—and on the assumptions underlying audit firm 
governance regulation, I hypothesize audit firms with stronger governance mechanisms 
in place to be of higher quality (i.e., be confronted with less stakeholder dissatisfaction, 
trigger less regulatory attention, and/or a lower likelihood to exit the audit market). I 
operationalize audit firm governance by constructing organizational and quality control 
variables. This study includes all audit firms active in the statutory audit market in the 
Netherlands. Data on audit firm characteristics are obtained from the proprietary files of 
the Dutch audit oversight body, the AFM, since they are for the most part not publicly 
disclosed. 
 Descriptive statistics and univariate tests show that many audit firm governance 
characteristics are significantly different for Big 8 and non-Big 8 audit firms, for the 
earlier and later years of public oversight, and whether or not the audit firm faced 
stakeholder dissatisfaction, experienced increased regulatory attention or exited the 
audit market. Multivariate analyses provide support that several audit firm governance 
characteristics are associated with distinct firm-level output measures of audit quality. 
Specifically, the results show that audit firms with expected organizational change or 
discontinuity, and with more clients for which they provide more non-audits services 
than audit services, are experiencing higher levels of stakeholder dissatisfaction. The 
public oversight body appears to focus its attention on larger audit firms with more 
audit-oriented auditors and on audit firms with a higher ‘risk profile’ (i.e., audit firms 
with a higher proportion of non-auditors on the board of directors, a higher proportion 
of audit clients for which audit fees are smaller than fees for other services, not subject to 
SRA quality reviews, with increased stakeholder dissatisfaction in the previous year, and 
This table reports the results for the model presented in equation (1). For the regression on DISSAT 
and REGATT zero-inflated negative binomial regressions were performed. For the regression on EXIT a 
probit regression was performed. The table reports coefficients estimates and z-values based on standard 
errors corrected for heteroskedasticity and for clustering of observations by audit firm. *,**,*** indicates 
significant at the α = 0.10; 0.05; 0.01 level, respectively (two-tailed). See Table 2 for variable definitions.
a Since none of the exiting audit firms asked questions to the public oversight body, the variable 
QUESTIONS is dropped to avoid multicollinearity.
b  STATA does not provide a (pseudo) R2 value for zero-inflated negative binomial regressions.
c  In the analysis of REGATT, the variable SIGNALSCOUNT is measured as the cumulative number of signals 
registered by the public oversight body up to that year, rather than the number of signals registered 
within that year.
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The three studies in this dissertation examine audit quality in a regulatory context and 
focus on three distinct features of this regulatory context: public oversight, auditor 
independence, and audit quality indicators. In this final chapter, I first summarize the 
results from the three studies. Second, I discuss the inherent limitations and main 
contributions of this dissertation. Finally, I discuss the main implications and provide 
suggestions for further research. 
5.1. Summary of Results
In the first study, presented in Chapter 2, the effectiveness of public oversight is examined 
by testing whether (a) the public oversight body can differentiate audit quality in its 
first-time inspection round, and (b) audit quality improves after the first-time inspection 
round. In particular, it is tested whether there is an association between the outcome of 
the first-time inspections (i.e., ‘material findings’ or ‘no material findings’) and the level 
of earnings quality, and any subsequent change in earnings quality, of companies 
audited by the inspected audit firms. 
 Based on a sample of first-time inspection reports of 51 audit firms covering over 
85 percent of the statutory audit market in the Netherlands, and relating to 6,609 client 
company-year observations over the years 2005-2008, the results show that companies 
audited by audit firms with material findings in their first-time inspections by the public 
oversight body have lower earnings quality than companies audited by audit firms 
without material findings. This finding holds for audit firms with and without PIE clients, 
except for the group of smallest non-PIE audit firms. However, the evidence does not 
provide support for an improvement in audit quality after the first inspection round, 
which is arguably the most important aspect of effective public oversight. This finding is 
in contrast to U.S. evidence suggesting an improvement in audit quality after PCAOB 
inspections. One possible explanation for this difference in findings is that audit firm-
specific inspection reports in the Netherlands were not publicly disclosed up until 2014. 
 In further analyses, it is found that the type of deficiencies identified by the public 
oversight body that are most able to distinguish audit quality are related to the 
performance and documentation of audit engagements, independence, and quality 
reviews. Furthermore, no support is found for an association between the prior peer 
review outcomes of audit firms and the audit clients’ earnings quality. This suggests that 
the prior Dutch peer review system appeared to be ‘friendly’, which may not be unexpected 
given that audit firms were allowed to select their own peer reviewer, and is also consistent 
with prior findings. There is also no support that audit quality improved after peer review 
outcomes. Collectively, it is concluded that the public oversight body is able to distinguish 
audit quality, in contrast with the prior peer review system, but both systems do not 
appear to bring about improvement in audit quality.
 In the second study, presented in Chapter 3, the effectiveness of auditor 
independence regulation is examined by assessing how audit firms adjust their efforts 
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and/or risk premiums when they maintain a business relationship with an audit client. 
Specifically, the association is examined between the existence of an audit firm-client 
business relationship and audit quality, inferred from both audit fees and earnings 
quality. 
 Based on a sample of Dutch companies maintaining a business relationship with 
their audit firm each matched with similar Dutch companies without such business 
relationships, business relationships are found consistently associated with higher audit 
fees and, particularly in those situations where the business relationship coincides with 
high non-audit fees relative to audit fees, with higher earnings quality. These results 
suggest that audit firms consider the business relationship a threat to the auditor’s 
independence and attempt to mitigate this threat with safeguards, as required by the 
independence regulation, such as additional audit or review efforts, or other quality 
control measures. However, alternative explanations for higher audit fees, such as the 
audit firm charging a risk premium to the audit client, are not completely ruled out. 
Importantly, no evidence of impaired independence was found, which would likely have 
resulted in lower audit fees and lower earnings quality. These results appear robust for a 
number of sensitivity tests on cross-sectional subsamples (e.g., based on the audit firm 
size (Big 4 or non-Big 4), type of audit client (PIE or non-PIE), demand for audit quality, 
and client risk), as well as for an alternative measure of business relationships (i.e., the 
monetary value of these business relationships) and alternative matching methods. 
 In the third study, presented in Chapter 4, it is examined whether audit firm 
governance characteristics are useful audit quality indicators. This is done by testing 
whether audit firms with stronger governance mechanisms in place are less likely to be 
confronted with stakeholder dissatisfaction, trigger regulatory attention, or exit the 
audit market. Audit firm governance is operationalized by constructing organizational 
variables and quality control system variables.
 Based on a sample of all active audit firms licensed to perform statutory audits in 
the Netherlands, univariate test results show that many audit firm governance 
characteristics are significantly different for Big 8 and non-Big 8 audit firms, for earlier 
versus later years of public oversight, and whether or not audit firms faced stakeholder 
dissatisfaction, experienced increased regulatory attention or exited the audit market. 
Multivariate analyses provide support that several audit firm governance characteristics 
are associated with distinct firm-level output measures of audit quality, albeit to a 
different extent. Specifically, the results show that audit firms with expected organizational 
change or discontinuity, and with more clients for which they provide more non-audits 
services than audit services, are experiencing higher levels of stakeholder dissatisfaction. 
The public oversight body appears to focus its attention on larger audit firms with more 
audit-oriented auditors and on audit firms with a higher ‘risk profile’ (i.e., audit firms 
with a higher proportion of non-auditors on the board of directors, a higher proportion 
of audit clients for which audit fees are lower than fees for other services, not subject to 
SRA quality reviews, with increased stakeholder dissatisfaction in the previous year, with 
a higher cumulative number of registered signals). Audit firms that exit the statutory 
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audit market appear to be smaller, more often experiencing ‘trouble’ (i.e., a higher 
likelihood of expected organizational change or discontinuity, more stakeholder 
dissatisfaction, increased regulatory attention in the previous year, and more signals 
registered by the public oversight body), and less likely to have made the quality 
investment of appointing a compliance officer. Interestingly, additional tests provide 
evidence that the informational value of the audit firm governance characteristics has 
increased over time. 
5.2 Limitations
Although the research in this dissertation has been carefully designed, I acknowledge a 
number of inherent limitations common to archival auditing research. All three studies 
make use of proxies for audit quality, i.e., variables that are indirect measures of actual 
audit quality, that may be subject to measurement error. Abnormal accruals measure 
earnings quality, which is also influenced by factors other than audit quality. This means 
low audit quality will not necessarily be associated with low earnings quality. Furthermore, 
using abnormal accruals in the studies limits the sample size to those audit firms with 
sufficient audit client financial data to calculate those accruals (i.e., mostly larger audit 
firms with larger audit clients) and excludes certain audit client industries (i.e., financials 
and utilities). This is particularly the case for the study presented in Chapter 2 and to a 
lesser extent to the study presented in Chapter 3. The results from those studies may not 
be generalizable to other, smaller, audit firms. The audit fees used in the study presented 
in Chapter 3 are known to not only measure audit effort, but also the auditor’s risk 
premium for expected legal liability as well as audit efficiency, which may be difficult to 
entangle. However, more direct measures of audit quality, like restatements, are not 
readily available in the Netherlands, and the limited number of bankrupt companies in 
the sample periods prevents a feasible analysis using going concern opinions.
 The studies presented in Chapters 3 and 4 may further suffer from some omitted 
correlated variables. There may be additional variables that simultaneously affect both 
the occurrence of a business relationship between the audit firm and the audit client, and 
audit fees (Chapter 3). Further, the study presented in Chapter 4 only incorporates audit 
firm-level quality measures, where (additional) engagement-level audit quality proxies 
might have been more effective.
 Each of the three studies is subject to one or more additional and specific 
limitations. The study presented in Chapter 2 focuses only on first-time inspections. It is 
unknown whether the inspection outcomes in subsequent rounds continue to be 
signaling or improve audit quality. Furthermore, the study covers a relatively long time 
period, i.e., from 2003 to 2008 including the peer review analysis, and ends in a known 
financial crisis, which makes the interpretation of any change in earnings quality 
difficult. It is also unknown whether the time gap between the abnormal accruals related 
to the public oversight outcome data and the abnormal accruals related to the peer 
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review outcome data, affects the results. There are some limitations caused by the use of 
the propensity-score matching approach to construct the research sample for the study 
presented in Chapter 3. The findings may not be generalizable to the full population. 
Since the study described in Chapter 3 only finds limited evidence of increased audit 
quality (i.e., proxied by lower abnormal total accruals), alternative explanations for 
increased audit fees should not be completely ruled out. It is for instance possible that 
audit clients are simply more willing to pay higher audit fees to the audit firm, when the 
audit firm pays good money for the goods or services delivered by the audit client to the 
audit firm, which could be characterized by reciprocal trust. The study presented in 
Chapter 4 uses proxies that are mostly ‘quantifications’ of governance characteristics 
that might be more appropriately measured in a more qualitative way. A further limitation 
of these proxies is that they are typically measured dichotomously, which implicitly 
assumes a homogeneous level of audit quality within each group. 
 Finally, it should be noted that all three studies are measuring association, not 
causation, which calls for cautious interpretation of the results.
5.3 Contribution
This dissertation contributes to the auditing literature in several ways. In particular, it 
sheds new light on various audit quality aspects by using proprietary data from the Dutch 
public oversight body. The study presented in Chapter 2 employs non-public data on 
first-time inspections outcomes (i.e., ‘material findings’ or ‘no material findings’, 
including detailed information on the types of deficiencies identified by the public 
oversight body), which adds to the literature on public oversight effectiveness as well as 
on the audit firm quality control system aspects that are most able to differentiate audit 
quality. The study presented in Chapter 3 contributes to the literature on auditor 
independence by examining a previously unstudied type of independence threat using 
data on business relationships between audit firms and audit clients obtained by the 
public oversight body in its 2011 thematic review on auditor independence. The nature 
and monetary value of these relationships illustrate their economic significance for both 
the audit firm and the audit client. Furthermore, the proprietary data enabled the 
inclusion of smaller non-PIE companies for which audit fee data had otherwise been 
unavailable. The study presented in Chapter 4 contributes to the growing literature on 
audit quality indicators by examining the association between several non-public audit 
firm governance characteristics and three firm-level output measures of audit quality 
(i.e., stakeholder dissatisfaction, regulatory attention, and audit market exits). The 
characteristics and measures are mostly non-public and obtained from the public 
oversight body’s yearly monitoring questionnaire and its internal records of audit firm 
registrations, notifications, signals, inspections, and sanctions. 
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 While most auditing research is U.S.-based, all three studies in this dissertation are 
set in the Dutch audit market. The Netherlands is an interesting and distinct setting for 
multiple reasons. Prior auditing studies have shown that audit quality differs across 
countries and that the quality of the institutional setting and the risk of litigation are 
important determinants of audit quality(e.g., Francis and Wang 2008). The Dutch audit 
market is characterized by a low litigious setting, which weakens the extent to which the 
auditor’s wealth serves as a bond for audit quality and increases moral hazard risk. There 
may be a greater need for effective audit regulation and public oversight to control for 
those risks, making the association of this regulation and public oversight with audit 
quality more important. Furthermore, in contrast to other countries such as the U.S., the 
statutory audit market (and the regulation and public oversight thereof) in the 
Netherlands entails the entire audit market including audits of private companies. More 
specifically, private companies in the Netherlands constitute the majority of the Dutch 
market for audit services: approximately 95 percent in number of audits and 83 percent 
in audit fees. While most U.S. auditing research is focused on listed companies, and 
therefore larger audit firms, the setting used in this dissertation also allows studying the 
combination of publicly listed and private companies, and therefore large and small 
audit firms.
5.4 Implications and Future Research
The findings of this dissertation have implications for audit firms and auditors, companies 
hiring auditors, investors, public oversight bodies, and regulators, and provide insights 
into future research opportunities. 
 The conclusion of the first study presented in Chapter 2 is that the public oversight 
body is able to differentiate audit quality, in contrast with the prior peer review system. 
This positively supports regulators’ decisions to replace peer review systems with 
independent public oversight. Companies hiring auditors and investors relying on 
auditors’ opinions may also benefit from knowing the reliability of the public oversight 
body’s assessment of audit firm quality by choosing higher quality auditors and thereby 
pressuring lower quality auditors to improve themselves. In light of worldwide discussions 
on the effectiveness and mutual recognition of audit oversight systems, insights from 
this study may benefit public oversight bodies across the world in further shaping their 
oversight systems. The additional findings in this study regarding the types of deficiencies 
in audit firms that are most able to distinguish audit quality provide useful information 
for audit firms to improve those areas and strengthen their overall quality control. 
 The second part of the conclusion, however, states that neither the peer review 
system nor the public oversight body appear to bring about improvement in audit 
quality, at least in the short term. A possible explanation could be that audit firm-specific 
inspection reports were not publicly disclosed until 2014. The lack of quality improvement 
should be of primary concern to stakeholders involved and calls for further research on 
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its causes. For example by examining audit quality changes in a setting where there is a 
change in disclosure policy. More generally, future research could look into the 
effectiveness of public oversight in improving audit quality over a longer time period, in 
an international context, and by employing different research methodologies (e.g., 
experiment, field study). 
 The results of the second study presented in Chapter 3 show that business 
relationships are consistently associated with higher audit fees and, particularly in those 
situations where the business relationship coincides with high non-audit fees relative to 
audit fees, with higher earnings quality. These findings may be of interest to the investors 
who are ultimately paying for a more expensive audit. Although the findings suggest that 
audit firms and auditors are complying with independence regulations requiring them 
to increase engagement effort to safeguard audit quality, it is not entirely certain that the 
auditor’s independence is not at all impaired by the business relationship. Future 
research, either by academics or by public oversight bodies in course of their inspections, 
could elaborate on this study by examining business relationships for specific 
circumstances in which increased professional skepticism, and therefore strict objectivity 
and independence, is of utmost importance, such as the need for restatements or going-
concern issues. Furthermore, future research may attempt to disentangle the different 
causes for audit fees to change, such as audit effort, risk premiums, or audit efficiency, 
and to find additional control variables to alleviate the potential endogeneity problems 
identified in the current study. Future research could also expand the literature on 
auditor independence by exploring the other types of independence threats covered by 
the Code of Ethics, such as financial interests, family and personal relationships, gifts 
and hospitality, and actual or threatened litigation.
 Although the results of the third study presented in Chapter 4 show that various 
audit firm governance characteristics are capturing aspects of audit firm quality, albeit to 
a different extent, the extensive descriptive analyses provide useful information for the 
ongoing debates about audit quality indicators. Audit firms, regulators, and the investors 
ultimately requiring increased audit firm transparency, will need to continue their 
collaborative search of consistently reliable measures that adequately provide this 
transparency. Academics may facilitate this search by conducting research that overcomes 
the limitations identified in the current study, for instance by employing alternative 
definitions of audit firm governance characteristics or other audit quality measures.
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strengthening of auditor independence, and the development of audit quality indicators 
to increase audit firm transparency.
 The purpose of this dissertation is to empirically assess how these regulatory 
topics (i.e., public oversight, auditor independence, and audit quality indicators) relate 
to audit quality. Are they informative about audit quality and do they improve audit 
quality? Besides contributing to the existing literature on audit quality by exploiting the 
unique access to proprietary data on audit firms from the Dutch public oversight body, 
the empirical assessment of these relationships also has practical importance and 
implications for audit firms and auditors, companies hiring auditors, investors, public 
oversight bodies, and regulators (also described in Chapter 5). 
 The first study, presented in Chapter 2, examines the relationship between public 
oversight and audit quality. After a number of high-profile corporate failures, regulators 
started to believe that the self-regulatory peer review system was no longer adequate and 
appropriately functioning. Independent public oversight was proposed instead as an 
alternative way of organizing audit oversight with the goal to restore confidence in and 
safeguard the public function of the auditing profession and the quality of its work. This 
study examines the effectiveness of public oversight in the Netherlands by testing 
whether (a) the public oversight body can differentiate audit quality in its first-time 
inspection round, and (b) audit quality improves after the first-time inspection round. 
The conclusion of this study is that the public oversight body is able to differentiate audit 
quality, in contrast with the prior peer review system. This positively supports regulators’ 
decisions to replace peer review systems with independent public oversight. Companies 
hiring auditors and investors relying on auditors’ opinion may also benefit from knowing 
the reliability of public oversight body’s assessment of audit firm quality by choosing 
higher quality auditors and thereby pressuring lower quality auditors to improve 
themselves. In light of worldwide discussions on the effectiveness and mutual recognition 
of audit oversight systems, insights from this study may benefit public oversight bodies 
across the world in further shaping their oversight systems. The additional findings in 
this study regarding the types of deficiencies in audit firms that are most able to distinguish 
audit quality provide useful information for audit firms to improve those areas and 
strengthen their overall quality control. 
 However, the conclusion of this study further states that neither the peer review 
system nor the public oversight body appear to bring about improvement in audit 
quality, at least in the short term. A possible explanation could be that audit firm-specific 
inspection reports were not publicly disclosed in the Netherlands until 2014. The lack of 
quality improvement should be of primary concern to all stakeholders involved. Auditors 
and audit firms could question themselves why they were unable to show improvement. 
Companies hiring auditors, and their audit committees in particular, could incorporate 
more explicitly the outcomes of public oversight inspections into their hiring decisions, 
and thereby pressuring lower quality auditors to improve their quality. Similarly, 
investors could take note of the outcomes of public oversight inspections and start a 
dialogue, e.g., during shareholders’ meetings, with company management about the 
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quality of the audit, creating yet another incentive for auditors to increase the quality of 
their work. Public oversight bodies and regulators could evaluate the effectiveness of 
their oversight and other regulatory activities and innovate their approaches in order to 
alter the system of incentives for auditors in such a way that higher quality audits 
becomes more rewarding. 
 The second study, presented in Chapter 3, examines the relationship between 
independence regulation and audit quality. Regulators around the world consider 
independence regulation as an important instrument to safeguard audit quality. By 
tightening independence requirements they attempt to improve audit quality and 
regain public trust in the auditors’ reports. Independence requirements deal with specific 
circumstances and relationships that create or may create threats to independence (e.g. 
provision of non-assurance services to an audit client, long association of senior personnel 
with an audit client, employment with an audit client, fees, business relationships, 
financial interests, family and personal relationships, gifts and hospitality, and actual or 
threatened litigation). Prior research examined the relationship between a number of 
these circumstances and relationships on the one hand and audit quality on the other 
hand. The purpose of this study is to examine one of the previously unaddressed 
relationships, i.e., business relationships between audit firms and their audit clients. 
Business relationships arise from commercial relationships or common financial 
interests between the audit firm and the audit client. This study focuses on business 
relationships in which the audit firms purchases goods and services from an audit client. 
It examines the association between the existence of an audit firm-client business 
relationship and audit quality, inferred from both audit fees and earnings quality. 
 The results of the second study show that business relationships are consistently 
associated with higher audit fees and, particularly in those situations where the business 
relationship coincides with high non-audit fees relative to audit fees, with higher 
earnings quality. These findings may be of interest to the investors, who are ultimately 
paying for a more expensive audit. Although the findings suggest that audit firms and 
auditor are complying with independence regulations requiring them to increase 
engagement effort to safeguard audit quality, it is not entirely certain that the auditor’s 
independence is not at all impaired by the business relationship. Further assessment of 
business relationships, either by audit firms themselves or by public oversight bodies in 
course of their inspections, could elaborate on this study. Questions that remain to be 
answered are for instance: Why are audit firms procuring goods and services from audit 
clients when they can also procure them from other companies? Are audit firms indeed 
spending more audit hours or other resources on audit engagements that coincide with 
business relationships or are audit fees primarily indicative of risk premiums? Why are 
audit clients willing to pay higher audit fees when they are also selling goods or services 
to the audit firm? 
 The third study, presented in Chapter 4, examines the relationship between audit 
quality indicators and audit quality. Transparency of audit firms through audit quality 
indicators is believed to increase market participants’ ability to observe audit quality, 
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Achtergrond en Probleemstelling
Dit proefschrift onderzoekt hoe de kwaliteit van accountantscontroles van financiële 
verantwoordingen verband houden met de gereguleerde context waarin die controles 
worden uitgevoerd. Accountantscontrole is het proces waarin zekerheid wordt verstrekt 
over de betrouwbaarheid van de informatie in de financiële verantwoording die is 
opgesteld in overeenstemming met algemeen aanvaarde verslaggevingsstandaarden 
(Knechel 2001). Accountantscontrole is ook een professionele dienst verleend door 
deskundigen als antwoord op de economische en gereguleerde vraag ernaar (Knechel et 
al. 2013). Veel belanghebbenden baseren economische beslissingen op informatie in de 
financiële verantwoordingen van ondernemingen. Accountants zijn de onafhankelijke 
professionals die worden ingehuurd om een deskundig en objectief oordeel te vellen over 
de betrouwbaarheid van die informatie. Zij verhogen daarmee de kwaliteit van die 
informatie en verkleinen de informatieachterstand van de gebruikers van financiële 
verantwoordingen. Accountants handelen dus in de eerste plaats in het publieke belang.
 Tegelijkertijd functioneren accountants in een systeem met prikkels die de 
kwaliteit van de accountantscontroles die zij uitvoeren negatief kunnen beïnvloeden 
(AFM 2014). Ten eerste worden accountants betaald door de ondernemingen waarvan zij 
de financiële verantwoording controleren, maar waarvan zij onafhankelijk moeten zijn. 
Ten tweede zijn noch de gebruikers van financiële verantwoordingen, noch de 
gecontroleerde ondernemingen in staat te beoordelen of de accountant gedurende de 
controle de juiste beslissingen heeft genomen en dus voldoende kwaliteit heeft geleverd. 
Ten derde moeten accountants hun eigen zakelijke doelstellingen, zoals groei, efficiëntie 
en winstmaximalisatie, in evenwicht houden met de gereguleerde kwaliteitsdoelstellingen 
voor de accountantscontrole. Vanwege deze prikkels die de kwaliteit van accoun tants-
controles negatief kunnen beïnvloeden, zijn beroepsstandaarden en -regels nodig om 
een constant en adequaat kwaliteitsniveau van accountantscontroles te waarborgen. Het 
accountantsvak is een sterk gereguleerd beroep geworden. Internationale wetgevers 
(bijvoorbeeld de Europese Unie) en regelgevers (bijvoorbeeld de International Auditing 
and Assurance Standards Board (IAASB) en de International Ethics Standards Board for 
Accountants (IESBA)) hebben net als nationale wet- en regelgevers (bijvoorbeeld 
beroepsorganisaties) een breed scala aan eisen opgesteld voor het accountantsberoep. 
Die eisen zijn enerzijds gericht op individuele accountants (bijvoorbeeld de theoretische 
en praktijkopleiding, permanente educatie, ethische beroepsregels, inclusief 
onafhankelijkheidsregels, en controlestandaarden). Anderzijds zijn de eisen gericht op 
accountantsorganisaties (bijvoorbeeld het opzetten en onderhouden van kwali teits-
beheersingssystemen en collegiale toetsingen). 
 Een aantal gevallen van gebrekkige controlekwaliteit en boekhoudschandalen in 
de vroege jaren 2000 (bijvoorbeeld Enron, WorldCom, Xerox, Ahold en Parmalat) 
hebben in sterke mate het publieke vertrouwen in accountants en hun controleverklaringen 
ondermijnd. Wereldwijd hebben wet- en regelgevers daarop gereageerd door in de loop 
van de laatste vijftien jaar hun regelgevende aandacht voor accountantsorganisaties te 
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verhogen. Drie van die regelgevende onderwerpen staan centraal in dit proefschrift: de 
introductie van onafhankelijk publiek toezicht, de versterking van de onafhankelijkheid 
van de accountant en de ontwikkeling van kwaliteitsindicatoren voor de accountants-
controle om de transparantie van accountantsorganisaties te vergroten. 
 Een van de meest fundamentele veranderingen in de geschiedenis van het 
accountantsberoep is dat in veel landen in het eerste decennium van de 21e eeuw on af-
hankelijke publieke toezichthoudende instanties zijn aangewezen ter vervanging van 
het door het accountantsberoep zelf gereguleerde systeem van collegiale toetsingen. 
Deze ontwikkeling in regulering werd ingegeven door spraakmakende faillissementen, 
waardoor regelgevers gingen geloven dat het systeem van collegiale toetsingen niet 
langer voldeed en naar behoren functioneerde. In plaats daarvan werd onafhankelijk 
publiek toezicht voorgesteld als een alternatieve manier om het toezicht op 
accountantscontroles te organiseren, met als doel het vertrouwen te herstellen in het 
accountantsberoep en de kwaliteit van haar werkzaamheden en de publieke functie 
ervan te waarborgen.
 Tegelijkertijd hebben wet- en regelgevers over de hele wereld onafhankelijkheids-
eisen aangescherpt, of overwegen dat te gaan doen, in een poging de kwaliteit van de 
accountantscontrole te verbeteren en het publieke vertrouwen in de controleverklaringen 
van accountants te herwinnen. Veel landen hebben een verbod geïntroduceerd op het 
verlenen van (de meeste) andere diensten aan controlecliënten die worden beschouwd 
als organisaties van openbaar belang (OOB’s; dat wil zeggen, beursgenoteerde 
ondernemingen, banken en verzekeraars). Verder is, in aanvulling op de reeds bestaande 
roulatieverplichting voor individuele partners, kantoorroulatie overwogen of zelfs al 
ingevoerd. Deze initiatieven zijn tekenend voor een breed gedeeld beeld dat de 
onafhankelijkheid van accountants en accountantsorganisaties verder moet worden 
versterkt, niet alleen in wezen, maar ook in schijn, om de kwaliteit van de accountants-
controle te waarborgen. 
 De governance van accountantsorganisaties (dat wil zeggen, organisatiestructuur, 
kwaliteitsbeheersingsbeleid, personeelsbeleid, onafhankelijkheid en ethiek) is een 
steeds belangrijker onderwerp geworden op de agenda van regelgevende instanties. De 
governance van een accountantsorganisatie heeft naar verwachting een significante 
invloed op de kwaliteit van de accountantscontrole die wordt uitgevoerd door 
(accountants van) die accountantsorganisatie. Het vergroten van de transparantie van 
de governance en het professionele handelen, in het bijzonder door het publiceren van 
kwaliteitsindicatoren, staat hoog op de agenda van regelgevende instanties. Van 
transparantie van accountantsorganisaties door middel van kwaliteitsindicatoren wordt 
aangenomen dat die het vermogen van marktdeelnemers vergroot de kwaliteit van de 
accountantscontrole waar te nemen, wat differentiatie en concurrentie tussen 
accountantsorganisaties op basis van publiek beschikbare gegevens mogelijk maakt, en 
accountantsorganisaties stimuleert de kwaliteit van de accountantscontrole te verhogen 
(o.a. Bedard et al 2010; PCAOB 2015).
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Drie Empirische Studies
Het doel van dit proefschrift is empirisch te onderzoeken hoe deze regelgevende 
onderwerpen (publiek toezicht, onafhankelijkheid en kwaliteitsindicatoren) verband 
houden met de kwaliteit van de accountantscontrole. Door gebruik te maken van de 
unieke toegang tot gegevens over accountantsorganisaties bij de Nederlandse 
toezichthoudende instantie, draagt dit proefschrift bij aan de bestaande literatuur over 
deze onderwerpen door voor verschillende aspecten van de kwaliteit van de 
accountantscontrole vanuit nieuwe perspectieven te bekijken.
In de eerste studie, gepresenteerd in hoofdstuk 2, wordt de effectiviteit van publiek 
toezicht onderzocht door te testen of (a) de publieke toezichthoudende instantie de 
kwaliteit van accountantscontroles kan onderscheiden in haar eerste inspectieronde en 
(b) de kwaliteit van de accountantscontrole verbetert na die eerste inspectieronde. In het 
bijzonder wordt getest of er een verband bestaat tussen de uitkomst van de eerste 
inspectieronde voor een accountantsorganisatie (dat wil zeggen, ‘materiële bevindingen’ 
of ‘geen materiële bevindingen’) en de kwaliteit van de winst, en met daarop volgende 
veranderingen in de kwaliteit van de winst, van ondernemingen die zijn gecontroleerd 
door die accountantsorganisatie.
 Op basis van een steekproef van eerste inspectierapporten van 51 accountants-
organisaties, die meer dan 85 procent van de markt voor wettelijke controles in Nederland 
afdekt, en 6609 controlecliënt-jaar observaties omvat voor de jaren 2005-2008, blijkt dat 
ondernemingen die zijn gecontroleerd door accountantsorganisaties met materiële 
bevindingen in hun eerste inspectie door de publieke toezichthoudende instantie lagere 
winstkwaliteit hebben dan ondernemingen die zijn gecontroleerd door ac coun-
tantsorganisaties zonder materiële bevindingen. Deze bevinding geldt voor 
accountantsorganisaties met en zonder OOB-cliënten, met uitzondering van de groep 
kleinste niet-OOB-accountantsorganisaties. Echter, de resultaten leveren geen bewijs 
voor een verbetering van de kwaliteit van de accountantscontrole na de eerste 
inspectieronde, wat misschien wel het belangrijkste aspect is van effectief publiek 
toezicht. Deze bevinding wijkt af van eerder Amerikaans bewijs dat duidt op een 
verbetering van controlekwaliteit na PCAOB-inspecties. Een mogelijke verklaring voor 
dit verschil in bevindingen is dat accountantsorganisatie-specifieke inspectierapporten 
in Nederland tot 2014 niet openbaar werden gemaakt.
 Uit aanvullende analyses blijkt dat de aard van de tekortkomingen die de publieke 
toezichthoudende instantie heeft geïdentificeerd en die het best in staat zijn con trole-
kwaliteit te onderscheiden, betrekking hebben op de uitvoering en de documentatie van 
controleopdrachten, onafhankelijkheid en kwaliteitsbeoordelingen. Verder wordt geen 
bewijs gevonden voor een verband tussen de uitkomsten van de voorafgaande collegiale 
toetsingen van accountantsorganisaties en de winstkwaliteit van controlecliënten. Dit 
suggereert dat het voorgaande Nederlandse systeem van collegiale toetsingen mogelijk 
‘amicaal’ was. Dit is niet geheel onverwacht, aangezien accountantsorganisaties hun 
eigen collegiale toetser mochten selecteren. Bovendien is deze uitkomst in overeen-
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stemming met eerdere bevindingen. Er is ook geen bewijs dat controlekwaliteit is 
verbeterd na de collegiale toetsingen. Alles bij elkaar wordt geconcludeerd dat de 
publieke toezichthoudende instantie in staat is om controlekwaliteit te onderscheiden, 
in tegenstelling tot het voorafgaande systeem van collegiale toetsingen, maar dat beide 
systemen geen verbetering van de controlekwaliteit hebben gebracht.
 In de tweede studie, gepresenteerd in hoofdstuk 3, wordt de effectiviteit van 
onafhankelijkheidsregelgeving onderzocht door na te gaan hoe accountantsorganisaties 
hun inspanningen en/of risicopremies aanpassen wanneer zij een zakelijke relatie 
onderhouden met een controlecliënt. In het bijzonder wordt het verband onderzocht 
tussen het bestaan van een dergelijke zakelijke relatie en de kwaliteit van de 
accountantscontrole, afgeleid uit zowel de prijs van de controle als de kwaliteit van de 
door de cliënt gerapporteerde winst.
 Op basis van een steekproef van Nederlandse ondernemingen met een zakelijke 
relatie met hun accountantsorganisatie gekoppeld aan vergelijkbare Nederlandse 
ondernemingen zonder een dergelijke zakelijke relatie, blijken zakelijke relaties 
consequent geassocieerd met een hogere prijs van de controle en, met name in die situ-
aties waarin de zakelijke relatie samenvalt met een hoge prijs van niet-controlediensten 
in vergelijking met de prijs van de controle, met hogere winstkwaliteit. Deze resultaten 
suggereren dat accountantsorganisaties de zakelijke relatie beschouwen als een bedrei-
ging voor de onafhankelijkheid van de accountant en proberen deze bedreiging met 
waarborgen te mitigeren, zoals vereist door de onafhankelijk heids regelgeving, 
bijvoorbeeld met aanvullende controle- of reviewwerkzaamheden of andere kwaliteits-
beheersingsmaatregelen. Echter, alternatieve verklaringen voor de hogere prijs van de 
controle, bijvoorbeeld dat de accountantsorganisatie een risicopremie in rekening 
brengt bij de controlecliënt, zijn niet volledig uitgesloten. Belangrijk is dat geen bewijs 
wordt gevonden voor verminderde onafhankelijkheid, wat naar verwachting zou 
hebben geleid tot een lagere prijs van de controle en een lagere kwaliteit van de 
gerapporteerde winst. Deze resultaten lijken robuust in meerdere gevoeligheidsanalyses 
op transversale deelverzamelingen (bijvoorbeeld op basis van de grootte van de 
accountantsorganisatie (Big 4 of niet-Big 4), type controlecliënt (OOB of niet-OOB), de 
vraag naar kwaliteit van de accountantscontrole en cliëntrisico), alsmede voor een 
alternatieve maatstaf voor zakelijke relaties (dat wil zeggen, de monetaire waarde van 
deze zakelijke relaties) en alternatieve koppelingsmethoden.
 In het derde onderzoek, gepresenteerd in hoofdstuk 4, wordt onderzocht of 
governancekenmerken van accountantsorganisaties bruikbaar zijn als kwaliteits-
indicatoren voor de accountantscontrole. Dit wordt gedaan door te testen of 
accountantsorganisaties met sterkere governancemechanismen minder kans hebben 
om te worden geconfronteerd met ontevredenheid van belanghebbenden, de aandacht 
te trekken van de toezichthouder, of de controlemarkt te verlaten. De governance van 
accountantsorganisaties is geoperationaliseerd door variabelen met betrekking tot de 
organisatiestructuur en het kwaliteitsbeheersingssysteem.




